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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to understand and explain both the deregulation and
subsequent reregulation policies for cable television as part of a national telecommunications
regulatory system. The regulatory policies evolved incrementally with both national and
local components. A case study methodology is used to analyze the participation of group
interests in the political process, with primary attention on the role of organized interests.
The focus of the analysis of group interest participation is undertaken in the framework of
their influence on Congressional policy decision making.
Three central purposes guide the analysis. The first is to explain why cable television
was freed from regulation in 1984, then returned to extensive regulation in 1992. The second
is to fit insights and observations drawn from the particular cases studied with the literature
on interest groups. One particular variable examined, which is not well treated in the
literature, is that of the affect of technological change on policy decisions. The third purpose
is to consider whether there are lessons to be drawn from the examination of cable
deregulation and reregulation that can add to the general understanding of regulatory policy
development and the role of groups in that process.
The conclusion of the study is that technological advances occur in the field of
telecommunications in a very rapid fashion. However, the deliberative traditions of
Congress as it contemplates policy decisions serve to both mitigate against policy decisions
that favor short-lived technological developments and to provide broad ranging access for
V

various groups in the best traditions of pluralism. Establishing regulatory policy for
telecommunications was found to be more of an iterative process than a terminal objective.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Cable television emerged as a telecommunications service in the 1940s. Over time,
a regulatory regime developed incrementally with national and local components. From the
1950s through the 1980s and 1990s, technological and associated economic developments
affecting an increasingly large proportion of the population related to cable drew the
attention of national policy makers. In the 1970s and early 1980s, efforts to forge a coherent
national policy for cable accelerated. The results were cable television's deregulation in
1984 and its subsequent reregulation less than a decade later, in 1992.
The purpose of this study is to understand and explain both deregulation and a policy
turnabout just a few years later. The basic analytical perspective is of the representation of
groups in the political process. In the study, the representation of groups is distinguished
between both organized and unorganized interests. For purposes of this study, organized
interests will be defined as: Formally organized ass9ciations of individuals or organizations
having shared attitudes which then attempt to influence decisions and actions of government
in a particular policy area of their interest.

Unorganized interests are defined as:

Individuals or agents which attempt to influence decisions and actions of governments in a
particular policy area of their interest without acting through associations, formally
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organized for that purpose.

Examples include persons, individual . compames or .

corporations, and community or industry leaders in issue networks, as well as policy .
entrepreneurs. Primary attention will be given to the role of organized interests, but the
shadow of unorganized interests also will be acknowledged.
In this case, the presidency is involved to an extent and its role examined, but the
major center of policy decision was the Congress. Thus, the prime focus is on the
representation of interests in the legislative process in connection with the 1984 and 1992
acts.

Central Purposes

Three central purposes guide the analysis to follow. The first is to explain why cable
television was freed from regulation to a substantial degree in 1984, then placed under more
extensive regulation in 1992. Special attention in this is given to the role of interest groups
in policy dynamics.
The second purpose, for which case studies are well suited, is to fit the insights and
observations drawn from a particular case analysis with the literature reviewed here as
something of a rough test. Several general observations about that literature are pertinent
for defining the task within workable bounds. The first observation is that it is rich yet
varied in its particulars and in the perspectives set forth. A second is that in the treatment
of group interests and their influence, often a clear distinction is not made between emergent
and mature policy regimes. A partial exception is to be found in the deregulation studies,
although they concern mature regimes under attack. In the case of cable television, however,
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there was no mature system in place. As will be seen in the following chapters, there existed
a nascent and fragmented regulatory regime featuring, primarily, hundreds if not thousands
of cities across the country. A third observation is that a critical variable at the heart of
dispute over cable television policy is not well treated. That variable is technological change
and its effects. In communications, there have been rapid and profound technological
developments for two decades or more. New technologies such as cable, wireless, and
satellite for example, compete among themselves and with older technologies, primarily wire
and traditional broadcasting. In general, the question is, how does the cable case fit with the
literature?
A final and related purpose is to consider whether there are lessons to be drawn from
the examination of cable deregulation and reregulation that can add to general understanding
of regulatory policy development and the role and influence of groups in that process.
To provide a foundation for addressing these matters, the following section reviews
the relevant literature.

Relevant Literature

In order to set the stage for the analysis of the influence that group interests have on
the shaping of regulatory policy, the literature regarding interests groups is reviewed in three
contexts. At the most general level, the place of groups in American politics is discussed.
Then, some perspectives on group activities as they relate to the policymaking process are
presented, and lastly, and more specifically, interest group roles and influence on change in
regulatory policies are reviewed. The assumption that guides this review of relevant
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literature is that the importance of interests in the analysis of policymaking grows out of the
pluralist perspective on American government and politics.

General Perspectives on the Role ofInterest Groups in American Politics

Increases in citizen advocacy during the late 1960s and 1970s were perceived by
some as an indication of a revival of participatory democracy. 1 As new groups formed to
push for changes in areas such as civil rights, environmental regulation, and consumer
protection, the voices of such constituencies spoke more loudly in the policymaking process.
Government, in turn, responded with many new laws and regulatory programs. America
seemed to be regaining the ideal of participatory democracy, a welcome development to
many given the conflict and alienation of the times. Yet, for others, the increase in citizen
advocacy was a cause for concern. One of the more prominent critics of this development
is political scientist Samuel Huntington, who has warned against an "excess of democracy. "2
In Huntington's eyes, the wave of new citizen lobbies produced by the "democratic surge"
of the 1960s "overloaded" the political system. The expansion of governmental activity
could not possibly satisfy all competing demands, and, ultimately, the authority of
government was undermined. Increased participation, for him, made the nation less
governable.
Beginning with James Madison's writings in Federalist 10, the idea of people joined
or associated to further their common interests was perceived as a potential threat to popular
government in America. Madison also realized, however, that the suppression of groups
1

Harry C. Boyte, The Backyard Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1980).
2

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper,"Public Interest 41 (Fall,
1975): 9-38.
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would effectively extinguish the flame ofliberty. He therefore believed that with appropriate
institutional arrangements, a proliferation offactions contending for power would check and
balance diverse ambitions. This idea of the essential nature of factions or groups in the
American political system has been important in the study of government and politics over
the years. From Arthur Bentley to David Truman to Robert Dahl, political scientists have
contended that the basic units for studying the American political system are interest groups.
Interest groups are known variously as "pressure groups," "special interest groups," "public
interest groups," "lobbies," and "citizens groups. "3 The traditional view of organized interest
groups is that they lobby or attempt to influence government by pressing for action in accord
with their policy interests. Depending on the type of group analyzed, this is viewed along
a continuum from corruption of the process, to domination by upper-class interests, to
merely educating decision makers on all aspects of a policy decision. In general, however,
the conventional belief is that the broader public interest suffers whenever the narrow
interests of particularistic groups prevail in government decision making.
The field of political science first saw the emergence of interest group studies at the
turn of the century. Their development was shaped by the obvious importance of organized
interests in politics and social and political theory that argued the basic societal significance
of groups. Arthur Bentley's work in 1908 was a starting point. It represented a shift away
from the nineteenth century study of jurisprudence and its focus on constitutional
distributions of power among institutions. Bentley was an early advocate of a descriptive
political science based on a group conception of political life. His work went beyond formal
descriptions of politics. 4 He suggested a "social mechanistic" view of government that was
3

Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Group Politics in America (New York: Harper
& Row, 1970).
4

741.

See Beard's review ofBentley for Political Science Quarterly, 1908, 739-
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more realistic in empirical terms than formal normative views of how the institutions of
government operated. In Bentley's view, the working class or elite groups were simply types
of groups not more important than families, farm organizations, racial groups, political
parties, interest associations and other groups in terms of their relationships with
government. His image of government was the appeasement of many small groups, each
with its own demands. Elitist theories held that business and organized economic interests
were pre-eminent and to be considered in totally different categories than others not included
among the economically powerful.

Additionally, Bentley rejected the definitional

differences between "interests" and "opinion" that prevailed in his time. Popular use of the
terms contrasted "interests" as elite groups and "opinion" as popular will such as "public
opinion." In his eyes, each was part of all the many and varied "interest groups" which the
governmental process must accommodate. s Bentley believed there were no effective
individual interests; that every group has its interest; that they always result in group action;
and that there is no one group interest that includes everyone in society. 6
G. David Garson writes that pluralism, in the early 20th century, became the rebuttal
to the traditional political theory of the absolute sovereignty of the state. 7 The beginnings
of this in practice were the nineteenth century struggles over matters such as independence
of religious groups from state intervention. 8 This conception of the partial sovereignty of
the state created a "framework for interpretation of the increasingly important economic
pressure groups that appeared at this time." It also provided a rationale for protecting the
s Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, Peter Odgard ed.
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 244.
6

See Salisbury's Interest Group Politics in America.

G. David Garson, Group Theories ofPolitics (Beverly Hills, Calf: Sage
Publications, 1978).
7

8

Ibid, 19.

7
growth of trade unionism from the intervention of a generally conservative and
unsympathetic state. He states that, At the core of the pluralistic critique was the argument
11

that the state was not sovereign as jurisprudential theory held, but rather that the state was
one of many associations in society". 9
In the spirit of the pluralistic critique, the desirability of focusing empirically on
groups grew among American political scientists. For example, Albert Hart noted that
"more and more people tend to accept the theory t�at all government in America -- national,
state, municipal or local -- springs from one source, the American people as a whole, who
choose to exercise power through a variety of organizations.

11 1 0

John Dickinson used

historical and anthropological evidence to argue that " conflict between interests is
inevitable" 11 and that order is not suppression of conflict; order is the readjustment of human
relations in the course of conflict, which is a never ending process. In this view,
"Government, like the human will, is motivated by the very forces which it governs; its
function is only to arrange them in a more orderly pattern.

11 1

2

Other important studies of a descriptive nature focusing on groups were Peter
Odegard'sPressure Politics, E. Pendleton Herring's Group Representation Before Congress,
and S. A. Rice's Farmers and Workers in American Politics. Rice's was the most
theoretically complex. Odegard's work was a descriptive study with little emphasis on
9

Ibid, 18.

Albert Hart, "Growth of American Theories of Popular Government,"
American Political Science Review 1907 1: 558.
10

John Dickinson, "Social Order and Political Authority,"American Political
Science Review, 1929 (May), 23 2: 293-328, 299.
11

12

John Dickinson, "Social Order and Political Authority,"American Political
Science Review, 1929 August, 23 3 : 593-632, 619.
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theoretical problems as was Herring's book. "Thus with the rise of descriptive political
science in the 1920's the study of politics came to be viewed as the study of influence and
power, not the study of government and the state. The crucial distinction between the two
lay in the abandonment of normative theory by the empirical students of group power. "13
For example, in his 1935 study of pressure groups and the tariff, E. E. Schattschneider
concluded that groups achieved access to influence government through campaign
contributions and inside connections when they were able to maintain lobbyists in
Washington. He viewed this as a result of an upper-class bias that served to distort the
public interest. 14
Following Bentley, group theory for some held out the promise of serving as a
general theoretical framework. From the 1950s to the 1960s, the group approach to the
study of politics was believed by some to be the most influential general framework for
analysis. 1 5

With the publication of Robert A. Dahl's Who Governs?, the pluralistic

perspective and group theory became widely accepted bases for analysis in political
science. 16 By the end of the decade, group theory changed from aspiring to be a research
theory to now serving as an area of analysis, or research area. 17
There is still today a general appreciation of the importance and influence of
organized interests, despite disagreements at the normative level as to whether this influence
13

Garson, Group Theories, 3 7.

14

E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1935).
15

Garson, Group Theories, 120.

16

Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City,
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961) 1961.
17

Garson, Group Theories, 119.
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is good or bad. A general feeling of acceptance in empirical terms that influence by group
interests matters in governance serves to justify a focus on organized interests in the study
of policymaking.
Classic Pluralism and Its Critics
Assumptions about the importance of interest groups in the analysis of policymaking
spring mainly from the pluralist perspective on American government and politics. Pluralism
as a political theory is built on a recognition that groups are key actors in politics, that there
are many sources of power and influence over government and that in a democracy, all
members of a society can share in the exercise of power and influence through membership
in groups and their interaction with political institutions within and outside of government.
It is, in part, a theory of factions. It deals with the distribution of power in the political
system. There is an assumption of equality in terms of opportunities to participate in the
democratic process. In general, proponents of classic pluralism assume that all Americans
belong to -- or can belong to -- groups, and that individual interests are thereby truly
represented in political processes. Pluralism is viewed as an accurate empirical description
of the basic nature of American political systems and is viewed normatively as the source
of the system's strength. These views are best exemplified by the works ofDavid B. Truman
and Robert A. Dahl.
Although one can trace the roots of pluralist thinking about American politics back
to James Madison and his efforts to promote the new constitution, the more explicit
evolution of pluralist theory, as previously noted, probably begins around 1908 with Arthur
Bentley in his book The Process of Government. 18 This work was extended by David B .
Truman in 1951. Truman's normative thesis was that groups comprise in the deepest sense
18

Bentley, The Process of Government.
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the "raw materials of politics and government. 11 It was his belief that groups embody the
basic instincts of men in pursuit of or in defense of their interests. For Truman, writing in
The Governmental Process, politics can be understood entirely by looking at the interaction
of groups. 19 To him, political man is a result of the influences that groups have on him.
Truman argues that the existence and operation of groups of interests, identified with
particular issues, is the appropriate unit of analysis for studying the governmental process.
He believes that a characteristic feature of the governmental system in the United States is
that it contains a multiplicity of access points. The federal system establishes decentralized
and more or less independent centers of power and vantage points from which to secure
access to the national government. 2° For Truman, the success of groups in gaining access
to governmental institutions comes as a result of interactions among complex factors which
he places into three categories: (1) factors related to the strategic position of the group in
society; (2) factors related to internal characteristics of the group; and (3) factors that are
particular to the governmental institution that is the target of access by the group. 21 It was
in this manner that Truman aimed to conceptualize a structure of pluralist interactions that
could be observed empirically.
Truman's defense of interest groups against critics who claim they are elitist and
exclude the poor, ethnic minorities, and less powerful is found in the assertion that "the work
of one political interest group, whether a business association or a group representing some
other interest in the society -- labor unions, for instance -- results in wave-like development

19

David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and
Public Opinion, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1951).
20

Ibid, 507.

21

Ibid' 506.
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of interest group activity; other groups are created to present different claims and to push
opposing policies, and, in tum, still other groups grow up in response to those, and so on. " 22
Robert Dahl's studies of pluralism evolved from the normative theory of the roles of
interest groups in democracy to an empirical study of city politics to describe the roles
actually played by particularistic interests, and finally to a synthesis of his writings as they
relate to democratic politics. His book A Preface to Democratic Theory published in 1956
was theoretical and influenced a good deal of thought on how the American political system
operates. 23 In 1961, he published Who Governs? as an empirical study to follow up on Floyd
Hunter's study of elite power in urban government settings. Finally, he synthesized these
perspectives in his book Pluralist Democracy.
In A Preface to Democratic Theory, Dahl argues that the definition of "normal"
American political process is one in which "there is a high probability that an active and
legitimate group" can be effectively taken into account at the important points in the decision
making process. 24 American democracy, in Dahl's view, is not about majority politics. For
him, "The numerical maj ority is incapable of undertaking any co-ordinated action; it is the
various components of the numerical majority that have the means of action. " 25
Dahl's study of politics in New Haven, Connecticut, discovered that policymaking
was a process which involved coalitions of groups and politicians whose levels of activity
22

Ibid, 79.

23

Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1956).
24

Ibid, 145.

25

Ibid' 146.
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varied by issues and their level of concern with the issues. 26 Fundamentally, he concluded
that through bargaining and compromise among groups and politicians, public policy
decisions were made without any single group always being dominant. To synthesize these
studies, Dahl wrote that pluralism as a political system builds upon the legitimacy of group
interests as they are used to avoid conflict and saw its value in avoiding single centers of
sovereign power. For Dahl, "The existence of multiple centers of power, none of which is
wholly sovereign, will help ...to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle
conflicts peacefully. "27 The strongest point made by Dahl in this context is that because of
the necessity for continuous negotiations and bargaining among various centers of power in
order to make decisions, group members learn and perfect the art of peacefully managing
conflict. This does not merely benefit the groups directly involved, but ultimately benefits
all in the society in the moderation of or avoidance of conflict. Pluralistic politics typically
result in decisions that involve limited, acceptable degrees of change in small increments,
or incrementalism.
Much of the criticism of pluralism is founded on an expectation of equity in political
outcomes. Critics say that the world depicted by classic pluralism does not exist and special
interest groups frustrate the development of American democracy. Elitist critiques attack the
notion of equality of classes in the political process. They contend that rather than provide
full representation in making public policy, some groups are advantaged over others. 28 The
26

Dahl, Who Governs? 1961.

27

Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and
Consent, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), 24.
See Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, N.C. : The
University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1953); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Mancur Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Peter Bachrach
and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science
Review, v. 56, December, 1962; Grant McConnell, Private Power & American
28
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wealthy and well organized are favored over those trying to find their voice. In the words
of E. E. Schattschneider; "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper-class accent. "29 Critics also contend that pluralist theory masks " cozy "
relationships in collections of interests both inside and outside government that exclude
other legitimate interests. 30
A fundamental criticism of pluralism comes from sociologists and some political
scientists who claim that the theory does not account for groups (or latent groups) that lack
resources to organize for political or economic reasons. This perspective is presented mainly
by writers and students of the elitist or stratification viewpoint. Floyd Hunter concluded from
his study of Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia) that a power leadership existed which made
policy decisions without the knowledge of the majority of citizens and to the advantage of
the few in leadership positions. 31 He believed that a small number of individuals formulated
and extended policy; that all policy makers have power but all who have power are not
policy makers. 32 It was this study that so intrigued Robert Dahl that he undertook to test
Hunter's hypothesis in New Haven, Connecticut.

Democracy, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).
29

E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 35.
30

See Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People; Theodore J. Lowi, The End
ofLiberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2ed. (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1979); McConnell, Private Power & American Democracy, ;
Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Sociery, (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1984)
31

Hunter, Communiry Power, 1

32

Ibid, 7.
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C. Wright Mills is one of the most notable critics of pluralism from the elitist
perspective. 33 Mills uses the phrase "power elite, 11 to distinguish those who wield power
within the ruling institutions of society and act with common interest to preserve and
enhance their power and the power of those institutions. For Mills, this elite includes the
holders of the top positions in the military, the executive branch of the nation's government,
the leaders of corporate industry, and members of fabulously rich families. An often cited
manifestation of this power elite is referred to as the "military-industrial complex."34
For Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, elitists look to the source of political
power while pluralists look at the exercise of that power or the processes involved. 35
Theodore J. Lowi argued that the ideology that interest group politics is good had
transformed into interest group liberalism, in which government had lost its basic legitimacy
and authority, thus inviting domination by select constellations of power in their own,
private self interest. 36 This resulted in what Lowi saw as a systematic abdication by
government to private groups of its power over the direction of public policies. These de
facto delegations of government authority in tum lead to policy without law and legislation
without accountability.
Grant McConnell described the emergence of the circumstances detailed by Lowi as
beginning with the industrial mobilization in America in response to the First World War.
He observed that some governmental agencies actually assumed the task of organizing
33

Mills, The Power Elite.

34

The term "military-industrial complex" was used by Dwight D. Eisenhower
in his farewell speech when he left the presidency and Washington, D. C. in 1961.
35

Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power."

36

Lowi, The End ofLiberalism.
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economic groups in order to fonnulate a consensus in policy arenas to relieve the
"government of much of its burden. " 37 The danger of this was the possibility of eliminating
public values from effective political consideration in making policy. 38

The process

approximates in some situations to the "capture of government. " 39 The major critique of
pluralism functioning in small group constituencies is that not all groups are organized and
not all interests are represented. This condition, McConnell believes, has serious
consequences for democracy.
In 1965, Mancur Olson presented an evaluation of organized interest groups which
served to undermine the arguments of group theorists in what some viewed as the most
devastating critique of pluralism. Olson contended that interest groups could not operate as
Truman and Dahl had theorized under pluralist thinking because of the difficulty in
organizing and maintaining group memberships for benefits that were collective. This
thinking tended to support the proposition that interest groups have bias toward monied
interests and therefore tend to ignore the broader public interest.
In Jeffrey Berry's discussion of classic pluralism he described two principle lines of
criticism. One was methodological in that important democratic issues are left out of the
empirical analyses of interest groups because pluralist studies focus on too narrow a set of
issues, for instance only those issues that reach the public agenda. 40 The other was a
criticism on a normative basis which assumes that all citizens generally have equal resources
for participating in interest group politics. While such criticisms attack pluralist thought on
37
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various grounds, they do not deny the importance of organized interests in the ebb and flow
of politics and policymaking.
Next we will look at several views on how organized interests participate in
policymaking.
Perspectives on Organized Interests and Policymaking

As Schattschneider observed in his study of tariffs, interest groups can interact with
government in various manners depending on the intensity of their interests.41 In a
somewhat passive mode, interest groups monitor government activity to determine what
might affect their interests. Then, in a more active mode, an offensive mode, groups initiate
or attempt to influence government action to favor their positions on a given issue, or, in a
defensive mode, attempt to block action that would be a detriment to their interests. These
activities in any particular policy area tend to establish long running and close relationships
among the interest group representatives, the congressional sector (both members and staff) ,
and the administrative or regulatory agencies involved. This leads to a discussion of views
on the structure of the involvement of organized interests in policymaking.
In the context of regulation, the major manifestation of the critique of classic
pluralism is what is known familiarly as capture theory. It claims to describe how regulatory
behavior actually works. For many years social scientists' understanding of the regulatory
process was based on a belief that agencies are captured by the interest groups that they
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regulate. This belief was developed by Huntington 42 and refined by others. 43 The main
argument is that agencies are created in response to the actions and wishes of those
regulated. Once established, the agencies continue to operate in the interest of those
organizations. In justification of the capture-at-origin view, proponents argue that such
regulations are needed to protect selected industries from competition, to reduce risks and
inefficiencies. Criticism of the capture theory centers on the claim that the theory is one
sided. That is, the theory ignores other constituencies that regulatory agencies have, not the
least of which are public interest groups that monitor the regulatory activities of the
agency. 44
The more systematic conceptualization of subgovernments has supplemented highly
simplistic capture theory to describe how interest groups act to influence policymaking.
Leiper Freeman, in one of the first subgovernment studies, discovered that when looking at
the public policymaking process with regard to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, bureaus,
committees and interest groups enjoyed a good deal of autonomy that resulted in a policy
subsystem involving mainly the leaders of the three entities. 45 He found that the relationship
between the bureau and the congressional committee was institutionalized and
depersonalized and that the bureau remained sensitized to the preferences of the committee.
Emmette S. Redford found evidence of a more complex system in his study of civil aviation
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policy than Freeman associated with Indian affairs.

Even though he found a large

divergence of interests, there existed a high concentration of decision making supported by
a consensus involving the aviation industry, the administration, congressional leaders and
trusted experts in the transportation area.

This structure in tum delegated routine

microdecisions to the administrative component of the system, reserving consideration of
policy matters to be worked out by leaders in the industry, the agency, and the congressional
leadership of the related committee. 46 According to Redford, subsystems serve to provide
stability and equilibrium among interests, and they provide for interests access and
opportunities to influence policymaking. As a corollary, subsystems also provide some
access and representation for interests that are not dominant because of the inherent nature
of multiple channels of access. Finally, subsystems prevent substantial changes in the
equilibrium of interests without intervention of the next level. Subsystem actors are without
authority to bring about radical change unless issues are raised to the highly visible arena of
macropolitics. 47
Jefrrey M. Berry defines subgovemments as consisting primarily of a limited number
of interest group advocates, legislators and their aides and key agency administrators who
all interact in a continuing and stable basis to dominate policymaking in a particular area.
The subgovernment perspective differs from capture theory in that it recognizes that interests
other than directly regulated groups play a role in influencing policymaking. For example,
conservationist interest groups attempt to influence policies to protect the environment, or
consumer advocate groups participate in auto safety policymaking. In a mature
subgovernment, participating interest groups would be involved in a close, co-optive
Emmette S. Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1969), 99-100.
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relationship with government, seldom challenged by hostile interests from outside the
relationship that might be opposed to their wishes. They are characterized as stable, long
standing relationships. These relationships breed from the circumstances that allow groups
to offer both incentives and sanctions to gain access through politicians. In general,
organized interests can provide the following political incentives for policy makers: (1) they
can provide important information to help make or support policy decisions; (2) they can
assist politicians with political strategy to pass or block bills or amendments; (3) they can
provide politicians with ideas and innovative proposals that promote their political
viewpoints; (4) because they may involve long standing friendships, many times they
provide access to entertainment, dinners, recreation and travel; and ( 5) they can provide
assistance in election campaigns in the form of volunteers for campaign staff and
coordinators. 48
For Berry, relationships in the subgovernment model may in some cases lead to
development of policy in what is viewed as a closed system. Closed systems are popular
within political science because they validate a belief that there exists an imbalance between
the economically advantaged and the general public interest as a result of interest group
politics. Various labels are used to refer to these closed relationships such as "whirlpools, " 49
"iron triangles," or "triple alliances. " so The basic characteristics of these closed structures
are: (1) that they involve a small group of actors who play a dominant role in developing
policy in a particular field; (2) that the policymaking is consensual, with quiet bargaining
48
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that produces agreements among affected parties; and (3) that partisan politics do little to
disrupt the autonomous and relatively stable arrangements. The negative implication is that
the established relationships exclude other interests and do not therefore serve the "public
interest" in the broad sense since such exclusion disallows representation by all important
interests at the bargaining table. 5 1
Another version of the subgovernment model of interest groups working with
bureaucratic agencies is provided by Jonathan Bender and Terry Moe. Their "adaptive
model" discusses indirect influence by interest groups on bureaucratic behavior. The model
they present involves a three-way interaction among legislators, a bureaucratic agency, and
at least two interest groups; one that prevails in the policy decision and another that loses. 52
In this model, agencies adapt their behavior depending on the indicators or cues they receive
from legislators. These cues, or "feedback," come from congressional committees or when
presidential administrations change.
Without denying the utility of the basic subgovernment concept, some scholars have
taken the view that reality, including the role of organized interests, is more complex and
variable. Redford, in Democracy in the Administrative State, identifies three levels of
politics based on "scope of participation and involvement. " 53 The first, and lowest level is
micropolitics. At this level organized interests, individuals, firms, or even communities
attempt to obtain beneficial decisions for themselves only. This level is characterized by
direct interaction with the governmental entity -- usually the bureaucracy --that provides the
51

Berry, Subgovemments, 240-241.

52

Jonathan Bendor and Terry Moe, "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic
Politics," American Political Science Review 1985, 79: 755-774.
53

Redford, Democracy, 83-85.

21
sought after benefit, such as a grant-in-aid, or a government contract. At this level, efforts
to reduce differentiated microdecisions result in administrative procedures and bureaucratic
rules and judgment of experts.
The next level is the intermediate level and deals with the politics of function, such
as the main executive departments and agencies, for example, Agriculture, Energy, the Army
Corps of Engineers, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. At this level, activities will involve
interrelationships among administrative agencies, congressional committee structures,
organized interests, such as trade associations. Alternately known as subsystem politics, this
model involves interrelationships between agencies charged with implementing public
policy, congressional committees responsible for legislating and oversight of the policy area
and the salient organized interests.
For Redford, the highest level is macropo/itics. At this level, issues such as major
changes in entitlements and the tax code are debated and resolved with the involvement of
the president, congress as a whole, large-scale organized interests and mass public opinion.
The questions raised to the macro level are broad in implication and normally involve
matters of broader issue and involve much wider interests than at the subsystem level.
Another perspective on understanding the involvement of organized interests in
policymaking was originally set forth in a book review in 1964 by Theodore Lowi. In it, he
argued that: (1) the types of relationships to be found among people were determined by
their expectations or what they intend to get from interacting from others; (2) in a political
sense, these expectations were determined by governmental outputs in the form of policies;
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(3) thus, political relationships were determined by the type of policy output at stake. 54 He
extended his argument to state that for every type of policy there likely would be a
distinctive type of relationship, or a different type of political process. These political
relationships are power relationships, when power is defi ned as having a share in making
policy or authoritative allocations.
Lowi's intent was to replace descriptive, subject matter categories used by pluralist
scholars with a set of functional categories. He discusses three functional categories as types
of governmental policies: distribution, regulation, and redistribution. The distributive policy
area is characterized by policies that can easily be disaggregated and are individually
dispensed unit by unit. Benefits are clearly identifiable, but the cost burden is not. In this
arena, participants are numerous, and government tries to accommodate as many citizens as
possible with as little of the unit benefi t as possible distributed to each. Competition and
conflict among interests are not typical, and power relations are stable. Regulatory policies
are characterized by decisions that directly raise costs and reduce or expand alternatives of
private individuals. These policies are distinguishable from the distributive in that they
involve direct choices as to who will be a loser and who a winner. The policy area involves
participation of a multitude of groups that interact in conflictual interplay so that policy
tends to be a residue of the compromises formed to accommodate coalitions seeking
preferred policy outcome. This arena is best described by the pluralistic model. The area of
redistributive policies is characterized by broader social impacts approaching decisions
along class lines. This policy arena is most closely associated with elitist political theory of
power structures. It can be characterized as involving two sides on a given issue
differentiated on ideological bases, but clear, stable and consistent on their stances. This area
Theodore J. Lowi, "American Businness, Public Policy, Case Studies, and
Political Theory" in World Politics, Vol. 14, 1964; 671-715.
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is therefore, given to negotiation of conflicts to maintain a balance in policies among
dichotomous "peak associations," Congress, and executive agencies. ss What may be most
important from what Lowi develops is that while the relations among interests and between
them and government vary, it is this variation by policy, policy type, and power structures
that needs to be explained in political analyses. 56
In The Politics of Regulation, James Q. Wilson uses his own notion of costs and
benefits to distinguish or categorize regulations into types. 57 His premise is that the
distributional effects of costs and benefits within the possible combinations of wide and
narrow distributions result in four political categories: majoritarian, interest group, client,
and entrepreneurial politics and are deterministic of actions by organized interests. First,
majoritarian politics are expected when both costs and benefits are widely distributed.
Interest groups or factions will not rise when no definable portion of society will pay or
receive a disproportionate share or burden. This type closely approximates Lowi's
distributional policy type. Second, interest group politics will mobilize in conflictual
relationships involving particular organizations when both costs and benefits are narrowly
concentrated. The general public (that is not involved) may be sympathetic but mostly
indifferent. This type is similar to Ripley and Franklin's competitive regulatory policy type
to be discussed later. Third, client politics arise when benefits are concentrated but costs are
widely distributed. When a small group will benefit, organization of interest groups and
lobbies will take place. Since the costs are widely distributed, and therefore relatively low
per-capita, there will be little incentive to organize in opposition to the policy. This type
ss Ibid, 7 1 1-713.
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closely approximates Lowi's redistributional policy type. Fourth, entrepreneurial politics
are expected when benefits are widely distributed (low benefit per-capita) but the costs are
concentrated in a small segment of society. Examples are clean air, auto safety, and work
place safety. This parallels Lowi's regulatory policy type and Ripley and Franklin's
protective regulatory type.

The work of Lowi also has been extended by Randall B. Ripley and Grace A.
Franklin. 58 They subdivide the regulatory arena into two distinct types: competitive
regulatory and protective regulatory. 59 They define competitive regulatory policy as
involving competition between prospective deliverers of goods or services for the right to
deliver them by winning the competition for the right as it is held by a government
regulatory agency. Agencies that operate in this policy area would be the old Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Ripley and Franklin state that the policies in the competitive
subarena are typically routine and very protective of well established interests represented
therein. Protective regulatory politics involve more conflict in their relationships than do
other subarenas. The authors believe this is because this policy subarea has the ability to both
prevent certain types of private activity and also to mandate activities in quite explicit terms.
The examples they provide include policies in the health, safety and environmental areas
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Participants must at times fight
58

Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, The Bureaucracy, and
Public Policy (Homewood, Ill. : The Dorsey Press, 1 986).
59

Ripley and Franklin actually discuss a total of seven policy areas. In addition
to the distributive and redistributive areas ofLowi, they also subdivide the
regulatory area into subareas of competitive regulatory and protective regulatory.
These four areas then fall under a general grouping of domestic policies. They
also analyze structural, strategi c and crisis as three additional areas and place
them under the general grouping of foreign policy.

25
off views opposing their own, thus this subarena is characterized by controversy and
volatility. If this argument is accepted, one concludes that individual organized interests
have less relative policy influence, leverage, or power than more dominant interests
operating in the competitive regulatory subarea. Therefore, the policies at issue in this
subarea are without closed subsystems, "iron triangles" or established subsystems. Thus, the
likelihood becomes greater that pluralistic expectations of countervailing actions by
emergent organized interests (for example, those that believe they stand to suffer some
decrement to the perceived quality of the environment, or the public's safety) will be more
successful.
Ripley and Franklin contend that distinctive political relationships are generated and
surround each of the different policy types. Even though they will differ by policy area, these
relationships can be structured by the following elements: (I) identification of the primary
actors involved; (2) the basic nature of the interactions among those actors; (3) the stability
of their interactions; (4) visibility of the policy decisions to those not involved or concerned;
and (5) the relative influence of individual actors.
The writings of Redford, Lowi, Wilson, and Ripley and Franklin represent thoughts
about the influence of organized interests in fairly complex terms. Redford suggested three
levels of politics, based on scope of participation and involvement. Lowi argued that the
types of relationships to be found among people were determined by what they intend to get
from government in the form of policies thus, political relationships were determined by the
type of policy output at stake. He extended his argument to state that for every type ofpolicy
there likely would be a different type of political process. Wilson uses his own notion of
costs and benefits to categorize regulations into types. His premise is that the distributional
effects of costs and benefits within the possible combinations of wide and narrow
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distributions result in four political categories. The characteristics of these distinct
categories, in tum, predict how successful organized interests will be in their efforts to
influence policies. Ripley and Franklin contend that distinctive political relationships are
generated and surround each of the different policy types which are similar to Lowi's types.
These relationships are structured by the primary actors involved, the basic nature of the
interactions, stability of their political relationships, the visibility of the policy decisions, and
the influence of individual actors.
The similarity of these approaches is that each posits that interest group involvement
in policymaking is variable on some observable dimension. The differences are in the
dimensions that each claims will cause involvement on the part of organized interests. In
Redford's framework, organized interests will be most active and influential at the
intermediate level in their efforts to maintain stability and equilibrium among interests. At
the macrolevel, organized interests play more of a peripheral role. It is this level that
provides access for more diffused interests that lack a voice at the intermediate level. Within
Lowi's model, organized interests will be most involved and influential when dealing with
the regulatory type of policy. It is in this policy arena that Lowi claims the particular
organized interests stand to gain or lose the most. They would be least influential in the
distributive type. Clearly, Wilson contends that within the two areas of interest group and
client politics one would find the most influential actions on the part of organized interests.
For Ripley and Franklin, the two strongest determinants for involvement and influence for
interests are the visibility of policy decisions and the influence of individual actors.
Collectively, they present a useful analytical perspective to view activities related to
regulatory policymaking in the case of cable television.
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Hugh Heclo provides another perspective on political structures, including organized
interests, that produce policy. It concerns what he labels as issue networks. He criticized the
notion of subgovernments as not so much wrong as incomplete. 60 He saw subgovernment
politics as evolving into "issue network" politics. These networks are more open than
clearly defined subsystems. He defines an issue network as "a shared knowledge group" that
ties together large numbers of participants with common technical expertise. They are made
up of technical specialists, journalists, administrators and political entrepreneurs working
out of varied institutional settings. Issue networks are characterized by sloppy and ill
defined organizational boundaries; participants move in and out easily. Issue areas overlap;
as an issue develops, new coalitions form in response. Networks are distinctive in terms of
their large size and accessibility to new participants. They tend to be shaped in two ways:
(1) a central grouping involved in a wide range of issues such as when trade associations act
as brokers of information or provide lines of communication on an issue; or (2) clusters of
individual groups that share common interests and concerns and form coalitions. Issue
networks can be highly conflictual when diverse viewpoints are represented. Another
distinction is that they lack the stability of subgovernments. While Heclo viewed the simple
notion of subgovernments made up of a limited number of key leadership individuals as
incomplete, he recognized that they have a place in issue networks as a subcomponent on
any given policy issue.
For Thomas A. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker issue network systems
are fluid, shifting, conflictual, and characterized by multiple access points for organized
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interests. 61 Authority is fleeting. The "insiders" of legendary iron triangles would not be
familiar with the rapid formation and mobilization of the new coalitions that are constantly
emerging and dissolving. The authors believe that most important changes in the 1980s in
public policy were fashioned within issue networks. They also contend that one of the most
important causes of this change is the rapid expansion in the number and variety of interests
that have achieved formal representation in the American system. In addition, as the range
of issues have increased, single subgovernments have gradually lost the capability to manage
the issues. Mass media gets involved with distributing information about the policy
questions and who is involved. More citizens are motivated to make their preferences known
to their elected representatives, and the widening of the pool of participants in the conflict
brings in some who are new to the policy area.
Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam, in their study of
tax reform enacted in 1986, addressed the influence of recent political changes on the
passage of tax laws, an area believed to be strongly steeped in the conventional model of
special interest involvement in policy change. 62 The authors refer to their case study of
changes in the tax laws as bearing on "nonincremental or breakthrough policy changes. "63
They believed that conventional interpretations of the policy process too often neglect the
consequences of recent institutional changes in Congress, in party politics, and in the
techniques of political communication and coalition building. Additionally, they noted the
often surprising ability of individual congressional entrepreneurs to initiate and shape key
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policies. Finally, they recognized that ideas as well as interests can have a powerful
independent influence on policymaking.
Conlan, et al, present three theories that structure conventional understanding of
political behavior and policymaking: (I) the pluralist/incrementalist school; (2) the
presidential/majoritarian model; and (3) the ideational/entrepreneurial perspective. The first
model is characterized as "business as usual." It is the theory of incrementalism to which
pluralism is usually linked and emphasizes outcomes as much as processes. Incrementalists
recognize that most new policies, most of the time, involve only small departures from their
predecessors. Incrementalism has a political explanation as well. Incremental decisions are
normally the path of least resistance where there is a pluralistic distribution of power. The
incrementalist model is also linked to subgovernment perspectives in that it allows
bargaining to shape incremental changes in ways that foster acceptance by relative losers in
particular interest groups.
The authors characterize the second model as "old-style reform. " In the presidential
majoritarian form of policy change, a strong president sweeps into office along with large,
unified party majorities in both chambers of Congress. This model somewhat resembles the
responsible party government model for overcoming structural obstacles and political inertia.
In this approach, the president mobilizes the substantial resources of his office to construct
a coherent legislative program and rallies the public and his party followers behind it.
Although effective in the short run (usually in the early weeks and months of an
administration) in a matter of time, internal forces return the system to the circumstances that
existed prior. The presidential-majoritarian model thus links great changes in policy to
decisive shifts in the electorate. "It accords nicely with the progressive reforms secured by
Woodrow Wilson in 1913 and 1 9 14, with the outpouring of New Deal legislation under
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Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s, and with Johnson's Great Society program in the mid1960s. " 64

The authors refer to the third model as the new politics of reform, one that places
emphasis on the significance of ideas in politics. It differs from pluralism in that it treats
ideas as an independent creative force in the political process. 65 The significant factors in
this model include policy ideas and professionals or academics, political entrepreneurs, and
the news media. Conlan, et al, argue that these same elements help to explain the enactment
of other significant legislation that is difficult to account for in terms of interest-group
politics and presidential-party leadership. They cite as examples many consumer and
environmental laws, as well as the deregulation of air transportation that pitted the interests
of broad, unorganized publics against narrow, highly organized interest group opponents.

Berry, in writing about subgovernments, issue networks, and political conflict,
believes that the conventional view is still that policymaking takes place across institutional
lines, (government agencies, Congress, courts, parties, and groups), and to understand policy
decisions one must understand how key actors from different institutions and organizations
interact. 66 He too contends that the recent growth in the number of interest groups militates
against the operation of subgovernments. The expanded number of interest groups makes
bargaining more complex and the control and coordination by key actors more difficult. 67
James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
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Berry cites William Browne's identification of more than 200 lobbies
concerned with farm, agribusiness, or rural interest as an example of proliferation
of groups that has destabilized the agricultural subsystem. Also, Gais, Person and
Walker's observation that the growth in liberal groups that took place as a result
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This in turn leads to the likelihood of heightened conflict between coalitions. Both the Carter
and Reagan administrations successfully broke down the autonomy of existing
subgovernments, Carter by appointing citizen activists to important administrative positions
and Reagan, in turn, by appointing administrators sympathetic to the then dominant political
ideology of slashing the budgets of many programmatic scared cows and, in general, to the
idea of limited government.

The basics of what can be viewed as five distinct perspectives on the study of
organized interests in policymaking now have been discussed. The first is capture theory,
which also can be considered the traditional model for viewing direct interest group
involvement in shaping regulatory policy. The second is the subgovernment model, which
expands the components to include relevant congressional committees and subcommittees,
industry leaders, and policy experts at times. The third perspective involves studying the
variability of organized interest participation in policymaking depending upon various
factors. The first subvariety is presented by Redford, who argued that "intensity of interests 11
is the determinant of participation. The second is found in the writings of Lowi and Ripley
and Franklin who argued that the type of policy being considered is the determining factor
for understanding participation by organized interests. The last is Wilson's work that builds
a model based on the distribution of costs and benefits as a determinant of participation. The
third perspective is issue networks. This model is a dynamic variation of subgovernments
but goes beyond them to analyze the ever changing coalitions and alliances that occur as
policy changes are considered. The last model is one that involves the policymaking
environment as it is influenced by institutions, ideas and interests. It includes analysis of

of the dawn of social regulation in the 1 960s and 1 970s was followed by a
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institutional changes and ideas and how they influence policymaking in a manner that goes
beyond the direct interactions between organized interests and decision making.
The Influence of Groups on Policy Change
Lastly, after consideration of John Kingdon's general point-of-view on policy change,
we turn to several focused studies on interest groups and their influence on the enlargement
and contraction of regulation.
Changes in policies, according to Kingdon, do not come about only through the
involvement of group interests. In addition to the influence of organized groups on policy
change, there are other factors that play a role. Two of these are ideas and policy
entrepreneurs. Kingdon addresses both in broad terms in his analysis. Policy entrepreneurs
are members of a community of specialists in a particular policy area. They are researchers,
staffers, bureaucrats, academics, lobbyists, and legislators. Solution ideas for problems
"float" in these communities, continually being refined and revised at conferences, through
papers, hearings, published articles, and legislative proposals. 68 They do not control events,
but they can anticipate them and bend events to their purposes to some degree. Finally,
Kingdon also recognizes that more than just reelection incentives play a role. Interest group
pressures and coordinating votes and political power affect agenda setting as well. He
discusses the aspect of "ideas" as goals or motivations in the sense of rational-choice theory
other than the classic, more narrowly focused self-interested quests. He argues that
"argumentation, persuasion, the construction of effective appeals, and the evocation of
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values and ideology seem as important as interest group pressure, reelection, career
advantage, and the pursuit of power " in the motivation of political behavior. 69
For him, ideas are a strong underlying influence on governmental policy formulation.
He contends that contrary to the prevalence in the academic literature that policy change is
infrequent and difficult, there are conditions under which quite sudden and dramatic changes
in public policy have been observed when entrepreneurs pushed their policy change ideas
when opportunity presented itself Kingdon cites the example of the early days of the
Reagan administration when it seized the chance to reorder budgetary priorities in the first
ten months of 198 1. These changes had far reaching influences on the government, the
economy and the political subsystems of the day. In other examples, when Kingdon finds
it difficult to explain such movements as abolition, civil rights, environmental protection and
consumerism strictly on the basis of the pursuit of traditional self-interests, he attributes the
success of these movements to the power of ideas. He contends that the history of policy
formulation in these areas is marked by powerful interests losing when confronting the ideas
underpinning social movements. We will return to the influence of ideas on deregulatory
policy when we discuss several case studies below.
Larry N. Gerston, Cynthia Fraleigh, and Robert Schwab study a number of factors
other than organized interests that influence policy outcomes. One is agency structure,
whether headed by a single administrator or by a commission.

The occupational

composition of a regulatory body may account for variations in the influence of interests.
The classic comparison is between agencies dominated by lawyers and those made up of
scientists, economists, engineers or technicians. The final environmental aspect mentioned
by Gerston, et al, is the agency's mandate. Some are broad and wide while others involve
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specific goals and timetables. They theorize that agencies with broad discretion are more
open to industry capture while those with constrained latitude due to specific mandates
produce inflexible and inefficient regulations. 70
Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis define regulatory politics as the struggle for
control over administrative levers of power and policy as it is established within
governmental institutions. Their thesis is "that regulatory politics entails mo�e than the free
play of self-interest, that they reflect to a large degree a clash of ideas regarding how we
ought to live. 1171 Similar to Kingdon, these authors recognized the influence of purposive or
goal-oriented perspectives found in rational choice theory on policy change. In support of
this thesis, they argue that the regulatory reforms of the 1970s advocated social regulations
based on the notion that government be opened up to provide new avenues for citizen
participation. This in tum resulted in a new kind of participatory institution that has come
to be known as the " public interest group." This development served to legitimize
representation of diffuse interests in the policymaking process.

As

a result, there was

heightened citizen participation, and the public interest lobbies took a "watchdog-like" role
in following through on the implementation of social regulation policy. Another tactic used
by public interest groups was to shift the regulatory "battleground" to the courts and call
upon them to "oversee the implementation of policies and mediate disputes" in that
process. 72
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The Influence of Groups on Regulatory Policy
Lawrence S. Rothenberg, writing about organizations and politics in regulation,
discusses two main differences in the study of regulatory politics. One is the economic
theory of politics associated with capture theory, and the other is referred to as the new
institutionalism perspective which grows out of the political economy tradition. His basic
premise is that a combination of the economic theory and the new institutionalism is needed
to accurately specify the processes by which organized interests influence regulation and is
of great importance if regulation is to be understood and explained. 73
Rothenberg notes that from the 1950s to the late 1970s, the understanding of the
regulatory process centered on agency capture by organized interests as theorized by
Huntington, Bernstein, McConnell, and Lowi. This view was systematized by George
Stigler as many saw his analysis as transforming the capture idea into scientific theory. 74 But
further empirical studies of the CAB and the ICC suggested that group dominance alone, as
in capture theory, could not explain all features of the regulatory process as observed. Many
scholars believed that a more general theory was needed. From this developed a multivariate
theory of group dominance that specified that the differences in the interests of organizations
probably reflect differences in the society. Rothenberg contends that combining the
multivariate theory of a "balanced of organized social forces" with the univariate group
dominance (or capture theory) perspective will better explain public policy decisions.
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In order to synthesize economic theory and new institutionalism theories, Rothenberg
advocates treating organized interests as an institutionalized part of the regulatory
environment by more precisely specifying the processes by which they influence agency
performance. His ultimate theoretical objective is the development of a framework to
determine if, when, and to what extent associations are influential and the identification in
greater detail of the conditions governing group influence. In concrete terms, he attempts
to better understand agency behavior by testing the economic theory on the role of groups;
developing ideas of what conditions group influence and when, or if, groups are important
players in the policy-making process; and devising improved perspectives on regulatory
politics that include reasonable assumptions about institutions and specifies the processes
of organizational influence. 76 Most importantly for Rothenberg, features of groups beyond
those that are typically incorporated in studies of policy decisions need to be considered in
understanding the role organized interests play in regulation and politics. Specifically, the
features to be included are the degree of organization, the political goals pursued, and the
capacity to achieve these goals. 77
In summary, current thinking holds that changes in regulatory policies do not come
about solely through the application of organized group influence. Additional factors play
a role. Two of these are ideas and policy entrepreneurs. Ideas are a strong underlying
influence on governmental policy formulation. Contrary to the belief that policy change is
infrequent and difficult, there are conditions under which changes in public policy have been
observed when entrepreneurs have pushed their ideas when opportunity has presented itself
The characteristics of regulatory agencies also influence policy change. One is agency
structure, another is the occupational composition of a regulatory body, and the last is the
76
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agency's mandate. Furthermore, the reforms of the 1970s that opened up new avenues for
citizen participation served to legitimize representation of diffuse interests in the
policymaking process, adding an additional dimension. Moreover, a combination of
traditional economic theory and new institutionalism is needed to describe the processes by
which organized interests influence regulation. This view advocates treating organized
interests as an institutionalized part of the regulatory environment by more precisely
showing how they influence policy. Finally, consideration of the features of groups, such as
the degree of organization, the political goals pursued, and the capacity to achieve these
goals need to be included in understanding the role organized interests play in regulation and
politics. The study of policy change in the area of cable communications is ripe for influence
from any of these sources, and the research will be watchful for signs of their interplay.

Selected Case Studies ofDeregulation

Several case studies were reviewed with particular attention paid to their findings on
the role and influence of organized groups in deregulation. In all of these cases, while
recognizing organized interests as important in regulatory policymaking and deregulation,
it is concluded that their influence may be dilluted by other factors.
In The Politics ofDeregulation, Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk examine a number
of deregulation cases (trucking, airlines, maritime shipping, and telecommunications) in
which the regulatory agencies and Congress supported regulatory reform. 78 Their hypothesis
is that when prominent regulatory problems exist, political conditions are ripe, and ideas for
solutions backed by policy entrepreneurs and political leaders are available, the diffuse
78
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interests of the general public can overcome particularistic business interests in a given
regulatory policy arena. The central question driving their study was why the affected
industries and associated organized interests were ineffectual in stopping deregulatory
reforms. They conclude that the combination of expert analysis, opportunistic political
leaders, and mass public sentiment can combat particularistic organized interests effectively.
The authors identify the determining factor for policy change in the cases they
present as the politics of ideas. Traditional notions such as capture theory, incrementalism,
and "iron triangles" would predict that only slight adjustments in policies acceptable to
regulated interests would have occurred. Derthick and Quirk describe a set of circumstances
that involve perceived problems, the ready availability of solutions (ideas), and political
conditions conducive to change that led to contrary results.
A central ingredient in their analysis is the role of policy reform leadership. They
discuss issue leaders in the context of champions for an idea. They argue that participation
by a potential leader is influenced by several conditions. One is timing of the issue. That is,
is the time "ripe" for change? Another consideration is room on the ag enda. If other issues
in Congress are more pressing at the time, a reform may not get much attention ( and
therefore, neither will the leader). A third factor is the merits of the issue or the magnitude
of the benefits to be derived from reform. The final factor influencing leaders' choices of
issues to support is prior commitments which in most cases are fashioned in election
campaigns. Essentially, Derthick and Quirk believe these cases show that the American
political system has a greater capacity for transcending narrow interests than generally has
been acknowledged. 79
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Anthony Brown, in his study of airline deregulation, discusses how the Civil
Aeronautics Board's support for deregulation was pursued over the objections of its regulated
clientele, thus violating the presumption of regulator-regulated collaboration.80 Similar to
the work of Derthick and Quirk, Brown notes that early proponents of deregulation were
professional economists who, in coalition with certain government agencies (the Antitrust
Division at the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of
Transportation) pushed for deregulation. Certain individual firms and segments of the airline
industry that stood to gain from deregulation also joined this coalition. The major opponents
were the larger air carriers and their employees, and they were joined by secondary interests
such as state and local organizations representing airport operators and small communities
that had benefitted from mandated service requirements in CAB regulations. Brown
concludes that airline deregulation was brought about by policy entrepreneurs, advocacy by
the affected agency itself, presidential support, changes in public opinion, and alterations in
interest group structure.81
In Regulation: The Politics of Policy, Michael Reagan examines deregulation in
communications, financial institutions, and transportation.82 He uses Wilson's typology on
the distribution of costs and benefits to categorize the politics that surround policymaking.83
He offers Social Security as an example of majoritarian politics where most of society
benefits and most expected to pay for the policy outcomes. For interest group politics, in
which both costs and benefits are narrowly concentrated and the general public has a small
80
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enough stake to stay out of policy fights, he cites the example of shipping regulation where
a small population of steamship lines and major shippers are active in the policy arena. Next
he characterizes client politics as benefits accruing to a small group but with the costs widely
distributed. Examples given are CAB protection ofairlines from competition while allowing
them to overcharge the public prior to deregulation as well as agricultural price support
polices. The last is entrepreneurial politics involving widely distributed benefits, while costs
are narrowly assigned. Health and safety and environmental policies are examples of this
category. 84

Reagan observed that interest group and client politics categories seem most
susceptible to capture theory, and his reasoning is simple. If a small industry group has much
to gain or lose from a given pattern of regulation, strong incentives exist to convince the
agency to adopt its demands. In the case of client politics, the fact that costs are so widely
diffused works against the emergence of strong organized opposition to policies favorable
to client industries.85
From an organized interest perspective, Reagan concluded that the present day
situation is one of much greater variety and diversity of politically effective groups than was
the case when capture doctrine was developed. A rise in the numbers, memberships, and
economic resources of consumer, environmental, and other public interests groups86 and the
success of these groups in influencing regulatory agencies in directions other than those
desired by regulated industries require a modification of the assumption that narrow,
84
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producer self-interested groups dominate public policy decisions. 87 However, such a rise in
influence by public interest groups in the social regulation arena initiated a reactive rise in
corporate political mobilization. The conclusion is that the political environment of the new
social regulation is considerably more diverse and complex than that which existed until the
1970s in economic regulation. 88
Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis write that, historically, the purpose behind
attempts to streamline the federal regulatory apparatus have been to make it more
accountable, more efficient, and more responsive. Changes in regulatory "regimes" were
seen as being caused by new ideas, new institutions and new policies, with new ideas being
the most crucial in the opinion of the authors. 89 The new public lobby regimes were seen as
the driving forces behind public participation in reshaping the FTC into a consumer
advocacy agency and the EPA into an environmental protector. The authors contend that the
EPA was an agency where the public lobby regime and environmentalist had strong
influence through involvement in public hearings and court appeals to ensure regulations
were enforced. Each ofthese cases characterizes the supplanting of particularistic economic
interests with diffused public interest organizations. They stated that new ideas indicate the
leadership role played by intellectual and political elites in establishing new regulatory
regimes. These elites included journalists, social critics, the professorate and political
activists.
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The authors referred to Lowi's interest group liberalism as a model that saw
organized interests as the only effective participants in the forming of public policies. In this
model, it is only natural that organized interests will oppose major changes, because their
influence is predicated on existing forms of regulatory institutions and processes. 90 This
contributes to what Harris and Milkis viewed as regulatory inertia. But the authors also
recognize how the new social regulation regimes were characterized more by issue network
models of interest group involvement than the subgovernment models of Lowi and Ripley
and Franklin. "The new social regulation was initiated and pursued by activist public lobbies,
and those organizations continue to play an important role in the implementation of
policy. 1191
Yet another perspective is provided by Dorothy Robyn in her case study of
deregulation of the trucking industry in 1980. 92 It was a victory of diffused, public interest,
political forces over concentrated interests. The conclusion that must be drawn, however,
is that Robyn's perspective is one of a different set of interests in the form of a coalition of
regulatory reformers prevailing over a previously entrenched subgovernment that benefited
politically from maintaining the regulatory inertia that existed before deregulation.
Robyn's case study provides a theoretical context in which she shuns the traditional
economic views of self-interest or utility maximization to explain the change in policy and
builds an argument that the change was due to application of certain strategic elements on
the part of reformers (examples include: farm groups that supported deregulation of trucking
90
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services; corporate shippers that organized to support deregulation; the president's Council
of Economic Advisors; and public interest groups such as the Committee Urging Regulatory
Reform for Efficient National Transportation). The four elements were: (1) strategic use of
economic evidence and analysis to prove the benefits of reform; (2) creation of and
maintenance of ad hoc coalitions to support reform; (3) use of transition strategies to
mitigate opposition to change, and (4) strategic bargaining by the president to gain positive
leverage in passing legislation.
For Robyn, certain changes in economic, intellectual, and organizational climates
were important contributors to deregulatory trends. The emergence of public interest groups
and organized consumer concerns created changes in the organizational climate in a way
that favored deregulation. Combined with these climatic changes was an increased tendency
of business interests to lobby Congress more directly in efforts to counter the growing
strength of consumer movements.
Lawrence Rothenberg's study of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
deregulation of the trucking industry also concludes that group theory, narrowly defined,
alone proved incomplete for understanding the agency (ICC) most closely identified with
capture theory. He found that in many respects group influence proved conditional. For
Rothenberg, it was evident that any ability for a group to dominate the political process
would be dependent upon the preferences of and the resource allocation choices made by the
leaders of organized interests. 93 He observed that the groups that dominated prior to
deregulation did not have adequate levels of expendable resources at their disposal to use
in regaining the dominance they enjoyed with the ICC before deregulation. They did not
have the political capacity to gather assistance from the three principal entities that could
93
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produce the desired change: i. e. , the ICC, Congress, or the president. The leaders in the
American Trucking Association (ATA) and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(IBT) were forced to make decisions about allocating the level of resources needed to effect
pre-reform conditions. The implication is that as institutional actors change, so will the
ability of groups to dominate in the political process. For example, as presidential
administrations, congressional committee assignments, leadership positions in agencies,
even committee staff members change, so will the fortunes of particular organized interests.
This takes place as new relationships and new institutional structures are formed that require
political maintenance in ways that differ from prior arrangements.
Rothenberg -- as does Robyn -- assigns a good deal of credit for the increased
saliency of regulatory reform to a response to inflationary economic conditions during the
later part of the Ford administration and during the Carter administration. 94 However, he
places much more emphasis on changes in the administration at the ICC as a result of
presidential appointments, as well as the personal commitment that Carter made to
deregulating the trucking industry to symbolize his fight against the inflationary aspects of
regulation. He does not mention the power of ideas as in Robyn's changing intellectual
climate, nor the successful strategies in the creation and maintenance of coalitions that she
also emphasized. His observation is that, "Presidential administrations with different
priorities and preferences come and go; leaders rise and fall at regulatory agencies;
congressional membership on key committees constantly turns over," producing regulation
in flux and evolving over time. 95
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In sum, these empirical case studies clearly show that regulated interests, as typified
by capture theory, do not dominate the policy process. They serve to picture regulatory
policy as produced by the interactions of organized particularistic interests, organized
interests that purport to speak for diffuse interests; government institutions; policy
entrepreneurs; policy elites; and the role that ideas play in policymaking.

Research Procedures and Organization
The qualitative research process is used to investigate primary data that were
collected from records of legislative hearings, reports and floor debates Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) actions and court decisions.

Interviews were

conducted with key participants in forging legislation. Other data were taken from
contemporaneous periodicals, including trade journals.
Given the nature of the research problem, the analytical procedure employed can be
explained in very basic terms.

For legislation, the first step was to identify major

participants in the 1984 and 1992 enactments, such as organized interest groups and their
representatives, and those in Congress and the executive branch. The next stage involved
identifying the major issues in each period and the positions of major actors on the issues.
Following this, policy preferences of major actors are tracked from hearings, through bill
mark-ups, to floor debates, and ultimately to final versions of the bills as passed by
Congress. The final stage of the analysis will be to examine the crafting of policy and the
factors that appeared to influence major actions at each of these key stages.
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For legislation, committee and subcommittee hearings are basic sources of data.
Selected hearings were analyzed in terms of points of interest such as the central issues and
the nature and range of interests represented and the weight of their representation based
upon several indicators. Additionally, attention was paid to the position asserted by the
various interests on major issues with particular sensitivity aimed toward differences within
interest groupings, for example, within the cable industry organizations and organizations
representing local governments. The usefulness of this perspective has been explained by
T. Alexander Smith when he wrote, "The way people define issues is highly significant in
determining the scope and intensity of issue confl icts. "96
From hearings and other sources, the concerns and leanings of congressional
members were ascertained as reflected in their questions and comments and their expressed
or implied attitudes toward various interests, as were their expectations regarding how
differences in policy preferences should be resolved.
After analyzing pertinent hearings, committee reports were examined to identify and
describe the collective position taken by subcommittees and committees on major issues and
to identify and discuss how the various interests fared in outcomes.
Finally, the analysis turns to floor debates. An important consideration in this phase
is analysis of the amendments offered, their fate, and what they indicate about the relative
winners and losers among participating interests.
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A continuing element throughout is a comparison of House and Senate processes in
formulating regulatory policy. Another is similarities and differences between the 1984 and
1992 enactments regarding process, participation, winners and losers.

Organization
Chapter I has introduced the study with a statement of the research problem, a
discussion of the relevant literature on pluralism and interest group participation in
policymaking, with a special emphasis on regulatory policy. This chapter includes a
description of how the analysis was conducted and closes by describing the organization of
the chapters to follow.
Chapter II covers the history of cable television from its earliest beginnings and how
it has been affected by the various regulatory frameworks applied over time. It contains a
more detailed discussion of the initial policy response to the emerging technology and how
the regulation of cable television came to the policy agenda.
Chapter ill deals with the first stages in the development of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984. Chapter IV covers the enactment of the 1984
legislation and the aftermath of implementation of deregulation of cable TV. It also
discusses activities of the FCC and the courts that took place from implementation as new
calls for reregulation began. Chapter V tracks the passage of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Chapter VI presents an analysis of the case study
including any implications about regulatory or deregulatory policy theories that may emerge.
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Finally, Chapter VII is an Epilogue that presents a brief summary of relevant policy
developments affecting the cable industry since the 1992 Act became law.
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CHAPTER II
THE EARLY YEARS

Cable television was developed in the 1940s, initially to provide television in
communities where terrain or distance prevented reception of licensed television broadcast
stations, as, for example, in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, in 1948. 97 At that time, antennas
were placed in areas having good signal reception in order to pick up broadcasts which, for
a fee, were distributed to subscribers over a cable network. Today, of course, most cable
systems have advanced beyond their original purpose of simply retransmitting local
television broadcast signals.

Emergence
Cable TV has experienced steady growth over the past decades. This growth and
development was described in 1976 "as a direct result of consumer demand for clearer
television reception and more viewing options than were made available under the
frequency-allocation plan of 1952."98 In 1950, cable systems were serving some 14,000
Paul W. MacAvoy ed., Deregulation of Cable Television, (Washington, D.C. :
American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 5.
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subscribers in only 70 communities. By the beginning of 1982, approximately 4,700 systems
were serving more than 21 million subscribers in some 13,000 communities in the United
States. Throughout the 1980s the number of systems in major metropolitan areas increased,
although most cable systems were still located in small communities. Between 1984 and
1992 the number of cable subscribers rose from 3 7 million to 57 million. The percentage of
homes with cable wire available to them rose from 71 percent in 1 984 to fully 97 percent
in 1992, and the number of programming services grew exponentially. By 1 995 it was
estimated that about 60 million homes subscribed to cable television through more than
1 1,000 systems. 99
The technology's most distinguishing feature is its capacity to provide many channels
of service. Although in 1977 an average of 10 channels were programmed per system, most
systems were capable of offering 12 or more. By 1995, systems commonly offered a
capacity of at least 36 channels, and some provided 54 or more. Some systems in large
metropolitan areas offered 100 or more channels.
"Cable television" is a deceptively uniform term which describes, without
differentiation, three distinct forms of wired service encompassed during the period
examined here. Cable could mean "community antenna," a four- to six-channel operation
simply enhancing the clarity of existing television signals; or the typically twelve-channel
"CATV," augmenting local transmissions with broadcast programming imported from other
markets; or the more modem "cable TV, " whose twenty-four to forty-eight [or more]
channels and two-way circuitry provided a communications network for a broad spectrum

Associated Press, "Cable deregulation passes hurdle, " Knoxville (Tenn.)
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of private information as well as general entertainment services. All cable operations share
the characteristics of multichannel, audience-supported, closed-circuit technique of delivery.

The Initial Policy Response
In the 19 5 Os, there existed many remote areas that could not receive strong, clear
television broadcast signals. Two technologies were developed in the early stages to provide
remedies for some regions. One was signal relay or "booster" systems and the other was the
community antenna concept which was the precursor of cable television. Battles between
cable and [signal] booster operators occurred predominately in small and moderate sized
communities as these technologies emerged as the preferred means to bring television to
remote mountainous areas. However, clashes of national significance occurred in the
slightly larger ·cities of from 20,000 to 40,000 population range, such as Cheyenne,
Wyoming, Helena, Montana, and Twin Falls, Idaho. Markets of this size in the west were
too rare for service providers of either the booster or community antenna approach to
surrender without a fight.

These areas became the "staging grounds for the first

congressional assault upon the cable challenge.

1 1 100

Initial Congressional Involvement

The legal authority of the FCC to regulate cable TV was, at best, murky. As cable
television grew to become a competitor with broadcast television, regulatory policies
regarding cable activities lagged behind and many times effectively constrained the progress
of the medium. The FCC's jurisdiction over cable derived from the requirement of the

1 000on R. LeDuc, Cable Television and the FCC: A Crisis in Media Control.
(Philadelphia, Pa. : Temple University Press, 1973 ), 8 8. (Much of the discussion
of the initial policy efforts is taken from LeDuc, 1973).
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Communications Act of 1934 to oversee interstate communications by wire or radio. What
was complicated about this was that cable provided television programming to consumers,
but did not do so by use of the frequency spectrum in the airwaves. The result was that the
FCC attempted to fit a regulatory scheme based on a "spectrum scarcity rationale" to a
medium that did not use the spectrum. Conversely, even though cable used "wire" to deliver
its programming, it did not fit into the FCC's regulatory framework for common carriers as
did telephone companies.
There were some early attempts to clarify the regulatory situation. For example, in
1954, the Senate Commerce Committee held the first ofan eight part series of hearings titled
the "Television Inquiry. " There were four hearings held between 1954 and 1960 where
testimony about small-market television problems was a focal point. 10 1 A significant
development was the holding of a special session of the committee in 1958 by Chairman
Warren G. Magnuson (D-Washington), a Westerner, on the problems of western small
market television stations. He appointed his former assistant Kenneth Cox as special counsel
for the hearings. Cox would later become a FCC commissioner. The purpose of these
hearings seemed to be to provide a forum for complaining small station owners to attack
rival cable systems and the FCC for its indifference to their problems. 102
In 1956, William Grove, station manager of Frontier Broadcasting's KFBC-TV,
Cheyenne, Wyoming, along with twelve other western broadcasters, petitioned the FCC to
declare 288 CATV systems to be interstate common carriers �d subject to commission
jurisdiction and regulation. The commission spent two years studying the case. In Frontier
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Broadcasting v. Collier, 1 03 the commission concluded, "It is the opinion of the staff, that,
under the provisions of the Act, and upon certain reasonable assumptions, CATV might be
deemed to be common carriers for hire in interstate commerce. 11 But it also stated that,
11

Assertion of jurisdiction would require the regulation of rates and services of several

hundred CATV systems. It would entail an administrative burden which the Commission is
not equipped to handle. 11 The FCC essentially avoided attempts to regulate CATVs as
common carriers because of the perceived administrative burden it would impose. Probably
more significant was the question of whether the Commission had the authority under the
Communications Act of 1934 to regulate the CATV industry as common carriers. As a
consequence, in April, 1958, the FCC declared that CATV systems were not common
carriers, because their customers did not select the particular messages they could receive.
This development caused broadcasters to tum to Congress for relief
One month after issuing the Frontier decision, FCC commissioners were called
before Senator Magnuson's committee. Commission Chairman John Doerfer was the first
witness and was subjected to contentious questioning by Special Counsel Cox. In summary,
Doerfer rejected the suggestion by Cox that the commission had any obligation to protect
local broadcasters from cable competition any more than it should protect them from drive
in movies or other attractions that might develop in their service areas. 104 This response
drew a line between the role of the FCC in protecting the public's interest and the economic
interest of those regulated, that is, broadcasters. When Senator Frank J. Lausche (D-Ohio),
asked Doerfer what legislation might help the FCC carry out its responsibilities in the area
of small local broadcast markets, he urged that Congress not take action until the
Federal Communications Commission, Frontier Broadcasting v. Collier, 16
RR 1005, 1958.
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commission could complete an investigation it was conducting on small-market problems.
In like fashion, Vincent T. Wasilewski, representing the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB), could not recommend specific legislation that would aid western
members of the organization. He suggested instead that the FCC use its authority to regulate
microwave relays to control cable growth. 105
Ultimately, the hearings were a disappointment suffering low attendance by senators.
On the second day, the hearings were adjourned when the last remaining senator left the
hearing room. Reasons cited were other pressing business and limited general interest in a
regional problem, and perhaps most accurately, that Senator Magnuson had already decided
in advance that the FCC should control the growth of CATV and held the hearings to
provide justification. In the end, the committee report written by Kenneth Cox contained
every position advocated by the western broadcast witnesses. 106 The report, titled "The
Problems of Television Service for Smaller Communities," recommended that the
commission set up a system of priorities with the highest priority given to local television
stations. It urged the commission to license all auxiliary services such as VHF boosters and
CATV systems. It also advocated a prohibition on importation of network programming
from other sources and a constant surveillance over the growth of auxiliary systems. Any
service in a lesser priority level would have to show an absence of economic threat to the
higher-ranking service before it would be allowed to begin or expand its services. The
burden of proof would be on the newer technologies to show that such innovation was not
an economic threat to existing services, thus eliminating the competitive-market nature of
introducing new technological developments. In short, the report was a complete victory for
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small-market broadcasters, so much so that it did not provide any points useful for legislative
negotiations. 107
Other than the report that merely recommended actions by the FCC, it appeared that
the hearings were successful only to the degree that they stimulated interest and support from
other western senators who before were indifferent to the controversy. They could now
articulate a single set of preferences for commission policy in the West.
Continued studies, findings and policies on the part of the FCC were contrary to the
report's recommendation to give priority to local broadcasting in protecting economic
health. 108 This prompted the Commerce Committee to request the Subcommittee on
Communications to draft a workable bill on auxiliary television services. Chairman John O.
Pastore (D-Rhode Island), opened hearings in the summer of 1959 with the stated purpose
of drawing up an equitable regulatory proposal which would protect all interests, including
the public's. Three types of bills were submitted: narrow and specific proposals of the FCC
concerning boosters and retransmission consent; broad and comprehensive cable regulation
from western Senators Frank E. Moss (D- Utah), and James E. Murray (D-Montana); and
one that involved a limited set of controls on cable submitted by Senator A. S. "Mike"
Monroney (D-Oklahoma), on behalf of the NCTA.

Senator Pastore put together a

compromise bill that was favorably reported by the Commerce Committee in September of
1959. But the skills in formulating a compromise demonstrated during the hearings did not
protect the compromise from the cooling-off period between the drafting and the enactment
107
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of legislation.

A month after the bill was reported, the National Cable Television

Association (NCTA), issued a statement clarifying its position and reiterating objection to
retransmission consent and mandatory local station carriage. It also renewed demands for
preemption of state and local regulations and called for grandfathering existing systems. The
cable industry then returned to the FCC and attempted to negotiate a private settlement with
western broadcasters.
In November, 1959, A. J. Malin, president of NCTA, wrote to Chairman Doerfer
proposing an ad hoc committee of station and cable owners to consider possible solutions
to basic complaints that broadcasters had about CATV. Doerfer rejected the NCTA request,
since Congress was struggling with the issue and he was reluctant to have the FCC back in
the middle of the battle. It was interpreted by some that the initiative by the NCT A was
really an attempt to slow or stop congressional deliberations on legislative remedies.
Pastore's Bill, S. 2653, came to the floor on May 17, 1960. Supporters were trying
to push it through the Senate while opponents were trying to have it referred back to
committee, killing it. By a roll-call vote, S. 2653 was defeated 18 to 37 and returned to
committee where it died.
An analysis by LeDuc summarizes the outcome. 109 Addressing the question of how
the NCTA faired so well over the far more powerful NAB, he concluded that the NAB did
not lose and the NCTA did not win. The broadcast organization did not actively campaign
for regulation of cable television. It was the small-market broadcasters from western states
who had taken the initiative to approach Congress on the cable TV question. This is
probably a result ofthe NAB not being a unified organization of broadcasters as much as a
1
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"federation" of narrow interests. The NAB was more focused on serving larger metropolitan
markets where the big three broadcast networks held station licenses. There was no obvious
cohesion between major-market broadcasters, not threatened by cable, and small-market
community operators. Furthermore, western broadcasters had little influence in the
association at all.
In a somewhat similar manner, the defeat of the legislation was not necessarily a
victory for the leadership of NCTA. The association's board of directors had voted
unanimously in 1958 to support federal regulation of CATV. Its motive was to centralize
regulatory authority at the federal level and avoid the variations and complications of state
and local regulations that were expanding in scope with each passing year. The concept was
not, however, shared by its 300 members. The board of directors, made up of owners of
large systems, was attempting to impose nationwide objectives on an industry that was
basically local in nature. Most single system owners had reached accommodation with the
regulatory bodies at the individual municipal or state levels. They had no interest in
becoming involved with the FCC bureaucracy in Washington.
In the final analysis, the initial groups advocating federal intervention could not
persuade their own organizations to support their positions. They represented only small but
vocal portions of their respective industries. Likewise, the western senators were also a
minority in the Senate and could not gamer the necessary votes without support from at least
one of the two national trade organizations. When the cable bill failed it was not so much
from opposition as from lack of interest among senators whose constituents took no
particular stand on the question.The rejection of S.2653 was the collapse of a compromise
among a minority of interests more than a victory or defeat of any particular faction. This
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first effort to establish federal regulation of cable television failed because of apathy; an
effect of the limited nature of its impact.
During the 1950s and 1960s, state and local governments attempted to fill the
regulatory gap by establishing their own jurisdiction over cable TV. At the same time,
broadcasters attacked the cable operations in various courts. In addition, advancements in
cable communications technology allowed systems to carry up to twelve channels. Cable
operators began to use the new technology to offer urban subscribers more than the three
networks most had received, many times with additional programming imported from distant
markets. 1 10
The new direction that took cable TV into urban areas placed the industry in conflict
with a more potent coalition of opponents. It included powerful broadcasters, programming
syndicators, and networks that were concerned with controlling the flow of television
programming into urban markets. Similarly, the importation . of distant signals also
threatened the independent UHF stations in urban markets. m
The FCC largely ignored the evolution of the cable television challenge until these
systems began campaigns to enter major urban broadcast markets in late 1 964. Because it
was unprepared for this development, the commission could only react. It imposed an
embargo on cable systems operating in metropolitan areas until the commission could
establish policy to apply to the cable TV situation.

°Ibid , 1 14.
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State and Local Regulation
Until 1972, local and state governments were the dominant force in cable TV
regulation.112 The attempts by states to establish regulations over early cable operations
proved difficult simply because, in general, their regulatory experience was with controlling
large corporations providing electric power and common carrier communication services.
Application of the traditional methods proved too cumbersome for the small business nature
of CATV operators that prevailed at the time, and many states were not convinced that after
expending the effort to establish such systems for regulating cable that the FCC would not
preempt their authority in the future. As cable regulation developed in its early years,
municipal involvement was generally found in authorizing the use of local streets and rights
of-way and to adopting regulations to protect the safety of life and property. The first cable
television franchises or licenses generally were granted upon the application of a prospective
operator.11 3 These early regulatory arrangements were characterized by informal agreements
that developed between small towns and the relatively small business operations of CATV
operators.114
For cities, not only did they seek to require cable systems to provide a wide range of
community services, but local officials sought to tax cable operators in the form of franchise
fees, which in turn provided local governments with a significant new revenue source. In
the view of cable operators, the urgency of prospective operators to serve the cities was used
to extract valuable and costly considerations that they believed were unrelated to providing
cable television services.It was partly this history of cable operators believing that excessive
112non R. LeDuc, Beyond Broadcasting: Patterns in Policy and Law (New
York: Longman, 1987), 37.
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demands were being placed on them by local governments and the view of cities that cable
operators were not always judicious in their willingness to agree to such terms that
influenced Congress to consider the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. For
operators, the franchising process had created a situation of over-regulation that exacted
payments by them in terms of money, services, and facilities that they felt bore little relation
to the marketplace or consumers' interests. Each franchising authority imposed a different
set of rules and obligations on its cable system providers. Many times these terms reflected
political considerations, not economic conditions or consumer demand . The situation had
become one where the interests of municipal regulators, cable system owners, and potential
cable operators differed sharply. Ultimately, Congress began to involve itself in the
establishment of a national policy for cable communications.

Initiating Federal Regulation of Cable Television

By 1965 Congress had begun again to pressure the FCC to develop policy for CATV
systems. The chairmen of both the Senate Communications Subcommittee and the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee became interested in the issue. However, they
differed in their approaches. While Senator Pastore wanted the FCC to make policy
decisions, Representative Oren Harris (D-Arkansas), Chairman of the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee, wanted only proposals from the Commission. He did not
want the Commission to set standards without first having the legislative authority to do so.
In March, the FCC staff prepared rules that simply reflected those applied to all cable
systems that used microwave to import signals in the same manner that was already being
applied on a case-by-case basis. 1 15 The FCC had been regulating cable systems using
usFederal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, [38 FCC
683, 23 April 1965] "In the matter of Amendment of Subpart I, Part 21, to Adopt
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Domestic
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microwave broadcast band width to transmit signals because it fit into the Commission's
scheme for regulating "broadcasting."

The "First Report and Order" contained two

fundamental regulatory elements. One required that cable TV operators obtain the consent
of local broadcast stations to carry their signals and the other was a thirty day non
duplication of programming of local stations. The non-duplication element prevented cable
TV systems from importing distant signals into a market that would show the same
programming that local broadcast stations had exclusive rights to show. This thirty day
period was intended to eliminate infringement on the exclusive programming rights of local
stations.

Although Senator Pastore was satisfied with the commission's actions,

Representative Harris was upset by the refusal of the FCC to consult with his committee
before enacting the regulations. He immediately introduced his own CATV bill, convened
hearings and summoned the commissioners to explain their actions. 116 Based on his
satisfaction with the initiatives taken by the commission, Senator Pastore stated that he
would not entertain cable legislation unless the House took positive action. During the
remainder of the decade, several bills were debated in the House but none made it to the
floor for full House consideration and therefore died.

The FCC Prevails

Federal regulation of cable began in earnest in the late 1 960s in response to urging
from the broadcast industry that it needed protection from competition by cable television's
capability to bring in, or import, broadcast programming from distant service areas into local
television service areas. The FCC assumed authority to regulate programming carried by
Point to Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to Relay
Television Signals to CATV, " 700.
11 6
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cable systems as a natural and necessary extension of its authority to regulate broadcast
television (also known as the ancillary doctrine). This doctrine was based on the FCC's belief
that if cable television could have a negative competitive impact on broadcast television, any
such negative impact in tum would adversely effect the public interest, and thus the need for
regulation. Indeed, in 1966 the initial cable TV rules were promulgated in the Second
Report and Order in Docket 15971, based on an inquiry and rulemaking proceeding begun
in 1965. The FCC found that importation of distant television signals could seriously
degrade the service offered by broadcasters, causing a reduction in service to households not
subscribing to cable systems. In order to protect local broadcasters, rules were established
that required cable systems to carry the signals of all local stations in their areas, to refrain
from duplicating programs oflocal television stations carried on the system during the same
day that such programs were broadcast by local stations, and to limit importation of distant
broadcast signals into the service areas of local television broadcasters in the top 100
markets. 117 In May, 1966, the U. S. District Court, Southern Division of New York ruled
that CATV systems relaying broadcast television programs violated copyright laws. Before
the end of 1966, the House of Representatives held hearings and a bill was produced to
extend the FCC's statutory authority to cover CATV. The FCC also began to review and
approve cable TV franchise agreements as they were granted or renewed by local
governments. It attempted to extrapolate its authority over CATV from the 1934 Act in a
piece-meal fashion as a reaction to the Commission's lack of explicit statutory authority to
regulate cable television. This was the prevailing approach until a very important decision
by the Supreme Court in 1968. In that case, the Commission's regulation of cable television
was affirmed in United States v. Southwestern Cable, when it upheld the authority of the
FCC to impose restrictions on the number of distant signals a cable television system could
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import and make available to its subscribers. 11 8 The Court held that the Commission had
jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1 934 to promulgate such regulations, but the
Court warned that the Commission's authority was limited to areas reasonably ancillary to
discharging responsibilities for regulating television broadcasting.
The Supreme Court based its decision on the finding that CATV performed one or
both of two functions. One, it supplemented broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory
reception oflocal stations in adjacent areas where the broadcast signal could not be received.
Second, it provided subscribers with signals of distant stations entirely out of the range of
local television antennae. As the number and size of CATV systems grew, their main
function became the importation of distant television signals. Because the use of satellite
technology had not yet developed at that time, cable television was yet to become a vigorous
competitor with broadcasters through the use of made-for-cable programming. Thus, at that
time, the Court's decision effectively relegated cable to second-class status in the television
industry. After the Southwestern case, the FCC promulgated rules in nearly every aspect of
the operation of cable systems. While the statutory authority of the FCC to do this was
under some doubt, the commission used its authority over broadcast transmission to
withhold permission to import broadcast signals from those cable operators who were party
to local government franchise agreements that did not meet FCC specifications for such
agreements. This denial of import permission would keep a cable system from being
profitable enough to stay in business. This regulatory approach effectively allowed the FCC
to preempt local control of cable TV franchises. 1 19
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Later in 1 972, FCC regulations requiring cable television systems to originate certain
kinds of local public access programming were upheld by the Supreme Court as reasonably
ancillary to the commissions's general obligation to promote diversity. 120 In a short period
of time, based upon such interpretations, a regulatory regime was imposed upon the
emergent cable television industry through a loose collection of separate rulings imposed by
the FCC and upheld by the courts.
As time passed, the FCC, as part of its efforts to protect broadcasters from
competition, went so far as to prohibit cable from purchasing the rights to display movies
that were more than three or less than ten years old. Similarly, a cable operator could be
fined if he telecast sporting events that had been broadcast in the same community within
the previous two years. With regard to syndicated programming, a broadcaster's exclusivity
contracts were used to forbid such program retransmissions by cable television.
Considering the question of whether the appropriate regulatory scheme had been in
place or if another would be better suited, MacAvoy contends, "Cable television was one of
those regulatory problem areas which official and unofficial Washington always found time
to study but also found very difficult to do anything about. In fact, the industry had been
intensively studied by the Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, various
executive branch agencies, and prestigious private organizations including the Committee
for Economic Development and the Sloan Commission." 12 1 Similarly, the question of
whether regulation was even necessary had been raised as early as the mid- l 970s when
President Gerald Ford's Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform (DCRG)
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in March 1976 concluded that "rules on signal use over the cable should in good part be
eliminated. " 122
In 1975, the FCC announced a program of structured dualism. Under this structure,
state and local governments were given :franchising authority and responsibility to select
cable :franchisees, establish :franchise boundaries, regulate the construction of cable facilities,
and maintain rights-of-way. Franchising authorities were allowed to regulate rates for basic
service while the Commission reserved exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects
of cable systems, including signal carriage and technical standards. 123 By 1979, the FCC had
issued rules regulating cable operators in the top 100 markets requiring them to: ( 1) develop
a minimum capacity of 20 channels; (2) develop the technical capability for accomplishing
two-way, non-voice (data) communications; (3) allocate separate channels for use by public,
educational, local government, and leased access users, with at least one channel for each;
and ( 4) provide production equipment and facilities for public assess use. The Commission
also regulated the rates that could be charged on access users, thereby treating cable
television as a common carrier.

Cracks in Federal Regulations
Problems in the Courts and Congress

At the same time that the FCC seemed to be solidifying its position on regulating
cable television, the Supreme Court was taking a different perspective. In December, 1968,
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a Supreme Court decision held that "cable television systems which pick up programs
originated by others . . . were free from any liability for royalty payments." 124 The Court on
March 4, 1974 125 held that cable television systems were not infringing upon network
copyrights by intercepting and retransmitting network programs to subscribers who could
not otherwise receive them. 126 These decisions reversed lower court rulings in these matters
and began to undermine the FCC's regulatory approach to cable TV.
By March, 1977 a U.S. appeals court threw out the FCC restrictions on program
availability to cable TV operators. 127 The Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit,
held that neither the Communications Act nor the First Amendment authorized such
regulating. The FCC, the NAB and ABC appealed this ruling. But the Supreme Court
refused to hear their arguments and in October, 1977 left standing the appellate court
decision that the FCC lacked the authority to restrict the programs offered by cable television
stations. The Supreme Court struck down another FCC order that had restricted pay cable
television's access to movies and sports events. Broadcasters, who opposed competition from
cable television, had backed the FCC curbs. 128
In 1979, the burden of these regulations again brought the issue before the U.S .
Supreme Court in a second case involving Midwest Video. This time the Court ruled that
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access requirements that could not be imposed on broadcasters could not be imposed on
cable systems either. But most importantly was the statement by the Court that, "The
Commission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose
such obligation on television broadcasters. We think the authority to compel cable operators
to provide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must come specifically from
Congress. " 1 29

The Seeds ofDeregulation Are Sewn

After adoption of the FCC's Report and Order in 1 972, there was concern about the
need for specific regulations, and also about the appropriate regulatory jurisdiction for those
regulations.

The cable television industry was particularly interested in eliminating

regulations it believed were excessive or duplicative and expressed :frustration about
inconsistent or conflicting Federal, state, and local rules. For example, the force of the
Commission's rate regulation requirement was doubted for states where local governments
did not possess rate regulation authority . 1 30
In a broader sense, the deregulation wave of the mid to late 1970s also touched the
cable television issue. In late 1975 and early 1976 President Ford's Task Force on
Regulatory Reform drafted legislation to deregulate the cable television industry. In addition,
during January, 1976 the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on
Communications issued a report criticizing the FCC for over-regulating cable television and
calling for legislation to promote the cable television industry. 131 On February 5, 1976 the
1
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Justice Department filed a brief in federal court challenging FCC restrictions on programs
carried by pay cable television. 132
In an effort to garner consensus on the question of appropriate regulation of cable
television, if any, the House Subcommittee on Communications released a series of " options
papers" in April 1 977. The "options" addressed potential legislation that would establish a
national policy on cable television. The result was that in February 1978 The

Communications Act Amendments of 1978133 was enacted. As it turned out, the only
provision for cable TV was that it required the FCC to regulate the rates, terms and
conditions for making cable TV pole attachments to ensure they were just and reasonable
unless a state regulates such factors on its own.

The FCC Retreats
In July, 1980, the Commission adopted a proposal to delete its distant signal carriage
restrictions and syndicated program exclusivity rules. This ended a rulemaking and study
that began in 1 976. 134 The basis for the action was the finding in the Economic Inquiry

Report that the viability of broadcast stations would not be substantially harmed as a result
of eliminating the rules and that the public benefit would be substantially increased by their
deletion. In July, 1 98 1 , after the Reagan administration came to office, in another major
deregulation action, the Commission deleted the syndicated program exclusivity rules for
cable TV systems. This only applied to cable operators in the top 100 markets and was
designed to protect contractual agreements between copyright holders and broadcasters for
program rights.
i32Ibid.
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Coming to the National Policy Agenda
Viewing Cable TV regulation from a public policy perspective, it was governed by
a chaotic piecemeal regulatory regime. Bernard J. Wunder, Jr., assistant secretary for
communications and information at the Commerce Department, believed that cable's initial
slow growth was due to regressive regulation by the FCC. However, the industry began to
boom in the 1970s once the Commission relaxed its rules and cable operators were able to
offer more to consumers. But the piecemeal regulatory regime had a local component as
well. It was the contention of cable operators and their congressional supporters that as
federal regulation decreased, local and state governments stepped up their regulation. 135
Indeed as the second Midwest Video ruling caused the FCC's presence in cable television
regulation to diminish, local franchising authorities quickly increased their activities to fill
the regulatory gap left by the FCC. The increase in activities came at a time when many
major cities were deciding which cable companies should be awarded initial franchises to
construct cable television systems and provide cable services. Local regulations were
particularly troublesome because of their inconsistency across the nation.
When cable TV regulation is viewed from a political perspective, the industry had
to struggle against the interests of broadcasters and cities that were regulating cable TV.
Broadcasters certainly worked to curtail the growth of cable television as a serious
competitor. They lobbied hard in Congress and at the FCC to restrict cable delivery of
programs that originated with broadcasters. 136 In 1980, Erwin G. Krasnow, then general
counsel for the NAB, said that the broadcast industry only wanted to assure that cable
135
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operators would pay a fair price for the programming they used, and that they not use it to
compete unfairly with local broadcasters. However, Brenda Fox, who had been a deputy to
Krasnow at NAB before becoming general counsel for the NCTA, stated that she believed
the record was pretty clear about the attempts by NAB to stifle the development of cable.
On July 22, 1980, broadcasters suffered a setback when the FCC voted to lift nearly
all limits on the programming of cable operators, giving as part of the rationale that
broadcasters' fears of competitive damage from cable were groundless.137 Cable television
lobbyists had been trying to win similar concessions from Congress, but broadcasters had
generated so much controversy that sponsors completely dropped broadcast-related
provisions from House versions of an attempted rewrite of the Communications Act of1934.
One aspect of the effort that diminished NAB impact in fighting the growth of cable
television was that about 30 percent of the cable systems were at that time owned by
broadcasters.

Another contributing factor to the rise of cable TV to the national agenda, was
changes in the industry itself.

As

large corporations began buying groups of cable systems

throughout the United States, a major shift in the policy position of the NCTA occurred. The
new owners supported federal regulation of cable to preempt state or local control and end
pattern of varied and uncertain individualized franchise agreements which made in difficult
to apply any uniform management from the headquarters of a corporation.Conversely, small
sized cable operators favored dealing with state and local officials, with which they had
established working relationships, over dealing with a federal bureaucracy in Washington.138
Local franchising authorities, of course, felt that they were the most capable of determining
Ibid, 2181.
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the aspects of franchise agreements that best suited local needs and desires and believed that
such FCC involvement was not necessary. At this same time, cable television was becoming
very aggressive in its lobbying strategies. A Senate aide described one tactic as, "when
going into a community to organize a franchise, they get together a board of 20 to 30 leading
citizens. All of them have immediate access to their representatives and senators. They are
very aggressive and very, very effective." 139
In these developments were the beginnings of the 1984 legislation to deregulate the
cable TV industry. The effort began as a reaction to the dominant regime of local
government regulation through application of franchise agreements and the efforts of
Congress to curtail the federal role.

Deregulation and Cable Television
The debate over cable television that intensified in the 1980s appears at first to be an
example somewhat different from other debates over deregulation that occurred starting in
the mid- 1970s. The conventional view of deregulation as a policy alternative had involved
economic arenas that were marked by long standing relationships within "subgovernments"
comprised oflegislatures, regulating bodies and the regulated industry. Some notable areas
include trucking, airlines and telephone services. The difference in the case of cable
television was that until the Cable Act of 1984, there existed no true national policy on cable
television. The FCC had established various regulations through rulemaking and courts had
reviewed them. Cities were an immediate regulatory presence for increasingly larger cable
139
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enterprises who argued the need for policy that allowed the industry to grow effectively and
efficiently without the kinds of regulations that prevented them from competing with the
broadcast industry in a fair and equitable manner. Broadcasting took a different tack, and
the cities were reluctant to be divested of their prerogatives. It was a complicated mix that
confronted policy makers and those who sought to influence them, as the next two chapters
will show.
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CHAPTER III
MOVING TOWARD THE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
ACT OF 1984

Approximately two decades after the regulatory process began for cable television,
Congress, for the first time, set formal national policy for this medium. Passed in 1984, the
first cable telecommunications act was essentially deregulatory in nature.

Most

significantly, the final passage of the legislation resulted from extended negotiations among
the National League of Cities, the National Cable Television Association, and some large
cities. Cities and the industry long had held opposing views on cable policy. Indeed,
according to one close observer, "One of the predominant themes in the history of cable
television regulation has been the ongoing tension between cable operators and municipal
franchising authorities based on mutual abuses of political and economic power. "140 The
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 addressed some of these tensions by imposing
uniform federal standards for specific components of cable regulation. But it focused
primarily on limiting municipal power while imposing only a few federal restrictions on the
ability of cable operators to exercise their market power. As one industry analyst observed,
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"It reduced and reconfigured the scope of regulation of the cable television industry, but did
not go further. " 141 .
More specifically, the act affirmed the authority of municipalities to award exclusive
franchises to cable operators and made cable television the only mass medium required to
provide access to any member of the public through channels reserved for public,
educational, and government (PEG) use. It limited the franchise fees that municipalities
could obtain to five percent of cable operators' gross annual revenues. It also mandated that
local regulation of basic cable service rates end in 1987. An exception was made for
situations in which the cable system was not subject to effective competition. In these,
regulation of rates could continue. This became one of the more contentious aspects of the
law to implement, since the FCC was directed by the act to define effective competition. In
1985 the commission ruled that any cable system would be considered subject to effective
competition if three or more unduplicated broadcast signals were available in the service
area. Because of this criterion, most cable systems qualified for rate deregulation by
November of 1986. The act preempted regulation of other than basic services, such as
premium channels and pay-per-view services, and reserved it for the FCC. The law banned
cross-ownership of cable TV services and broadcast stations in the same community and
prevented telephone companies from entering the cable business in their service areas except
in areas that were predominately rural and not likely to be served by cable operators. Lastly,
the law prohibited treatment of cable operators as common carriers, provided for consistent
procedures for renewing cable franchises, but included no ban on newspaper cross
ownership. 142
141 Robert Britt Horwitz, The Irony ofRegulatory Reform: The Deregulation of
American Telecommunications. (New York: Oxford Press, 1989), 244.
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This chapter examines the origins and development of the legislation through 1983 .
Its completion and immediate aftermath are the subject of the following chapter.

Overview
The central focus of the deregulation battle that emerged was over continuing the
development of the cable industry and choosing the appropriate regulatory policy for that
to occur. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two basic issues divided cable system operators
and municipal governments. The first issue was whether or not to continue regulating cable
television. The second was, if regulation of the industry were to continue, how should
authority be distributed among federal, state and local governments. Moreover, continuing
the policy of cable operators paying franchise fees to local governments was of underlying
concern to municipal government interests. These fees provided significant revenue sources
in return for relatively low costs in city operations . .

The National Cable Television Association, which represented cable system
operators, preferred that Congress deregulate the cable television industry because cable
operators believed they were in a competitive market. Absent total deregulation, the NCTA
argued that any continued regulation should be at the federal level, similar to what existed
for the broadcast industry. It believed that federal regulation was needed to preempt state
or local control and thereby end a pattern ofnonstandard and uncertain franchise agreements.
Variegated local regulations made it difficult for the large cable corporations which owned
many local operations to uniformly manage their subsidiaries. Also, local regulations were
seen as unfair impediments to the development of the cable television industry as it
attempted to compete with other video entertainment. However, not all cable operators
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preferred federal regulation. Small, independent cable system operators favored dealing
with state and local officials, with whom they had established successful working
relationships, rather than dealing with a large federal bureaucracy. But, since the corporate
cable operators dominated the leadership of the NCTA, the view that local regulations were
burdensome prevailed as the industry's official position. 143
On the other side of the question, the National League of Cities, representing local
government interests, contended that regulation was vital to ensure that cable operators
complied with franchise agreements. As an example, some franchise agreements included
promises for expanded services that had not been fulfilled, such as data retrieval and open
access to spare channels not used to transmit television programming. Additionally, some
cable operators had poor performance records. Consequently, municipalities and other local
governments took the position that rate regulation through franchise agreements was the only
protection that consumers had against the effective monopoly of the cable operators.
Therefore, the NLC felt that local governments were the appropriate regulating authorities,
since they were best situated to represent each community's needs for cable services.
Serious efforts to enact major cable legislation began in 1981. In April of that year,
S. 898, the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 198 1, was introduced
by senators from four western states. The bill provided for far-reaching changes in basic
communications policy, but focused mainly on the common carrier aspects of telephonic
communications and not on cable communications. The Senate passed S. 898 in October by
a vote of 90-4, but not before it was amended to eliminate contested provisions added in
committee that would have removed the authority of states and municipalities to regulate
143
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cable television operators. It was the first bill to deregulate the telecommunications industry
and restructure AT&T that would reach the floor of either chamber in five years of effort.
Despite strong support in the Senate, it was not considered in the House. There, the only
actions taken on cable television in 1981 were hearings on miscellaneous
telecommunications matters by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Energy and Commerce Committee (hereafter referred
to as the Telecommunications Subcommittee).
Municipalities were angered language added to the bill limiting their regulatory
power, since they had no opportunity to be heard. Consequently, on January 1 8, and
February 16, 1 982, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held
hearings specifically on cable television regulation. As a result, on March 4, 1982, the Cable
Telecommunications Act of 1982, S. 2172, was introduced. Comprehensive hearings on the
bill were held in April. On August 10, the Senate Commerce Committee reported the bill
that again included provisions to restrict local regulation of cable television. Despite interest
in the Senate, there was little support in the House because of opposition from cities. It was
evident that there would be no action on the legislation in the House so close to the end of
the session. Nevertheless, the cable industry still wanted a vote in the full Senate to
encourage completion of legislative action early in 1983 when a new Senate session would
begin, but in this they were not successful and that vote did not take place. 144 In contrast, the
only cable television activity in the House ofRepresentatives in 1982 was a one-day hearing
before the Telecommunications Subcommittee. The subject was whether local citizens
interested in gaining access to cable television studios and transmission channels were
allowed adequate participation in franchising decisions.
1 44
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The following year, on January 26, 1983, Senator Barry M. Goldwater, (R-Arizona),
introduced S. 66, the Cable Telecommunications Act of 1983 that was essentially identical
to S. 2 172. It contained severe limitations on state and local regulation of cable operations,
and the NLC immediately went on record in opposition to the bill. In April, S. 66 was
amended to reflect a compromise worked out by the NLC and the NCTA and was approved
by the Senate Commerce Committee. After a short delay to accommodate opposition from
some members and to avoid a threatened filibuster, the full Senate passed S. 66 by a 87-9
vote on June 14, 1983.
In the House, hearings were held before the Telecommunications Subcommittee on
May 25, June 22, and November 3 "to consider proposals to revise and clarify FCC, State,
and local regulatory jurisdictions. " 145 These subcommittee hearings were also used to
consider the March compromise agreement between NLC and NCTA concerning regulation
of cable TV systems. H.R. 4103, the Cable Franchise Policy and Communications Act of
1983, was introduced in October of 1983. On November 17, the subcommittee approved a
version of the bill that would have sharply reduced the power of cities to regulate the cable
television business. The bill then moved to the full committee and was reported on October
1, 1984. It was passed by the House and added as an amendment to S. 66. A conference
committee produced a compromise version. Within hours of that action, both houses
approved the conference report and the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, S. 66
was passed on October 1 1. President Ronald Reagan signed it into law shortly thereafter.

145 Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Options for Cable
Legislation: Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.,
1 st sess., May 25, June22, November 3, 1983. Washington, D.C. : Government
Printing Office, 1984. (1984 CIS Microfiche H36 1-19).
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Table 3. 1 presents major congressional actions on cable legislation from 1981
through 1984 in chronological order.
Table 3.2 presents the major congressional hearings held between April of 1979 and
June of 1983. The June 1983 hearings were the last held before the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 was passed. The hearings are listed by date, committee, and the major
issues discussed at the hearings.
Table 3. 1. Major Congressional Actions on Cable Communications: 1981 through 1984
YEAR

SENATE

HOUSE

1981

April - S. 898 introduced.
June 2, 11, 15, 16, 19, - Hearings held:
"Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation
Act of 1 98 1 "
July 16, - bill reported by vote of 16 to I .
October 5-6 -consideration of amendments and
Senate Passage.

June 9, & 16, and July 23, 28, hearings held:
"Telecommunications
Miscellaneous, Part r•.

1982

January 18, and February 16, - hearings held:
"Cable Television Regulation, Part 1."
March 4, - S. 2 172 introduced.
April 26-28, - hearings held: "Cable Television
Regulation, Part 2."
Au2USt 10, - S. 2172 reported out of committee.

March 8, - hearings held: "Cable
Franchise Investigation."

1983

January 26, - S. 66 introduced.
February 16, 17, - hearings held: "Cable
Telecommunications Act of 1 983 ".
April 27, - S. 66 reported out of committee.
June 14, - S. 66 passed by Senate.

May 25, June 22, and November
3, - hearings held: "Options for
Cable Legislation".
October 6, - H.R. 4 103
introduced.

1984

October 11, - Senate concurrence in House
amendments to S. 66, passage with additional
amendments.

August 1, - HR. 4103 reported
out of Committee.
October 1, -passage of H.R. 4 103 ;
passage of S. 66 and tabling of
H.R. 4103.
October 11, - House concurrence
in Senate amendments to S. 66.
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Table 3 .2. Hearings on Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
Congress
97th

98th

Date

Committee

Issues

June 2, 1 1, 15, 16, 19,
1981

Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee

Telecommunications
Competition and
Deregulation Act of
1981

June 9, 16, July 23, 28,
1981

House Energy and Commerce Committee's
Subcommittee on Telecommunication

Telecommunications
Miscellaneous, Part
1.

June 22, 1981
August 3, 1981

Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee's Subcommittee on Communications

Rural
Telecommunications

January 18, Februuy
16, 1982

Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee

Cable Television
Regulation, Part 1

March 8, 1982

House Energy and Commerce Committee's
Subcommittee on Telecommunication

Cable Franchise
Investigation: Local
Participation.

April 26-28, 1982

Senate Commerce, Science, and Tramportation
Committee

Cable Television
Regulation, Part 2.

Februuy 16, 17, 1983

Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee's Subcommittee on Communications

Cable
Telecommunications
Act ofl983

May 25, June 22,
November 3, 1983

House Energy and Commerce Committee's
Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection and Finance

Options for Cable
Legislation

June 6, 1983

House Energy and Commerce Committee's
Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance

Parity for Minorities
in the Media

In the following sections, the activities and events which led to Cable
Communications Act of 1984 will be examined in more detail.
Cable Deregulation Gets Underway
As the cable television industry began to prosper in the 1970s after the FCC relaxed
its rules, the medium offered consumers more entertainment options. These included
original programming in addition to simply providing programming from broadcast stations.
Simultaneously, the FCC refrained from directly regulating cable television since it had no
explicit mandate to do so. But as federal regulations decreased, local and state governments
increased their roles in regulating cable TV. The result was a "patch-work quilt" of
regulation that varied significantly by state and local jurisdictions. As each jurisdiction
developed its own unique set of regulations, including franchise fee schedules and demands
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for in-kind services, cable operators found it increasingly difficult to make consistent
business decisions of a corporate nature on either a national or regional basis. Thus, they
sought from Congress relief from inconsistent regulation or, alternatively, the creation of
one consistent set of national regulations. To this end, organized interests for the cable
industry found congressional allies, particularly from the Westem states of Washington,
Oregon, New Mexico, and Arizona, who were willing to include provisions for regulatory
relief in broad based bills intended to rewrite telecommunications policy.

The final

deregulation policy was produced after several cycles of introducing bills, hearings,
negotiations with stakeholders, and finally passing a law.

Key Players

As the 97th Congress began in 1981, the political tone in Washington was favorable
for continuation of deregulation efforts begun in the 1970s. The Republican party held a
majority in the Senate and the Democrats were in the majority in the House of
Representatives. It was the first year ofRonald Reagan's two presidential terms, and one of
his election mandates was to reduce government regulation. Several members of Congress
were instrumental in enacting deregulation for cable television. Very early in the process,
senators Robert Packwood (R-Oregon), and Barry Goldwater, were involved, Packwood as
chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and
Goldwater as chairman of the Communications Subcommittee. A favorable factor for
deregulating telecommunications was that Senator Howard D. Cannon (D-Nevada) was the
ranking minority member of the committee. He was noted for his efforts to deregulate the
trucking and airline industries and was experienced in dealing with regulatory policy issues.
He had cosponsored bills to amend the Communications Act of 1934 during the 96th
Congress. Additionally, senators Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico), and Slade Gorton (R-
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Washington), were also active in early hearings. In the House of Representatives, members
who would play key roles in deregulating cable TV included Timothy E. Wirth (D
Colorado), Edward J. Markey (D-Massachusetts), and Alan Swift (D-Washington).
Representative John D. Dingell (D-Michigan), who chaired the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, actively sought a negotiated consensus. 1 46 Another significant
participant was Representative Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tennessee), who did not serve on the
Communications Subcommittee until 1983, but stayed closely involved, especially in cable
matters, after his election to the Senate in 1984.

In 1981 and 1982, the Senate Communications Subcommittee had four Republicans
in the majority and three Democrats, with Senator Ernest F. (Fritz) Hollings (D-South
Carolina), as the ranking member. The make-up of the subcommittee changed slightly in
1983 when Senator Gorton became a member and Schmitt left the subcommittee. In the
House, Wirth chaired the Telecommunications Subcommittee. In 1981 and 1982, the
subcommittee had nine Democrats in the majority and six Republicans in the minority. In
1983, the make up changed to ten Democrats and four Republicans. This is also the year
that Al Gore joined the subcommittee, as well as Mickey Leland (D-Texas), who would
become a key player the last hours before enactment of the deregulation law.

Initiation: 1981
As the 1st Session of the 97th Congress began, it was increasingly evident to both
sides of the aisle that a new national policy was needed in the area of telecommunications.
However, even though expectations were high that deregulation policy for
Thomas Wheeler, personal interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 18,
1997. Wheeler referred to Dingell' s efforts as "holding a shotgun wedding."
146

83
telecommunications finally might be passed, it was noted by Congressional Quarterly that,
"This is the fifth year of a concerted congressional effort to rewrite the 193 4 Communication
Act. " 147 Immediately upon introduction of S. 898 in April 1981, it was referred to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation chaired by Senator Packwood. The
bill provided for far-reaching changes in basic communications policy, focusing mainly on
telephonic communications by common carriers.
The partisan structure of the relevant congressional committees played a role in
changing telecommunications policy. One result of the new Republican majority in the
Senate was change in the make-up of the Communications Subcommittee, now chaired by
Goldwater. During the Democrat-led 96th Congress in 1979 and 1980, it had 12 members.
But in the 97th Congress, only four Republican senators chose to serve on the subcommittee.
This effectively limited the Democratic positions to only three and thus reduced the total
membership of the subcommittee to seven. 148 The reduced subcommittee size lessened the
potential number of divergent viewpoints to reconcile when considering legislation.
There also existed in the House a high level of interest in deregulating
telecommunications. This was evidenced by the efforts of some members of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce to change standing committee rules which prohibited
subcommittee chairmen from serving on other subcommittees. Representative Wirth pushed
this because he chaired the Telecommunications Subcommittee but also had interests in
energy issues. The Democrats were successful in making the change and other members
who served on the Telecommunications Subcommittee, as well as on subcommittees they
chaired, were Markey and Swift. Even though Gore was interested in serving on the
147

CQWR, June, 1981, 999.

148

Broadcasting, Vol. 100, No. 2, 26.

84
Telecommunications Subcommittee, he would not be appointed until 1983. 149 John Dingell
was elected to chair the House Energy and Commerce Committee and Wirth was appointed
to chair the Subcommittee on Telecommunications. 1 50 Both Dingell and Wirth became
important actors in developing the final cable television policy.

Senate Begins Legislative Activities

The Senate began the legislative process in June when hearings on S. 898 were
conducted by the full Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.
Consequently, Packwood chaired the hearings, rather than Goldwater. This was unusual
because matters normally are considered first by the subcommittee of jurisdiction.
According to Ward White, the senior counsel for the Communications Subcommittee at the
time:
In the Senate, the subcommittees in the Commerce Committee don't
necessarily operate as subcommittees and particularly with Packwood, the
way he operated. Packwood operated out of the full committee -- he did
whatever he wanted. Goldwater sort of acquiesced to it -- he wasn't
necessarily interested in doing all this. It was a personal matter. Goldwater
wasn't particularly active at this time -- he wasn't in good health; that made
it difficult. 1 51
Packwood described his perspective:
I was the chairman and I was very interested. And as a matter of routine,
anything that I was really interested in and wanted to keep a strong hand in,
I did at the full committee level rather than at the subcommittee level. That
would keep a much better handle on it rather than have a subcommittee do
it and come up with a recommendation. m
149
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Ward White, personal interview by author, Washington, D. C., September
4, 1996.
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Robert Packwood, personal interview by author, Washington, D. C. , July
17, 1997.
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Senate Hearings
At the first hearings, the main focus of the testimony on S. 898, during five days in
June, was AT&T. The objective was how to structure a policy that would establish enough
competition in common carrier telecommunications to allow deregulation of the telephone
giant. The spirit of deregulation led a desire to deregulate the telephone industry to avoid
a court ordered divestiture. This tactic caused problems with the Judiciary Committee and
its anti-trust interest in the pending law suit against AT&T. Ultimately, the huge telephone
monopoly agreed in January 1982 to a court ordered divestiture which took effect in 1 984. 153
The court order broke AT& T into a single long distance company and seven separate local
telephone companies called Baby Bells. It also ordered a spin-off of the research and
development division, Bell Laboratories, later to become Lucent Technologies, as an
independent company.

Competition in the long distance market flourished with the

emergence of such companies as MCI and Sprint. However, the court order precluded the
Baby Bells from entering into the long distance telephone market and the long distance
carriers from operating in local markets.
Rather than a total divestiture as the court ordered, passage of S. 898 as drafted
would establish a policy whereby AT&T would be designated as a dominant carrier under
FCC regulation. It would require that AT&T establish fully separate subsidiaries to provide
any other telecommunications services other than basic voice communications. It also
limited state regulation to local exchange services, allowed interconnections between local
telephone companies, and required carrier payments for exchange access charges to local
phone companies. 154 The only witness listed for these hearings that could be identified with
m CQWR, July 2, 1994, 1779.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981: Hearings
before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1 st
154
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the cable television industry was Gustave M. Hauser, chairman of Warner-Amex Cable
Communications, Inc., who testified on June 19. Both his testimony and his submitted
remarks included only cursory attention to regulation of cable television by state and local
governments and then only in the context of how telephone companies were not subject to
franchise fees, local rate regulations, and channel capacity set-asides as were cable operators.
The NCTA later submitted a statement for the hearing record, but it merely addressed the
industry's desire to cooperate with a proposed interagency task force that was intended to
augment the establishment of fully separated subsidiaries for AT&T if it were eventually
allowed to compete with other telecommunications carriers.
The Communications Subcommittee, however, did hold a three-hour hearing on June
22 on the subject of rural telecommunications that was separate from the full committee's
hearings on S. 898. 155 Senator Larry Pressler (R- South Dakota), presided at the hearing
which was also attended by senators Wendell Ford (D-Kentucky), Goldwater and Stevens.
The topic of the hearing was how to ensure that rural areas would be included fully as the
telecommunications industry underwent technological change. Witnesses testified on such
telecommunication technologies as television translators, low-power television, direct
broadcast satellite systems, community antenna television, and, of course, telephone
systems. Witnesses who referred to cable television included Mark Fowler, the new
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission; Steven Effros, the executive director
of the Cable Antenna Television Association (CATVA); Bruce Jacobs, director of the
Cooperative Communications Project of the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting;
sess., June 2, 11, 15, 16, 19, 1981. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1981), CIS S26 1-79.
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and Thomas Wheeler, president ofNCTA. However, the context oftheir testimony was not
regulation of cable television at any government level, but rather as a communications
technology in competition with telephone companies dependent upon utilities that owned
the poles to which cable operators attached their wires. The staff of the Commerce
Committee, nevertheless, did list this subcommittee hearing in the legislative history portion
of the committee report on S. 898, since some of the witnesses mentioned their support or
opposition to certain portions of the bill that dealt with deregulation of the telephone
industry. 156 Interestingly, none ofthe hearing witnesses represented states or municipalities,
either individually or as organized lobbies.
On July 16, nearly a month after hearings were completed, the Commerce Committee
met in open markup session, and S. 898, with amendments, was reported out of
committee. 157 As the committee report showed, the NCTA won the first round of the
lobbying battle with the cities when it acquired enough votes in committee to place
amendments in the bill that restrained local government cable regulatory authority. They
were not on the agenda when the hearings took place, nor were they the topic of any
testimony during the hearings in 198 1 . The controversial language was included by
committee staff at the request of the NCTA in a manner considered a "time-honored
lobbying tactic" of adding favorable language to a bill that did not deal directly, but only
tangentially, with the industry's interest. 158 The NLC staff opposed the new language when
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it discovered it at a time when they too were attempting to have language favorable to the
cities' interests included in the reported bill.
The specific language in the bill that the NLC found unacceptable essentially
removed the regulatory authority local governments had over cable TV services. It stated
that no government regulatory agency could establish, fix, or otherwise restrict the rates
II

charged any person either for the use or sale of cable channel capacity. This language was
11

considered by the Commerce Committee to be consistent with general deregulatory
II

objectives of the bill to minimize unnecessary non-Federal involvement in the provision of
competitive services. s9 The committee took the position that,
11 1

11

Such services were

nonessential and possess none of the characteristics of utility type services" and therefore
did not require economic regulation. 160 Furthermore, it beHeved that the cable industry was
operating in a fully competitive environment where market conditions existed to the degree
that prices would be controlled by consumer actions.
Understandably, when S. 898 was reported out ofcommittee, it triggered a legislative
battle between lawmakers who supported local governments and those who supported cable
television operators. These circumstances eventually led to a heated debate when the bill
was considered on the floor of the Senate on October 5 and 6. Some of the strongest debate
was over the cable provisions which preempted the authority of cities and counties to
regulate rates for cable while keeping the federal limits on what cable operators paid to local
governments in franchise fees. The strongest objections came from Goldwater who said that
they were inserted into a draft of the bill just two days prior to the mark-up session which
was held when he was out of the country. He announced his intent to offer an amendment
159
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to strike the section that would remove local authority. 161 Goldwater, on a number of
occasions, had publicly promised there would be no cable television legislation without
hearings. He, therefore, considered it a matter of honor to introduce and fight for an
amendment that would remove cable language from the bill, because no representatives of
the interests of states or local governments had testified at hearings on the legislation. In
debate on the floor of the Senate, he expressed his indignation and denounced the tactics
used to insert the language in the bill. Meanwhile, in an attempt to retain some provisions
on cable television in the telecommunications deregulation bill, Packwood and Cannon
introduced an amendment with compromise language that basically codified the existing
arrangement for regulation of cable television, leaving the role of cities unchanged. 162 This
move was not acceptable to Goldwater. The Packwood-Cannon amendment was considered
first, and it passed 52-40. Next, the Goldwater amendment to delete most of the language
in the bill pertaining to cable television was accepted by a vote of 59-34, thus negating the
Packwood-Cannon language. 163 Soon thereafter, S. 898 passed the Senate by a vote of90-4.
There apparently were attempts on the part of the Communications Subcommittee
staff to schedule hearings and draft new legislation on cable television soon after floor
action. These activities were not sanctioned by Goldwater and he stated so in no uncertain
terms in a memorandum to the staff counsel, Ward White.
Maybe you have forgotten, but I am the Chairman of the Communications
Subcommittee. Please keep that in mind. There will be no hearings or
legislation on cable television until I return after the first of the year, my
absence being caused by an operation. I repeat, no hearings, and please don' t
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try to run around me on this because, if you do, there is going to be a loud
noise. 164
There were no hearings held until Goldwater's return in 1982.

Initial Activity in the House
In June and July of 1981, the House Telecommunications Subcommittee held
hearings on miscellaneous domestic and international telecommunications issues. 165 Among
them were relations between the United States and Japan on telecommunications equipment
sales, FCC licensing of VHF broadcast stations in states lacking VHF broadcast TV stations,
and municipal cable TV franchising processes.
Of particular interest, the July 28 hearing focused on cable franchising. Mark S.
Fowler, chairman of the FCC, testified about the commission's policies, objectives and
desires to revise and improve telecommunications competition. Among the witnesses were
Ralph Smith, vice-president of policy and planning studies for the Bertman Group, who
testified about the potential adverse effects of cable TV franchises on broadcasting. Harold
Horn, President of the Cable TV Information Center and Jeff Forbes, a former cable TV
official for the State of Massachusetts, testified about cable TV ownership and access to
programming channels. They two supported stronger regulations to guarantee greater access
to cable channels. Mayors Ernest Morial ofNew Orleans and Thomas Taylor of Wetland,
Michigan, along with Councilman Bob Bolen ofFt. Worth and Morris Tarshis, the director
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of franchises for New York City, represented the National League of Cities, the U. S.
Conference of Mayors, and their respective cities. They collectively presented an overview
of cable TV services, explained the cable TV franchising process, and argued the merits of
maintaining municipal authority over cable franchising and local regulation. Representing
the cable TV industry were Ben Campbell, president of CATA Systems, Inc, Thomas
Wheeler of NCTA, Douglas Dittrick, president of Tribune Cable, and Lester Green,
president of Community Communications Systems, Inc. They argued against excessive
local cable TV regulation by presenting examples of problems in cable franchising practices
and offered their remedies. 166

Moving Forward: 1982
Many developments related to deregulation in the broadcast and cable television
fields came in 1982. 167 In February, the Supreme Court announced it would include in its
list of cases to hear that year one with direct bearing on the local regulation of cable
television. In it, Community Communications Company claimed that Boulder, Colorado had
violated antitrust laws when the city adopted an ordinance that restricted its plans to expand
its geographic service area. The City Council of Boulder enacted an emergency ordinance
prohibiting Community Communications from expanding its business for three months while
the Council drafted a model cable television ordinance. Its intent was to attract new cable
providers to enter the Boulder market under terms of the new ordinance. Later in the year
it was held in Community Communications Co. v. Boulder that, indeed, Boulder was not
1 66
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exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act, because it was exercising a power that was not
delegated by the State of Colorado. 168 This case triggered a renewed interest on the part of
cities to obtain legislation to protect their authorities to regulate cable operators.
Among other regulatory developments that related to cable issues, the FCC
deregulated AM radio. Then it adopted rules that gave birth to low-power television
(LPTV). 169 In addition, it adopted interim rules for direct broadcast satellites (DBS), and it
deregulated subscription television (STV). 170 These actions affected the prospects for
legislation favorable to cable television since they showed the deregulatory bent of Reagan's
FCC and underscored the existence of competing media, of which cable TV was only one.
Thus, in both Congress and the FCC during the second year of Reagan' s presidency
there was substantial support for the trend away from regulation by government and toward
regulation by market forces. Opinions expressed by various committee staff members were
that Congress was in agreement with such trends but had been unable to precisely formulate
specific policies for cable. The belief was that what the FCC had in mind was congruent
with congressional support, but some were concerned that the commission was moving too
fast and, in some areas, perhaps, without appropriate authority. It was widely understood,
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furthermore, that only Congress, and not the FCC, could provide truly meaningful
deregulation of cable television. 171

Second Round ofSenate Hearings
In 1 982, legislative efforts to set national policy for cable television became more
focused. Exploratory hearings were held, followed by introduction of a bill on the specific
. topic of cable telecommunications.

Early in the year, Packwood authorized field hearings to address cable television
matters. In the process, he provided some members of the committee a chance to participate
in hearings in their home states. 172 Senator Gorton, a member of the Commerce Committee,
but not a member of the subcommittee, participated in a field hearing on January 1 8 in
Seattle, while Harrison Schmitt held a field hearing in Albuquerque on February 1 6. These
were fact-finding in nature and intended to aid in drafting legislation. Because the debate
between cities and organized cable interests had sharpened since the committee report on S.
898 was issued in July of 1 98 1, the testimony of divergent interests in the field hearings
provided a foundation for structuring new legislative language on the issues. 173
At the Seattle hearing, Packwood presided, and his experience with S. 898 set the
tone. He had seen the provisions in S. 898 to deregulate cable television, as well as his own
171
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compromise amendment, eliminated because state and local governments were not allowed
an opportunity to testify on them. However, these interests were strongly represented at this
hearing.

Indeed, seven of the ten witnesses testifying represented state and local

governments and provided most of the testimony.
The context of the hearings was the intensified attention of cities to cable television
regulatory issues. Mayor Charles Royer of Seattle represented the NLC. He testified that
the organization's task force on telecommunications and cable television had met in
December of 198 1 and instructed the "NLC staff to develop affirmative cable legislation"
to counter the "cable industry's aggressive assertion of its interests in both Congress and the
courts. " The creation of a task force and specific direction given to the staff represented a
heightened formality in the organization oflobbying efforts by the league on cable television
issues. The NLC believed such action was necessary to insure a balanced debate on the
issues. The position taken by local governments was that the cable industry's desires, as
reflected in earlier legislation, failed to take into account both the public's interest and the
legitimate concerns of state and local governments. For the NLC, it was important to
emphasize that the public had First Amendment rights to receive information from a variety
of sources, and also that state and local governments possessed rights under their police
powers to set terms and conditions for the use of public rights-of-way. 174
Conversely, the cable television industry still preferred deregulation. Alternatively,
however, if regulation was to continue, the industry preference was for regulation at the
federal level, preempting state and local regulations. Regulation at the federal level would
place cable TV in a more predictable environment with nationwide consistency in regulatory
standards and requirements. In addition, policy implementation would take place in a more
174
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familiar regulatory framework of a federal agency subject to congressional oversight and
presidential influence. Larger cable operations, which dominated the NCTA board, felt
more comfortable in operating within such a regulatory environment. m
Packwood made a determined effort to extract from state and local government
witnesses what they thought was lacking in the failed Packwood-Cannon compromise
amendment to S. 898, which would have codified the existing arrangements for municipal
regulations. 176 In his questioning, he emphasized his understanding that the NLC had agreed
to the compromise and expressed his frustration that the agreement seemed to vanish prior
to the floor debate. He repeatedly listed the points in the compromise amendment and, with
the exception of retaining FCC authority to limit franchise fees, suggested that they were
equivalent to the provisions the witnesses were proposing. When he asked the witnesses
representing local governments what else they thought should be included, they did not
respond with any additional preferences. Frank Greif of Seattle and Rose Besserman of
Vancouver said that they hesitated to answer as to general needs since each municipality was
unique. 177 They urged that national policy include the authority for local jurisdictions to
negotiate with cable operators through the franchise process to satisfy a particular
community's needs as officials perceived them.
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Senators Packwood and Gorton were the only members of the Senate Commerce
Committee to attend the Seattle hearing. Various comments made by them seemed to
establish Packwood as an advocate for cable TV operators. This was, perhaps, due to the
defeat of his compromise amendment to S. 898 by the efforts of the NLC. Gorton, on the
other hand, seemed most attentive to the interests of the NLC, perhaps because the in
coming president of the NLC was the mayor of Seattle and one of his constituents. In
addition, Seattle's director of the Office of Cable Communications, Frank V. Greif, another
important witness, also served as the national chairman of the National Association of
Telecommunications Officers and Advisors. This organization was clearly acting as an
organized voice for the interests of state and local government regulators.
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At the second one-day field hearing, conducted alone by Schmitt in Albuquerque,
New Mexico on February 16, ten witnesses were heard, five representing state and local
governments and five the cable industry. Schmitt set the tone of the hearing by stating an
intent to build a hearing record on "case studies of how local communities, local public
utilities, cable entities, as well as states as a whole are dealing with [the] explosion of
opportunity from broadband communications. "179 In his opening statement> he established
a sense of neutrality when he stated, "I have no strong opinions one way or another, except
on the nature of the problems. . . and I don't believe that the committee, as a whole, has
strong opinions on the solutions to those problems." What he wanted to do was to "find the
middle ground to make sure that all existing interests are able to compete in a free and open

See writings on trade organizations, interest group alliances and opposition
by Robert H. Salisbury, John P. Heinz, Edward 0. Laumann and Robert L.
Nelson, "Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition,"
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 8 1, (December 1987) 4: 1217- 1 234;
and Browne, "Organized Interests and Niches".
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environment . . . while at the same time new services at lower costs are provided to the
consumer. " 1 80
As testimony was about to begin, Schmitt made an important point regarding the
proposed consent decree that was being considered to settle the long-standing antitrust suit
against AT&T. He wanted witnesses to think about the effects the decree would have on
cable systems as potential competitors with local telephone operating systems. Schmitt
believed that the issue of treating cable as a common carrier would be accelerated as a result
of the decree if it were implemented. However, little was mentioned by the witnesses in the
context of cable as a common carrier. Most testimony centered around how to create a
environment of open competition within a structure of local government regulation.
The position ofthe cable industry at the time can be summarized from the testimony
of Douglas Dittrick, president of the Tribune Company Cable system. He argued that the
heart of the matter was the desire on the part of municipalities to establish total regulation
over cable TV systems on the premise they were public utility monopolies. 181 Dittrick' s
view was that this premise was false. In his estimation, it set the climate in many cities that
put cable at severe competitive disadvantages. 182 He believed that regulating cable
operations as utility monopolies put cable companies at the mercy of uncertain local politics,
limiting their ability to make timely business decisions regarding expansions and upgrades
or attracting capital investments to finance growth.
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Speaking on behalf of local TV broadcast media, Mac Sklower, general manager of
KOAT-TV in Albuquerque, described what he considered unfair competition between
broadcast TV and cable TV. His point was that cable TV was not subject to the same kind
of operating conditions as broadcast TV. These included equal time rules under FCC
regulations, and having to bid for programming in an open marketplace. Cable did not pay
for the programming as did broadcasters, yet it competed with local stations for advertising
revenue. 183

Presenting the viewpoint of cites was Steve Barshov, a staff attorney for the New
Mexico Municipal League. Barshov addressed the issue of"open competition." From the
perspective of the cities he was speaking for, "The only way of producing true competition
is for the municipality to be able to impose a meaningful set of negotiating terms. " If cable
legislation would effectively "take away the city's power to in any way negotiate by making
its franchise fees meaningless, or taking away any regulatory authority it may have, [was]
the wrong way to go." 184 Barshov endeavored to claim the high ground for municipalities
by describing the intent of cities to protect the interests of their citizens who were cable
consumers. He claimed the "real basis for the regulation comes from the fact that the
municipality has to be concerned with protecting the public's interest, and that public
interest is getting the widest amount, the most highly diverse amount of cable programming
and on the state of the art technology as is possible." 185 Schmitt delved into the way cities
structured the use of public rights-of-way by cable operators and translated that into a right
to regulate them. He then cautioned Barshov on using the rationale of regulating cable TV
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because it was a public service, suggesting that the municipalities themselves could be
regulated. 186
In all, eight issues were raised, and four of them dominated the two field hearings.
Table 3.3 profiles them and illustrates the issue complexity that had emerged even as the
debate was in its early stages. Not surprisingly, the most frequently raised issue was the
authority oflocal governments to regulate rates charged for cable services. The second most
frequently raised issue involved extending the pole attachment law so it would apply to
cooperatively and publicly owned utilities and telephone companies. Cable system operators
depended on existing power and telephone utility poles to carry their cables. In the early
development of cable TV, there existed no regulation of fees for pole use charged to cable
operators. Some utilities that had desires to provide cable service would charge inordinately
high attachment fees, establish spacing specifications that effectively prevented use by cable
systems, or flatly denied the space at all. Initial legislation to control and prevent such
tactics exempted publicly owned or cooperatively owned utilities. Quite naturally, the cable
industry sought to extend the pole attachment regulations to include all utilities. There were
a large number of cooperative and publicly owned utilities and telephone systems in rural
Washington and New Mexico. The third most frequently raised issue was whether
municipalities should be allowed to own and operate cable systems. The fourth most
frequently raised issue was whether the FCC should limit franchise fees.
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Table 3.3. Issues Raised in 1982 Field Hearings
Issues
Raised

Albuquerque

Seattle

Total

Support

Oppose

Support

Oppose

Local regulation of cable
rates.

5

1

3

2

11

Extension of pole
attachment law.

2

4

1

3

10

Municipal ownership of
cable systems.

3

3

3

0

FCC limit of franchise
fees.

3

3

0

1

Federal preem tion of state
and local regu£atory
authorities.

1

1

0

1

3

Required access to channel
capacity.

2

0

1

0

3

Must-cany rules.

0

1

0

0

1

Anti-trust protection for
cities.

1

0

0

0

1

Table 3.3 further shows that there was equal frequency of testimony on the topics of
Federal preemption of state and local regulatory authority and requiring cable operators to
provide access to commercial and PEG use of excess channel capacity. The former issue
was the total replacement of local regulation with federal regulation by the FCC. The latter
issue was related to allowing programmers and PEG access to channels on a cable systems
that were not being used. Must carry rules and antitrust protection for cities were each the
subject of only one witness. Neither of these two topics were discussed in Albuquerque.

On March 4, 1982, Goldwater introduced S. 2172, the Cable Telecommunications
Act of 1982. The intent of his bill was to use the information gathered from the field

101
hearings in Seattle and Albuquerque and combine it with the subcommittee' s staff research
to formulate a viable policy for cable telecommunications. He wanted to revise and clarify
the regulatory jurisdictions of the FCC, and of states and local governments over cable TV
systems. Specific provisions in the bill included clarifying the FCC' s authority in restricting
foreign ownership of cable TV systems, yet it also had a provision that would permit
municipal ownership of cable TV systems. The bill sought to authorize state and local
governments to award cable TV franchises and regulate the rates charged under such
franchise agreements. This provision was balanced by another that would require the FCC
to establish a ceiling on cable TV franchise fees. Additionally, the bill required cable
systems with twenty or more channels to set aside channels for PEG programmers.
The only action in the House in 1982 came just after Goldwater' s bill was
introduced.

A one-day hearing was held on March 8 by the Telecommunications

Subcommittee in Chicago. Wirth presided at the hearing and the only other member of the
subcommittee present was Representative Cardiss Collins (D-Illinois). It was billed by the
subcommittee as a "Cable Franchise Investigation." 187 The stated subject of the hearing was
local participation in cable franchise matters, but the focus of the testimony was minority
participation and ownership of cable systems. The subcommittee heard from eleven
witnesses who represented interests in minority involvement in decisions on cable franchise
agreements.

No witnesses appeared from either the cable industry or other

telecommunications industries competing with cable. The only information from the cable
industry was a written submission from Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. Edward R.
Vrdolyak, a member of the Chicago City Council, testified about Chicago's cable
187
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franchising process. After that a panel of witnesses spoke about the need for minority
participation in the franchising process and service availability from cable operators. The
last panel of six witnesses spoke on the need for and importance of minority cable TV
ownership as well as public participation in local cable TV franchising processes. Despite
this hearing, minority participation in cable TV franchising processes did not become an
issue in final versions of any cable regulation legislation. However, the issue became a pre
cursor for equal opportunity employment provisions in the final enactment.
On April 26, 27, and 28, the Communications Subcommittee held more extensive and
comprehensive hearings on Capitol Hill. As subcommittee chairman, Goldwater presided.
It was clear that the hearings were intended to honor a commitment on his part to correct
the failure to include state and municipal interests in the 198 1 hearings on S. 898. During
his opening statement he commented about the number of communications bills that the
Commerce Committee had considered. He spoke of his successful efforts to strike cable
provisions from S. 898 because no hearings had been held on those sections. 1 88
The hearings provided an opportunity for key interests to assert their basic positions.
One ofthe first witnesses was the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
Information, Bernard Wunder. His message was that the Reagan administration, in general,
supported S. 2 172 with certain minor reservations. Also testifying was Mark Fowler,
chairman of the FCC. He was generally in favor of the main intent of the bill with the
exception of some specific aspects which he specified. One aspect that pleased him was the
elimination of the fairness and equal time provisions of the Communications Act for both
Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.
Cable Television Regulation, (Part 2): Hearing Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982. (1982 CIS
microfiche S26 1-59) : 1 6 1 .
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broadcasters and cable television. He was concerned that if these survived, they could be
extended to newspapers. Then, in the event newspapers were transmitted over cable
broadband circuits, it would be inconsistent regulation since the fairness and equal time
doctrines did not apply to printed newspapers. His position was that any direct or indirect
restraints on speech and the press should be eliminated, and he was adamant about protecting
the First Amendment rights of cable. He also supported provisions requiring access to excess
channel capacity by PEG organizations as well as commercial leasing to third parties.
Interestingly, Fowler believed that the principal area of cable regulation was non-federal.
He opposed the provisions calling for FCC preemption of state and local regulation of cable.
In addition, the FCC opposed cross-ownership of cable systems by telephone companies or
broadcast stations in the same community. It opposed limitation of foreign ownership of
cable systems but supported reciprocity with neighboring countries if they would allow
American cable companies to operate with status equal to cable operations in their own
nation.

At this time, no other countries, especially Canada, allowed American cable

companies to operate in their jurisdictions.
Thomas Wheeler, speaking on behalf of the NCTA, made the case for deregulating
cable TV, noting that it already faced effective market competition from alternative
communications technologies. Wheeler also outlined the NCTA position on the dominant
issues under consideration, particularly franchising. The NCTA believed that the concept
of"renewal expectancy'' should be established as national policy. Cable TV operators invest
large amounts of capital in equipment and cable runs in developing their infrastructure. In
order to borrow the monies needed, lenders need assurances operations will continue long
enough to pay off the debt. What the cable industry wanted was a policy that as long as a
cable operation lived up to the provision of its franchise agreement, it could expect the
agreement to be renewed without having to enter a bidding contest to retain the operations.
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The problem in cable industry-municipal relations, he asserted, "is not that cities and
community groups have trouble gaining access to cable, rather that through the franchising
process cities are demanding free of charge, channel capacity far beyond any showing of
reasonable need or ability to utilize. " 189 Regarding rate regulation, the NCTA position was
that it should only be allowed in situations where a minimum complement of broadcast
signals is not available off-the-air. Wheeler stated that the association was strongly in favor
of the FCC having the authority to establish a ceiling for franchise fees that should " not . . .
exceed the costs of a reasonable level of city regulation of cable."190 Regarding the pole
attachment law, the NCTA strongly supported its extension, and also believed that publicly
and cooperatively owned utilities should be included under the law. Such entities were
monopolies that could charge whatever they wanted for such attachments, and indeed some
had engaged in price-gouging.
Vincent Wasilewski, president of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
testified on behalf of television broadcasters. He outlined their position on cable legislation
based on three principles: "First, fair and equitable access to programing; second, open entry
with the ability to participate fully in ownership and development of cable television; and
third; regulatory parity." He expressed the view that this latter principle be accomplished
through further deregulation of broadcasting rather than establishing additional regulation
ofcompeting media. 191 A point made by Wasilewski would eventually present an interesting
irony in future considerations of cable television regulation. In this hearing, one of the
criticisms that he expressed was that "the Federal Government continues to grant cable
systems a subsidy in the form of a compulsory license to use broadcast programing." In later
189
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years, the NAB would argue that cable system owners should be both required to carry local
broadcast signals and to pay for the use of them.
Stephen Effros, testifying for the CATVA, pleaded the case for cable TV systems
that served small communities with subscriber bases of less than fifty percent of those
offered the service. But the strongest portion ofEffros ' testimony came when he discussed
the issue of municipal ownership of cable television systems. 192 Some municipalities were
interested in taking over cable systems and running them as government operations. This
was opposed on two fundamental points. The first was the idea that government ownership
could control programing content and flow of information. For some this held First
Amendment implications. The second was that others opposed it because they had built,
equipped and developed the systems over many years and were afraid they would not receive
adequate compensation if systems were taken over and operated like government utilities.
Effi-os ' testimony had a confrontational tone when he took Goldwater to task over language
in the bill that provided support for municipal ownership. He cited comments made by the
senator in television interviews expressing concerns about his perception of a "trend toward
nationalism and socialism" in America. Effi-os went on to say, "Let us not mince words.
Municipal ownership of cable television systems is socialism. . . . It is not only the
government taking over a non-essential private enterprise, but the media as well." 193
Challenged in a way that senators are not used to at hearings, Goldwater merely
thanked Effros and called the next witness.
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For the cities, Helen Boosalis, mayor of Lincoln, Nebraska testified on behalf of the
U. S. Conference of Mayors in support of maintaining the franchise process at the local
government level. It was also the mayors' view that local government rate regulation was
"the key ingredient to protecting the public interest."1 94 Franchise fees, she argued, were
business taxes and therefore compensation for the use of public rights-of-way. This point
would become one of the most contentious issues in the consideration of cable legislation.

The NLC was represented by Cathy Reynolds, a city council member from Denver,
Colorado. The main message she delivered was that the NLC believed that "S. 2 1 72, by
increasing the role of the Federal Government and preempting state and local authority in
many areas, goes too far toward a national cable policy." Furthermore, "Since local interests
predominate, states and local governments should have primary responsibility for the
regulation of cable through the franchise process. "m

For Goldwater, the key section in the bill was the provision that divided regulatory
authority over cable television between the Federal government and the states. In general,
the cable TV industry favored some form of standard national regulation which could only
come from the FCC. Local governments, of course, believed the most appropriate place for
obtaining effective regulation was at the state and local levels. Goldwater stated his
"personal" preference, "We are not looking for an excuse to have more regulation. I am
personally looking for an excuse to do away with regulation." 196
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On the second day of the hearings, Senator Pressler provided some insight into his
deregulatory leanings on the issue of cable TV. In his opening statement on April 27,
Pressler stated, "It seems to me any satisfactory cable legislation must cover two issues: The
nature of the industry and the nature of government regulation. Cable service promises vast
and far reaching new technologies. But this potential is uncertain at least partly because
there is no coherent and consistent government policy." 197 This statement established, at
least for Senator Pressler, that there needed to be a national policy for cable TV systems,
formulated through the federal legislative process.

The Bill Clears Committee
On August 10, 1982, the Senate Commerce Committee, by a vote of 13-3, reported
the bill, S. 2172. Its major provisions served to clarify the FCC' s authority to restrict foreign
ownership of cable TV systems. Provisions favorable to cities included authorizing state and
local governments to award cable TV franchises and to regulate cable TV rates. It also
permitted municipal ownership of cable TV systems and required cable TV systems with 20
or more channels to set aside access channels for public, educational, and government
programming. The provisions favorable to the cable industry included establishing cable
operator's presumptive rights for franchise renewals and allowing them to extend their areas
of coverage. Lastly, it required the FCC to establish reasonable upper limits on cable TV
franchise fees. 198 Franchise fees were, in many cases, a percentage of cable operation' s gross
revenues. Since there were no regulatory limits in place, fees were inconsistent across the
nation and rising in bidding contests for franchise agreements and in renewal negotiations.
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This situation was one of the main drivers for the cable industry to seek a national policy on
cable TV.
But before the bill was approved, three amendments were considered. Senator
Gorton, in support of the cities, attempted to delete the provision that included presumptive
rights for cable operators on franchise renewals and extensions of service areas. His
amendment failed 4 to 7. Senator Cannon, a supporter of deregulation, offered an
amendment to explicitly deregulate cable in cases where substantial competition existed.
Cannon's amendment failed 4 to 1 1 . The last amendment considered was offered by Senator
Robert Kasten (R-Wisconsin). Kasten supported a sports blackout provision in the original
bill, but it was deleted during revision. His amendment provided for an additional franchise
fee of three percent that cable operators would pay for cable-casting distant programming
such as professional sports events. It was defeated by a vote of 3 to 7. 199
The reported bill received mixed reviews from organized interests. Cable operators
said the bill would resolve their difficulties with overlapping and uncertain regulations that
had impeded development and would help them compete with unregulated
telecommunications companies. However, a coalition of mayors, state and county officials,
consumer advocates and labor representatives opposed the measure. They contended that the
bill was an unwarranted federal intrusion into local government affairs which unfairly
restricted local regulation of rates that a cable customer would pay and that, in effect,
required cities to renew an operator's franchise automatically. 200
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The coalition of state and local governments, along with consumer and labor
spokesmen, lobbied hard with some senators in support of amending the legislation to make
it more acceptable to their interests and even to block a vote on the bill. 201 Senator Gorton
was a strong supporter of these efforts. He opposed the bill because it preempted "the
legitimate and traditional participation of States and local governments" in regulating cable
television services. 202 He also believed it overly protected cable companies from vigorous
and worthwhile competition. Moreover, he said he intended to amend the bill to eliminate
the provision that would have required nearly automatic renewal of cable operators'
franchises. 203 Furthermore, Gorton and Senator John C. Danforth (R-Missouri), who also
opposed the bill in committee, and several other Republicans wrote Majority Leader Howard
Baker (R-Tennessee), asking to be included in discussions about bringing the bill to the
floor. They said they expected extended debate on the bill. Indeed, as a result of evidence
of strong opposition, the bill was not considered by the Senate before the session adjourned.
After the bill was deferred and at the urging of Goldwater in the Senate and Wirth
in the House, the staff of the NLC and the NCTA met to resolve differences on the
legislation.

The negotiations to arrive at agreement on legislative content began in

September of 1982. The NCTA was willing to negotiate on the language in order to assure
that its interests were protected and so it would not be seen as uncooperative in resolving
cable issues.
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Meanwhile, cable copyright legislation passed the House (H.R. 5949) in September.
It was concerned with issues regarding royalties paid on retransmission of movies and
broadcast telecasts and was an example of how a negotiated approach to differences in
legislative interests could be successful. Amendments to the bill were negotiated by the
National Cable Television Association, the National Association of Broadcasters, the
National Religious Broadcasters, the Motion Picture Association of America, and the
National Association of Public Television Stations. This was an important bill to these
interests, since it allowed copyright matters to be handled legislatively apart from the
deregulation issues. Many of the interests supporting the copyright legislation testified in
hearings on cable deregulation, urging that the issue not be included in regulatory bills. The
concern was that enactment ofthe copyright compromise in H.R. 5949 might be jeopardized
by the difficulties associated with passing a broader cable television bill.

Nearing Resolution - 1983: Movement Accelerates
In 1982, a new Congress was elected, and there were changes in the composition of
both the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate and the Telecommunications
Subcommittee of the House. For the Republicans, in addition to Goldwater, Pressler and
Stevens, Slade Gorton was appointed to the Communications Subcommittee replacing
Harrison Schmitt. The three Democrats on the subcommittee remained Hollings, Inouye and
Ford.

In the House, changes to the Telecommunications Subcommittee were more

numerous. Tim Wirth remained chairman. However, Democratic representatives Al Gore,
Mickey Leland, John Bryant (D-Texas), and James Bates (D-California) joined the
subcommittee. On the Republican side, Michael Oakley (R-Ohio) joined Matthew J.
Rinaldo (R-New Jersey), Carlos J. Moorehead (R-California) and Thomas J. Tauke (R-
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Iowa). The subcommittee balance changed from nine Democrats and five Republicans to
ten Democrats and only four Republicans.
The year began with the introduction by Senator Goldwater of another cable
television deregulation bill. Cities continued to oppose the restrictions on their regulatory
authority as contained in the bill. But as they began to realize that such provisions would
ultimately be enacted, they continued negotiations with the cable industry to reach a
compromise on national cable television policy. In March, a compromise was reached and
incorporated in the bill that cleared the Communications Subcommittee on April 2 1. The
Senate then passed the bill on June 14 and sent it to the House. The House, on the other
hand, had its own version of cable television legislation drafted after holding subcommittee
hearings in May, June and November.

On November 17, the Telecommunications

Subcommittee reported a bill, H.R. 4 103, that differed somewhat from the Senate bill. The
bill went no further than the subcommittee's approval. Meanwhile, the compromise
agreement between the NLC and the NCTA unraveled, in part over the differences between
the House and Senate bills. This generated another round of strong lobbying by both sides
that prevented final passage of a bill in 1983.

The Senate Leads Again.
On January 26, 1983, with the NLC-NCTA negotiations at an impasse, Senator
Goldwater introduced the Cable Telecommunications Act of 1983, S. 66, which was
essentially identical to S. 2 172 of the previous year. The new version still contained
dramatic cutbacks on state and local government authorities over cable operations. Because
of those aspects, the NLC immediately went on record in opposition to the bill. Alan Beals,
executive director of the NLC said, "S. 66 represents a completely unwarranted usurpation
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of fundamental state and local franchising powers and would abrogate freely negotiated
contracts. " Using a certain degree of hyperbole to establish local governments as the put
upon underdogs, Beals attacked the legislation stating, "There is no need for this special
interest legislation which would destroy the franchising powers of cities. 11204 Another
controversial issue was the ability of franchising authorities to determine the annual fees
paid for franchises. In the early stages of the bill's consideration, it was predicted by the
NLC that the statutory ceiling on franchise fees would be less than the three or five percent
in the FCC standard at that time. Municipalities viewed any reduction in the fee levels as
a serious threat to the revenues they obtained from cable television franchises.

Compared to the amount ofinvolvement by local governments and the cable industry
interests, there was relatively little testimony presented at the hearings on behalf of the
public or consumer interests. During February hearings on S. 66, held by Goldwater's
subcommittee, Susan Buske, executive director of the National Federation of Local Cable
Programmers, expressed concern that there was no testimony scheduled from the general
public representing libraries, educators, or churches. She testified that, "These groups
requested the opportunity to speak but were denied" 205 • It was her conclusion that the bill
placed all resources and authority inherent in federal policy squarely on the side of the cable
industry. This, she suggested, was contrary to the public interest standard that had been the
basis of regulation of telecommunications for over 50 years. 206
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The only arguments directly considered in favor of consumer interests were those
included in statements from the NLC. Its position was that cities were the negotiators for
consumers that could ensure they would get the best deal from cable operators. The cities
viewed cable plant as infrastructure -- like bridges and roads -- requiring local government
input, even in the planning stages. 207
Speaking against any regulation of cable television, the Mountain States Legal
Foundation (MSLF) submitted a statement at the invitation of Goldwater's staff. It was
against the legislation on First Amendment grounds. The foundation took the position that
cable was an important communications medium that should be free of government
regulation at local, state or national levels. It felt that competition among providers in the
marketplace would more properly control the medium and protect the interests of consumers.
A key point in its testimony was the belief that cable monopolies are the creations of
governmental entities rather than the marketplace. The MSLF's conclusion was, "Exclusive
franchises in communications are incompatible with the First Amendment, as well as the
pro-competitive national policies embodied in the Sherman Act and recited in this bill [i.e.,

s. 66].
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Because of strong lobbying efforts on the part of both the industry and cities,
Goldwater realized that his bill was as doomed as earlier attempts to set legislative policy
unless a compromise could be reached. He said in his opening statement at the February
hearing that after many city officials opposed S. 2172, he asked the two sides to meet and
resolve their differences. 209 At the same time, he indicated his willingness to consider any
207
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agreement that could be reached between the NLC and the NCTA on compromise legislation
if it could be done in time. He added:
It is my firm belief that we need to establish a national policy for cable this
year if that industry is to ever realize its full potential. If we do not get
legislation soon, I mean this year, the current patchwork system of Federal,
State and local regulation of cable will be too firmly entrenched to undo. Not
only will the cable industry suffer, but the cities will lose, too. Ultimately,
however, it is the consumer who will suffer the most, and I hope we can
prevent that. 210

Negotiating Compromises
As a result of negotiations between the NLC and the NCTA that began in September
of 1982, the first compromise agreement was reached on March 4, 1983 . The motivation for
the NLC leadership to negotiate was its belief that congressional interest in deregulation,
coupled with continuing court challenges to municipal franchising authority, would result
in cities losing all regulatory authority over cable television. Therefore, it felt the need to
capitalize on the stance taken by Goldwater during hearings by continuing to negotiate a
compromise with cable operators that left cities with a role to play.
First Compromise Reached. In these negotiations, the cable industry was represented

primarily by Tom Wheeler, president of the NCTA. During the first round, the NLC team
included five local regulatory administrators from Boston; Atlanta; Scottsdale, Arizona; St.
Paul, Minnesota; and Seattle, Washington. 211 Early negotiations did not involve the United
States Conference ofMayors (USCM) because, historically, it had not shown much interest
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in cable issues. 212 Cable was more of a city council thing and not something that held much
interest for mayors as an organized interest. However, the USCM did become involved
when a second round of negotiations occurred because some NLC negotiators from larger
cities became dissatisfied with language in the original compromise.
Tom Wheeler, recalled the impetus for negotiations that came from John Dingell:
Let me tell you a story. John Dingell was Chairman of the Commerce
Committee in the House. And, Chairman Dingell didn't want things to break
out into open warfare between us and the cities in particular. So he held a
shotgun wedding. It was a white shotgun so it was a formal wedding. He, in
essence, sat us both down and he said to us: ''Nothing's going to end up
happening unless you reach an accord with the cities." And he said to the
cities: "You folks run a real risk of building a negative record which will
enable the cable folks to roll all over you at some point in time unless you sit
down and negotiate. Why don't you folks sit down?"213
As one of the NLC negotiators, Cynthia Pols remembered this about the process.
"It was just him (Wheeler), Jim Mooney, [executive vice-president of NCTA] and their
lawyer -- just the three of them. And they [NCTA] knew exactly what they wanted; had a
game plan." Ward White recalls the principal negotiators as Cynthia Pols, who was the
Legislative Counsel for the NLC and Jim Mooney, and various members of the Commerce
Committee staff. He also recalled there were "a lot of meetings and a lot of it was intense.
A lot of frustration and it went on for a long time."214 The early negotiations often were held
in congressional staff offices because they were considered a neutral location. However,
Tom Wheeler recalled the intensity of the negotiations near the end of reaching the first
compromise, particularly the settings of the meetings:
Considering that some of the sessions were in windowless, hotel meeting
rooms at various places across the country - I remember one in some dark,
212
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hotel meeting room at Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport on a Friday - I guess -- that
then lapsed over into Saturday. I remember talcing my morning jog around
the D/FW Airport that morning and asking myself: What the hell am I doing
here?21 5
Mooney specifically recalled "one guy from Scottsdale wouldn't agree to anything.
The group was trying to work by consensus but he just held out and held out on critical
issues. He jammed on everything to the point where Goldwater [when he heard about the
stall] said, ' You've got to agree now. I'm going to move the legislation forward if you don't
agree."'216
According to Mooney, Mayor Royer of Seattle and also president of NLC "had to
step in and make a decision on the compromise because the Scottsdale representative had
blocked the other local regulators from reaching consensus." 217 At the end of the first
negotiations, he had to take the heat from other member cities for doing that, "and that's why
things got so messy. Because Royer had to make the decision. " In defending the original
compromise, Royer wrote to the membership as NLC President expressing his view that it
had become apparent in the fall of 1982 that the NLC was "winning battles" but'that winning
the war "was becoming less and less certain. " In an effort to convince city officials critical
of the accord, his letter described that they could only get three votes in the Senate
Commerce Committee for their position, while 13 senators favored the industry's position.
Furthermore, in the House, key members and staff of the Telecommunications
Subcommittee indicated there was little support for the kind of regulation that was then in
place. Moreover, Royer asserted that subcommittee contacts indicated there was a growing
215
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concern for what some congressional members viewed as regulatory abuses by cities along
with a feeling that cable operators needed regulatory relief. 218
On March 6, 1983, the NLC's board approved the first compromise agreement and
the NCTA approved it on March 22. Both groups believed they had made significant
concessions in the process. The NLC approved the agreement because ofits expectation that
some form of legislation was clearly going to pass the Senate and that the compromise was
better than what they would have gotten from the Senate. 219 As it turned out, this was the
first of ultimately three cable legislation compromises negotiated with the NCTA.
Two major areas of compromise were franchise fees and local regulation of rates
charged to subscribers. The March 1983 compromise allowed a city to charge a franchise
fee of up to five percent of the operator's gross annual revenues with no limitation set on
how the fees could be used by the city. Cities had been concerned that the FCC would
restrict the level of fees below the five percent mark and limit how the cities could use the
funds. Cable operators were pleased that a limit was agreed to since fees in some cities were
as high as 20 percent. Originally, cable operators wanted the fees to be used only for cable
related purposes.

As for rates charged to customers, the compromise allowed local

governments to regulate rates for basic service in only those instances where the system was
located in an area receiving fewer than four broadcast television signals, therefore making
cable TV the dominant medium for television programming.
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With this compromise, Goldwater believed that he had finally succeeded in resolving
the core disagreements between contending interests. He and the staff revised S. 66 by
including the compromise agreement between the cities and the cable industry. The
agreement became the substitute language inserted as an amendment to the bill. He offered
his amended version in an executive session of the Commerce Committee on March 22,
1983. However, the committee postponed voting on the bill after complaints were voiced
by Democratic members that they received the amended version too late. To avoid a fight,
Packwood and Goldwater agreed to postpone a vote. In addition, Senator Hollings, ranking
minority member on the committee, found certain aspects of the revised bill unacceptable.
It soon became apparent that there were thorny issues that fell outside the agreement.
For example, Hollings and some other members were primarily concerned with making the
bill more pro-competitive. Hollings wanted to amend the definition of cable systems to
permit common carriers to provide cable services and cable operators to provide telephone
like services. He was also interested in retaining FCC authority over ownership, whereas
the bill barred the FCC from prohibiting persons to own cable systems by reason of their
ownership of other media, including broadcast, cable, newspaper, programming services, or
other printed or electronic information services except telephone companies. Senator James
Exon (D-Nebraska), shared Hollings' concerns and said he feared a concentration of power
would develop if the FCC had no authority to rule on cross-ownership matters.
Gorton, who in representing the concerns of the NLC had opposed legislation in
1982, praised the compromise and said he was satisfied with the bill's contents. 220 But not
all cities represented by the NLC were satisfied with the agreement. When the first round
of negotiations ended, the municipal regulator-types [staff employees] took strong exception
220
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to the results that Royer engineered in response to Goldwater. According to Pols, "They
then went to the US Conference ofMayors. The USCM became a repository for disgruntled
regulators. "221
On the industry's side, White felt there was also a split in the NCTA over objectives.
Time-Warner was much more aggressive in trying to get things done -- they
were always pushing. TCI [Telecommunications, Inc.] wasn't big then;
Time-Warner was more influential. . . But I just happened to remember that
there was that split inside as to where they wanted to go. And Time-Warner
was aggressive and they would hold independent discussions [lobbying] with
people; pushing for things. 222
Some examples of Time-Warner' s focus were consistent franchise structures,
assurances of franchise renewals to end bidding wars whenever a franchise agreement was
nearing expiration, and limits on what cities could include as remuneration in franchise fees
The Compromise Begins to Unravel. After the committee postponed consideration
of the bill, the NLC changed its position on the compromise legislation. Mayor Royer of
Seattle wrote a detailed letter to Tom Wheeler, President of the NCTA on April 6 outlining
maj or areas in the amended version of S. 66 that would have to be changed to obtain the
NLC's continued support. 223 Basically, Royer' s letter showed that there were difficulties in
application of portions of the agreement, for example, in the calculation of franchise fees
within the five percent limit, and on matters not covered in the agreement.
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NLC had problems with several sections of the bill and wanted them eliminated.
One section they wanted taken out would have prevented the FCC from applying cross
ownership restrictions. It wanted to eliminate the section that authorized the FCC rather than
local authorities to establish rules and procedures for the use of access channels by the
public, educational interests, or municipalities. A third provision it wanted removed
prohibited the exclusion of financial instruments such as bonds, security funds, and letters
of credit when calculating the five percent franchise fees. A fourth section to eliminate
would prevent cable operators from obtaining personally identifiable information about cable
subscribers. Additional problematic aspects included the voiding of existing franchise
agreements, which would have required all franchise agreements to be reestablished under
the new law. The section included restrictions on states and franchising authorities from
exercising jurisdiction over matters of strict local concern as well as restrictions on the
administration and enforcement of provisions in existing franchise agreements.
In response to these developments, the NLC and the NCTA promptly returned to
negotiations with the added assistance of committee staff members from both the majority
and minority. An amended version of the agreement was written and on April 20, 1 983 it
was fully endorsed by both the leadership of the NLC and the NCTA. Essentially, all of the
changes wanted by the NLC were accepted by the NCTA and incorporated in the bill by
committee staff. Those changes included: 1) eliminating a section that prevented the FCC
from prohibiting ownership of certain cable systems so that the commission could continue
to apply cross-ownership restrictions; 2) allowing franchising authorities and cable
operators, rather than the FCC, to establish rules and procedures for the use of access
channels; 3) permitting the collection of personally identifiable information about cable
subscribers with prior written or electronic consent; 4) grandfathering franchise agreements
in effect on the date of the bill's enactment which required a cable operator to provide
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programming, services, facilities, equipment, or access channels; and 5) allowing states and
franchising authorities to exercise jurisdiction over matters of strict local concern that were
necessary for reasons of public health, safety, and welfare, including the terms and
conditions for the granting of a franchise, as well as the construction and operation of a cable
system. However, one section the NLC wanted eliminated, but was retained, was the
inclusion of financial instruments such as bonds, security funds, and letters of credit in
calculating franchise fee payments. This version of S. 66 was endorsed by Mayor Royer of
the NLC and Tom Wheeler of the NCTA in a joint letter dated April 21, 1983.
On that same day, the Senate Commerce Committee approved the revised S. 66 by
a vote of 15-2. Senator Hollings' concerns about the bill were satisfied by removing
language that kept the FCC from prohibiting certain cross-ownerships of cable systems.
Only one amendment was added to the bill during the markup, and it was a clause granting
franchising authorities the power to censor pornography.

224

Although the bill fully reflected the compromise reached by the NLC and the NCTA,
it still had significant opposition. The two senators who voted against the bill in committee
were Frank Lautenberg (D-New Jersey), and James Exon. They believed the bill failed to
promote competition.

Provisions in the bill, as it passed the committee, precluded

franchising authorities from considering competing applicants when renewing cable service
agreements. Additionally, Exon disliked the bill because it allowed cable operators to
provide data transmission services without state or local regulation. He viewed this as an
unfair advantage over telephone companies who were subject to state regulations when
providing these same services. He concluded that, in time, telephone companies would lose

224

Broadcasting, Vol. 104, No. 17, April 25, 1983, 26.

122
this business to cable operators and would raise residential telephone rates as a
consequence. 225
Lautenberg and Exon were concerned about limiting the power of cities and local
franchise authorities to consider competing applicants when renewing a franchise or
removing an operator that had not lived up to a franchise agreement. Their concerns were
shared by a dissident group of NLC member-cities. In particular, the larger cities of
Cincinnati; Dallas; Denver; Fort Worth; Lexington, Kentucky; Miami; Nashville; New York
City; the city and county of Sacramento; and Tucson all opposed the bill and lobbied,
through the USCM, to have it amended on the Senate floor.
Opposition Coalition Formed There were other organized interests that also were
not satisfied with the committee's bill. The USCM convened a meeting of representatives
of a number of cities and other critics of the bill which eventually led to the forming of a
coalition opposing S. 66. The major members were the dissident cities, working through the
USCM, AT&T, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC),
the Telecommunications Research and Action Center, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), as well as educators, consumer advocates and the United Auto Workers {UAW) .
Members of the coalition saw a number of problems. One was that USCM had not
been included in the negotiations that produced the compromise. Tom James, coalition
spokesman and cable franchise administrator for Dallas, said the limit on franchise fee levels
was not a major consideration for the bill's opponents. More importantly, the objection was
that S. 66 would limit the ability of communities to ensure that cable operators provided
adequate service at a fair price. In addition, there was concern that the bill would allow for
i2 s
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automatic rate increases by cable companies for basic service by up to five percent a year.
Furthermore, another provision in S. 66 mandated cities to renew franchises if operators had
substantially met the requirements of their franchise. Moreover, the members of the
coalition representing educators, consumer advocates, the UAW, and the ACLU argued that,
as written, the bill would limit community access to cable television channels and would also
restrict the authority of local officials to hold cable systems accountable. 226
AT&T was a late comer to the cable debate, and its concerns, which were outside the
scope of the NLC - NCTA compromise, proved to be the most difficult for advocates of the
bill. It objected to the portion of S. 66 that allowed cable system operators to provide non
voice, non-entertainment, data transmission services without regulation. Since AT&T was
subject to regulation by state public utility commissions when it provided such services, it
believed the bill would give cable companies an unfair advantage in selling data
transmission services. Furthermore, AT&T, at that time, was allowed to cross-subsidize
residential telephone service with the larger profits earned in providing long-distance and
special services. Such cross-subsidization was used to universally provide residential
telephone service at affordable rates. AT&T argued that if cable operators could offer data
transmission services in an unregulated manner they would do so at cheaper rates and
thereby "skim-off'' the most lucrative of customers in this market. They contended that if
cable "skimmed" the larger accounts, the cross-subsidies would be negatively impacted and
residential telephone service rates would have to be increased, thereby threatening universal
telephone service. In fact, soon after AT&T began lobbying against the bill, the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners also expressed opposition to the bill. It
wanted to maintain the authority of state regulatory commissioners to regulate data and voice
transmission services regardless of who provided them.
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In early May, the Senate began to take notice of controversies associated with the
bill.

Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina), chairman of the Senate Judiciary

Committee, announced it would hold a hearing to review antitrust implications of the bill's
requirements to renew franchises and prohibit consideration of competing applications by
franchising authorities when renewing contracts. Certain factions within the NLC asserted
that the renewal provisions might possibly violate antitrust laws. This matter was later
resolved to the satisfaction of Senator Thurmond when Packwood agreed to eliminate
language from the bill which prohibited accepting competing applications during renewal
proceedings. The· Judiciary Committee hearing was then cancelled.
At about the same time, AT&T launched a lobbying campaign against the data
transmission provision, gaining the support of senators James Abdnor (R-South Dakota),
Mark Andrews (R-North Dakota), and Rudy Boschwitz {R-Minnesota). They feared that
local telephone rates would increase for rural areas if an erosion of telephone companies
revenues occurred because of competition with cable operators. So they wrote a letter to
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker asking to be consulted before the bill was scheduled
for floor debate. In response, Packwood and Hollings modified the draft bill in an attempt
to address AT&T's concerns. AT&T objected to the changes as not going far enough,
although its representatives participated in negotiations on language. 227
Meanwhile, supporters were still confident the bill would reach the floor of the
Senate. Chairman Packwood and Commerce Committee members Goldwater, Ho111ings,
Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), and Gorton reiterated their support for the bill by distributing
a "dear colleague" letter to other members of the Senate. 228 On May 21, the Commerce
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Committee agreed to the scheduling of the floor debate on S. 66 on June 13, with a vote on
June 14. The postponement resulted partially from a threatened filibuster on the part of
Democratic senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New York), Howard Metzenbaum, and
Frank Lautenberg. Supporters of the bill believed that the delaying action was engineered
by AT&T and the dissident cities.

Tom Wheeler of the NCTA was confident that amendments proposed by senators
Packwood, Goldwater and Hollings adequately addressed the concerns of AT&T and the
cities. Others, however, were not convinced. Abdnor was still worried about the impact that
certain provisions would have on residential telephone rates as they were subsidized through
universal telephone service policy. Therefore, he drafted two amendments that would
counter the deregulation of cable-provided data transmission services by "insuring that all
providers of telecommunications services share in the obligation of providing universal
[telephone] service. "229 Lautenberg prepared an amendment to place the burden of proof on
cable operators to show why a renewal should be granted rather than have a municipality
prove why they should not be granted a renewal as the bill's language stated. Likewise,
Senator Alan Dixon (D-Illinois), was prepared to offer an amendment to delete the automatic
presumption of renewal and shift the burden of proof to cable operators as well as deleting
the provision that would grant automatic rate increases to cable operators. 230 All senators
opposing the bill were Democrats, although not all Democrats in the Senate opposed it.
Floor Debate on S. 66
When the bill finally came to the floor on June 13, Packwood was the floor manager
and Goldwater assisted throughout the debate. The major action during floor consideration
229
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on June 14 was the Abdnor amendment to subject cable to the same state regulations as
telephone companies. It represented the best hopes for the opposition coalition to defeat the
bill. Although Abnor and Lautenberg ostensibly wanted to amend the bill to protect
universal telephone service, the wording would have subjected cable TV operators to the rate
regulations that telephone companies were under. 23 1 Had this amendment been accepted, it
would have killed S. 66. Instead, the amendment was defeated 44-55. In its place, to
address the stated concerns of Abnor and Lauthenburg, the Senate adopted a policy of
promoting universal telephone service at reasonable rates to be subsidized by
telecommunications companies. That amendment passed 97-0 and kept the bill alive.
In further floor actions, the Senate also turned back an amendment sponsored by
Lloyd Bentsen that would have grandfathered all existing contract agreements about
regulated rates for all services. Bentsen' s amendment would cause any new requirements
to apply only to franchise agreements created after passage of the bill, excluding, or
grandfathering, agreements negotiated before the new law went into effect. It was defeated
by a vote of 19-79. The bill, as reported from committee, allowed grandfathering of existing
agreements that regulated rates for basic services for five years or half of the remaining term
of the franchise agreement, whichever was longer. Additionally, the Senate voted 26-72
against an amendment by Dixon that would have removed the automatic rate increases
provided in the bill. Finally, the Senate voted 82-16 to table, or kill, another Dixon
amendment that placed the burden of proof on a cable company to show that it had
conformed with applicable law before its franchise was renewed. 232 This was Dixon' s
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attempt to undermine the renewal expectancy aspects of the bill which favored cable
operators.

Senate Passes S. 66

On June 14, 1 983, the full Senate voted 87-9 to pass S. 66. However, the wide
margin of victory for the bill did not reflect the hard-fought efforts of AT&T to defeat it.
Cable operators, on the other hand, lobbied strongly for passage of the bill to gain some
relief from what they felt to be overly burdensome and uncertain local regulation which they
believed had stymied the development of their industry. The NLC also lobbied for passage
of the bill because of its belief that it was their last best hope to retain some authority over
cable operations in their communities. However, as events would proceed, the faction of
discontented cities within the NLC and USCM would continue to work against passage of
the measure.
S. 66, as passed by the Senate, was essentially based on the compromise agreement
negotiated between the NLC and the NCTA. The provisions that were favorable to the
organized interests of cities authorized state and local governments to award cable
franchises; allowed a local government to acquire a system at fair market value if a company
defaulted; and allowed local governments to require access to channels for public,
educational and governmental purposes. The provisions favorable to cable operators
included barring any level of government from prohibiting ownership of systems because
of owning other media; allowing cable operators to automatically raise rates by five percent
a year; limiting to five percent of gross annual revenues the fees that cable firms would be
required to pay; and requiring state or local governments to automatically renew a franchise
except under limited circumstances. These favorable conditions for cable operators were
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obtained in concert with the positions that they testified for, lobbied for, and negotiated with
the NLC.

Even though the bill finally passed the Senate, it still had opposition to contend with.
Several major cities still opposed the bill, and a day after it passed the Senate, the USCM
unanimously adopted a resolution criticizing the bill at a meeting in Denver. When the
matter of regulation of cable television was taken up by the House of Representatives, the
organized interests began to struggle again for the inclusion of their preferences in
legislation.

Support/or the Compromise Fades
As the cable TV debate moved from the Senate to the House, support for the
compromise among NLC member cities continued to wane. Even though at the annual
meeting of the NLC in July, the board of directors reaffirmed its support for the compromise,
it also noted the substantial concerns of a growing number of cities regarding various
portions of the agreement. The NLC board then took the position that it would not oppose
efforts on the part of some cities to alter the compromise, and that the NLC staff would
provide technical assistance in those efforts. 233

At that meeting, Sidney Stahl, who represented a number of cities on cable
legislation, presented some of their views on the situation. He stated that:
The League now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having agreed
to certain things in the compromise which a large part of its membership
finds totally repugnant. The League neither wants, on the one hand, to
renege on a deal, nor on the other hand, to embrace legislation which violates
233
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the fundamental and sacred principles of all local and state governments. It
is indeed a dilemma for the League. In one case, the League risks losing
credibility with Congress; and in the other, it risks losing credibility among
its members. 234
Stahl further stated that the foremost issue was the inherent right of local
governments to retain jurisdiction over local matters. This issue was most significantly
present in S. 66 regarding rate regulation at the local level. However, Stahl said, "Rates are
not the issue. The issue is local control. "235
Gradually, the position taken by the NLC began to change. At the time of the July
meeting, over 150 cities had passed formal, official resolutions in opposition to S. 66. In
addition, the U. S. Conference of Mayors and the National Association of County Officials
had passed similar resolutions. A resolution was adopted subsequently by the NLC's
Transportation and Communication Steering Committee at a meeting in Seattle on
September 23 and 24, 1983 that appeared to reject the NLC-NCTA agreement. The
committee recommended that the NLC should pursue cable legislation as long as three
conditions were satisfied. First, legislation should not limit the options oflocal governments
to regulate the rates charged by cable operators and that basic service should be defined by
negotiations between cable operators and :franchising authorities. Second,

maxtmum

competition should exist in franchise renewals with no expectation or presumption of
renewal on the part of incumbent franchise holders. Third, all existing franchises and all
franchises in the proposal stage should be "grandfathered." That is, existing franchise
agreements would not be subject to the provisions of the law when it takes effect, but be
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allowed to continued under provisions of agreements either in-place or being actively
negotiated when the law is enacted. 236

The House Considers Cable Television Legislation.

While the Senate was preparing for and completing floor action, in the House, the
Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Telecommunications prepared to
hold hearings on its own cable television bill, H.R. 4103 . The first two hearings took place
on May 25, June 22, even while support for the compromise was fading. The last of three
hearings took place on November 3, 1983 .

The first version of the House

Telecommunications Subcommittee's bill had much the same language as S. 66. However,
it did include a few additional provisions. The notable differences included provisions added
by Wirth that required cable operators to set aside some of their channels for lease to
commercial users (similar to common carrier use), a ban on cross-ownership by newspapers
or broadcast television stations, and a guarantee to cable operators of access to potential
subscribers in multiple-unit dwellings. 237
Chairman Wirth stated that he believed the major issues in deregulating cable TV,
in addition to such matters as franchising and rates, included mandatory access to
commercial leased channels and common carrier status for data transmission channels. 238
Wirth felt that with access came diversity and that diversity of ideas is in keeping with the
purposes of the First Amendment. Expressing his views on the concerns of AT&T, he
stated, "Arguments by telephone companies that data transmission services offered by cable
236
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operators should be regulated as common carriers do not belong in the debate about cable
deregulation11239
Considering the S. 66 Compromise. The House subcommittee appeared to be less
disposed toward the NLC-NCTA compromise than the Senate, although it figured
prominently in the first two hearings. Early in the hearings, it became evident that the House
intended to exercise independent judgment. 240 When testifying at the May 25 hearing,
Mayor Royer of Seattle noted that, "At the urging of you, Mr. Chairman [Wirth], Senator
Bob Packwood, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Congressman Swift and
others, the NLC and the NCTA decided to sit down to see if we could reach some agreement
so that we could bring a skeletal compromise to you for legislation. 11241 The response of
Representative Al Swift was, "Our role is to examine this [compromise] and be sure it is in
the public interest -- and we will do that -- and I am sure we won't agree with everything in
it any more than anyone else does. 11 He went on to say, "The time to compromise is when
nobody can win clearly. If you wait to negotiate until it is clear you will lose you don't have
much place from which to negotiate.11242 Finally, Wirth added, "As I have said before, it
seems to me that the compromise is a very useful framework, but the Congress is not in the
business of asking outsiders to go out and draft legislation and just rubber-stamping that
deal. "243 He also stated that R.R. 4 1 03 made a number of significant and substantial
improvements over the compromise, especially with respect to leased access by program
providers, or cable channels.
239

Ibid, 57.

240

Congress, House, Options for Cable Legislation: hearings, 10.

241

Ibid.

242

Ibid, 170.

243

Ibid, 989.

132
The concerns and leanings ofmembers as reflected in their questions and comments
began to reveal their attitudes toward the choices facing them. Wirth stated that the bill
would have to embody two fundamental principles. First, it would have to provide an
environment in which the cable industry could flourish so that the American public would
benefit, and second, the legislation would have to incorporate the goal of assuring the
American public ofthe widest possible diversity ofprogramming and information sources. 244
On the second day ofthe hearings, Wirth addressed how to assure diversity through access
to the electronic media by those other than the licensee or owner ofthe media. He believed
this was one ofthe greatest challenges in establishing communications policy. Wirth stated,
11

Access itself is not the goal; diversity is the goal. Access provides an effective means of

meeting the goal, guaranteeing that a diversity ofviewpoints can be heard without relying
on rules or regulations concerning cable program content.11 24' In cable television there are
two basic types ofaccess provisions and thus two principal tools for assuring the public as
wide a variety of information sources as possible. "The first category of access is public,
educational, and governmental access -- known as PEG. The second form of access is
known as leased or third party commercial access. Both forms of access are means of
assuring information source diversity, which is clearly one ofthe key federal interests to be
addressed by cable legislation. The legislative goal is to promote diversity, consistent with
protecting the economic interests ofthe cable industry. 11246

On the issue ofcable competition with telephone, Wirth stated:
Should cable's provision oftelecommunications services be regulated? Ifso,
how? The telephone industry has argued that cable should be regulated as a
common carrier by the States. The fact is, however, that telephone
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companies are not regulated because they transmit voice and data, but
because they offer universal service as an effective monopoly. The cable
industry does not have that kind of market power -- and should not be
regulated like the telephone industry. Historically, the subcommittee has
been very much on record related to market power and market share, and it
seems to me the issue is a very different situation where one firm has one
tenth or ten-tenths of 1 percent of the marketplace and another has 98
percent. That is one of the very fundamental purposes of regulation to
protect consumers from the excess of monopolies in terms of prices and
output. When there is competition in the marketplace, then we do not need
to regulate to prevent monopoly. 247
When Representative Ed Markey questioned Mayor Edward Koch of New York
regarding the NLC-NCTA compromise agreement, he referred to, and seemed to support,
federal legislation to promote localism. Koch opposed federal regulation of cable and
preferred the status quo as it existed in New York City and New York State.
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Representative Matthew Rinaldo, speaking on the issue of the cable industry competing with
the telephone industry at local level said, "The cable system [potentially] provides a service
of the same sort that is being provided by the local telephone company. Should the cable
system service be regulated in the same manner as the phone company service? As I stated
at the last cable TV hearing, it seems to me that equity requires that similar regulatory
schemes be imposed on all entities to the extent that they provide similar or identkal
services. "249
House Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell, in a �tatement to the
subcommittee, directed its members to consider the following questions: How to construct
a regulatory system which would recognize the changes which had already occurred in the
cable industry, yet would be forward-looking and not preclude the development of necessary
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regulation as the industry changes? How to assure fairness would exist for all participants?
How to avoid the problem ofthe 1934 Communications Act which set up two categories into
which every service had to fit, broadcast and common carrier, even though as the technology
developed some services began to cross the line, such as cable? How to assure that cable TV
would be as universally available to all citizens as the telephone had become?250
It began to appear as though the compromise between the NLC and the NCTA was
going to collapse. Soon after Wirth introduced H.R. 4103, NLC president Charles Royer
wrote a letter to him outlining in detail the League's opposition to numerous provisions in
the bill. The letter also stated that the NLC position supporting the compromise worked out
with the NCTA in the spring would be reassessed by the full membership at the annual
meeting in November. Royer noted that Wirth's bill failed to provide municipal franchising
authorities with adequate authority to ensure diversity of information or to protect other
essential interests of consumers. 25 1
When the last of the three hearings was held in November, conflicting views were
quite evident. Wirth's bill was severely criticized by Representative John Bryant, (D-Texas)
and a good number of the witnesses testifying before the subcommittee.

Bryant

characterized H.R. 4103 as a "bail-out" for the cable industry and said he did not believe the
industry had demonstrated a compelling need for federal preemption ofthe existing contracts
between cable operators and franchising authorities. 252 Instead, he introduced an alternative
bill, H.R. 4299, that would have allowed municipalities to retain their existing power to
negotiate and enforce cable contracts. Because of differences between the language in H.R.
lSO
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4 103 and S. 66, the NLC opposed Wirth's bill.253 Mayor Royer, speaking for the NLC,
testified that H.R. 4 103 had provisions that did not reflect the compromise that S. 66 was
built upon. He said that language in Wirth's bill contained "adverse interpretations of
ambiguous or incomplete provisions of the compromise."254 Cities had become very
concerned about three principal provisions of the bill. One freed most cable systems from
rate regulation on all but the lowest tier of services. Another gave cable operators an
expectation of renewal, and finally, still another allowed operators to renege on franchise
promises in some cases when conditions changed substantially. Also Royer, following up
on a letter he had earlier sent to Wirth, reminding him that support for the compromise
among the NLC member cities was eroding and might disappear completely. 255
The U.S. Conference ofMayors represented the cities that were dissenting from the
compromise worked out with the NCTA, and this was its first testimony in that role. Mayor
Gregory Sparrow of DeKalb, Illinois, testifying for the USCM, said that the conference
shared the goals of the legi slation. But it believed that the goals could "be achieved without
erecting a structure which, regardless of initial intent, had the end result of protecting the
industry from the marketplace, and from itself. "256
The NCTA defended the bill, and while it testified that H.R. 4 103 was not a "bail
out" for the industry, it did acknowledge that many cable operators had gotten into trouble
because of promises made during franchise bidding wars. Also defending the bill, Stephen
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Eftros, of the CATVA, said he believed it was needed to bring order to the industry on
behalf of all. He said, "The absence oflegislation will be chaos. " 2 s7
To further complicate passage of a bill, opposition by the telephone industry was
presented by Robert Blanz, president of Mountain Telephone and Telegraph Co. He
objected to the provisions that prohibited states from regulating cable as long as cable did
not provide conventional or "switched voice" telephone services. Even though cable only
intended to provide data transmission services and not voice transmission, he said since
telephone companies are regulated by states, the exemption for cable operators would put
the telephone industry at a competitive disadvantage. He believed the solution was to
regulate all who provide the service or free all who contend in the market. To this end,
Representative Swift introduced H.R. 4229 that would permit state regulators to have
jurisdiction over cable systems when they provide data transmission services. 258
Other organized interests also found fault with R.R. 4103 . James MacNaughton,
speaking on behalf of the National Satellite Cable Association {NSCA), representing satellite
master antenna television (SMATV), testified against the provision that established a
statutory right for cable companies to serve tenants in apartment buildings regardless of the
landlord's wishes.

This, he believed, would give cable a competitive advantage over

SMATV service. 259 Additionally, Sue Miller Buske, speaking for the National Federation
of Local Cable Programmers, testified against the way the bill treated access to cable
channel capacity for use by public, educational and governmental entities. The bill allowed
only a "reasonable" amount of channel capacity for PEG access. She complained that the
257
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bill did not define " reasonable," and that this would impede franchise negotiations and
eventually end up in the courts. 260
The only witness claiming to speak for the general public's interest was Jamie Love,
representing Ralph Nader's consumer organization. Love testified that he believed that both
H.R. 4 103 and S. 66 would harm consumers. In his estimation, the bills were not truly
deregulatory, but would create a world where entry was limited by a franchise award. Love
testified, the House bill "is deregulatory in the sense that it relieves the cable operators of
the obligation of increased services and lower rates, but it still retains the protection against
competition. "261
On November 16, 1983 the Telecommunications Subcommittee approved H.R. 4 103
in a voice vote despite efforts by some committee members to delay consideration. 262
Representative John Bryant had moved to delay the vote until December 6, 1983 so that the
NLC's full membership could take a formal policy position on the bill. This motion failed
by a vote of 9-5, but it was supported by Representatives John Dingell and James Broyhill
(R-North Carolina), who were two key members of the full committee. 263 Dingell was
chairman and Broyhill was the ranking minority member, and as such, they were ex officio
members of the subcommittee.
Just prior to the vote by the subcommittee, a key amendment was accepted that
established equal employment opportunity quotas in the cable industry. The amendment
260
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reflected an agreement reached between Representatives Leland, Cardiss Collins (D
Illinois), and the NCT A. This provision in the bill would become an issue later when the
Senate ultimately considered passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act after
conference committee meetings in 1984.

The subcommittee members who voted passage of the bill, such as Chairman Wirth,
and representatives Leland, Swift, Jim Bates (D-California), Tom Tauke {R-Iowa), Michael
Oxley (R-Ohio), Edward Markey, Al Gore, and Matthew Rinaldo, believed that
subcommittee action was necessary to force the cities to take a reasonable and responsible
position on cable legislation. 264 The vote was intended to "move on" with the legislation and
the necessity for doing so was characterized by Tauke when he said, "If we wait around for
the mayors to be happy, we are going to wait forever. 11265
Differences Erode Compromise. But HR 4103 contained restrictions that the cable

operators opposed, including a requirement that a percentage of channels on large systems
be set aside for third-party commercial programming leased access. It would also prohibit
cable system owners from owning other media properties, including daily newspapers in
their home communities, required landlords to allow cable into their buildings only if the
cable firm offered compensation under an FCC approved formula, and allowed cities to
require public, educational and government channels on a cable system.

After subcommittee passage of the bill, Alan Beals, executive director of the NLC,
said that his organization was pleased to see that a number of improvements were made in
the bill by the subcommittee. However, the NLC continued to have major problems with
264

Ibid, 16.

265

Broadcasting Vol. 105, No. 21 November 21, 1983, 29.

139
the bill in the particular areas of the restrictive definition of basic service, the provisions
allowing the cable operators to renege on services and facilities required in franchise
agreements, and the franchise renewal provisions.266 Meanwhile, those city officials aligned
with the USCM were still dissatisfied with the bill and, along with the telephone industry,
. continued to oppose the legislation. 267 When the NLC convened for its annual meeting in
late November, a formal vote was held on support for H.R. 4103. In that vote, the League
formally withdrew its support for the legislation. It also adopted a formal resolution calling
for significant revisions to the bill. 268
Committee Members Urge Renewed Cooperation. Wirth began the task of renewing

cooperative activities by the cities and the NCTA. He defended his bill during a luncheon
speech at the NLC convention and chastised the League for abandoning the compromise269 •
Wirth said, "It is my own belief that the repudiation of your leadership's compromise is a
result of enormous and often systematic lack of information about the bill, little awareness -
if any -- about the changes the subcommittee recently made, little if any response to requests
for assistance in making further changes, and perhaps most disappointing, a failure to focus
on the big picture, on what is really important in this legislation. "

270

Wirth hit particularly

hard on the lack of responsiveness by the cities. He said, "I have been asking city
representatives since early this year to furnish the subcommittee with a specific legislative
enforcement package. After months of asking we received a small package of enforcement
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ideas from the League staff only the night before the subcommittee markup. " 271 He also
stated that when he asked the cities' representatives to help resolve disagreements over the
bill's contents, he was told "there was no interest in cleaning up the bill." Wirth reiterated
that municipal authority over cable television was under serious challenge by recent FCC
decisions that limited cable rate regulations and franchise fees, the massive lobbying
campaign on the part of the telephone industry to treat all non-video cable services as
common carrier activities subject to state regulations, and private lawsuits attacking the
fundamental authority of cities to grant franchises. 2n He concluded by cautioning the cities
that the best chance to resolve the matter was to improve legislative policy through
congressional action, but that it would take participation and continued support by the cities
themselves.
When the NLC rescinded its support for the compromise worked out in support of
S. 66 and voiced opposition to H.R. 4103, the NLC and the USCM, became united, thus
ending their differences and enlarging the coalition opposing the bill. Because of this united
opposition and the cities claims that the terms of S. 66 were too favorable to the industry,
no further progress was possible in 1983 .

Conclusion
Regulation of the cable TV industry had evolved over many years. Since there
existed no national policy on the regulation ofthe industry, and the FCC had at various times
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been deemed without authority over the medium, regulation developed at the local and state
level. Within this framework, the regulation did not evolve consistently across states and
municipalities resulting in many dissimilar aspects.
However, the technology associated with cable telecommunications became very
sophisticated and the medium matured rapidly. The main example of this was the ability to
transmit programming produced by cable owners and others over satellite signals. This
development made cable TV systems a valuable commodity. Further development of the
cable television industry was stymied due to difficulty in attracting the amounts of capital
investment needed. This resulted from the uncertainty inherent in a collection of regulatory
restrictions that varied from city to city. Cable TV system owners began to challenge some
of the regulations in the courts and with increasing frequency, the courts reached decisions
favorable to cable operators. This eliminated some by not all of the state and local
restrictions. But still, a cohesive and comprehensive national policy was needed. At the
suggestion of the courts and initiatives by cable TV industry interest, Congress sought to
establish a national policy.
The time was ripe for the cable TV industry to approach Congress. Deregulation had
become the dominant policy choice in the economic regulatory arena. The best the industry
could hope for was to be deregulated entirely and operate in a free market for video
communications, but they would settle for a national regulatory policy under the authority
of the FCC similar to that applied to the broadcast industry. As could be expected, the
parties that stood to lose the most in such a regulatory change activated their organized
interests to counter such a campaign. Municipalities and state regulators began to lobby for
a national policy that would maintain the status quo and solidify the authorities they had
structured over several decades. Using the argument that they were best suited to serve as
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public "watch dogs" for consumers, cities and municipalities strove to maintain the revenue
sources that they derived from regulating cable TV operators through local .franchise
agreements.
As the issue became more contentious between the main antagonists of cable TV
operators and local governments, congressional leaders pressed the two sides to negotiate.
After several iterations of compromise agreements, S. 66 passed the Senate on June 13,
1983 .
A vision of the movement toward deregulation begins to focus as the developing
technology of cable TV intersects with institutionalized methods for dealing with
telecommunications policy decisions.

Before the maturing of cable television as a

communications medium, the existing regulatory policy relied on a framework comprised
of two main yet distinct approaches. One was telephone (and telegraph) which performed
as common carrier services and were regulated as such. The other was broadcasting which
used the air-waves, owned commonly by everyone, but regulated by the government. Both
the regulators and the relevant industries were comfortable in this structure. The technology
used for cable television is a hybrid of these two approaches and, therefore, fit into neither.
So regulation became problematic because the existing policy approaches did not match well
with the technology. Moreover, the dominant actors in the broadcast and telephone sectors
of communications regulatory structures each wanted to share in the lucrative new sector.
This also led to issue conflicts over whether the medium should be regulated at all
since it did not fit into the existing policy framework. Because some attempts had been
made to regulate at local and state levels, due to the use of public rights-of-way, a vested
interest in continuing that relationship was created by municipalities. They attempted to
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define the issues as one of consumers being overwhelmed by a monopolistic industry.
However, legislators choose to define the policy issue in terms of the need for protection and
nurturing of a developing new technology, one that operated as an under-dog when
competing with the larger more dominant and mature broadcast industry that thrived in the
existing regulatory policy scheme.
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CHAPTER IV
COMPLETION, AFTERMATH, AND REACTION

As the second session of the 98th Congress began in 1984, cable legislation faced a
difficult road. Expectations were that there would be an intense debate on the Wirth
deregulation bill centered around the policy differences among the cable industry, those
cities opposed to the measure, and the telephone companies. The full House committee
appeared to be divided on the bill, although 23 of the 42 members had co-sponsored the
measure. Complicating matters further, Representative Dingell, the chairman of the full
committee, opposed the bill as approved by the subcommittee.273 And, if a bill passed the
House, it was expected that there would be a difficult conference because of substantive
differences between Senate and House versions.

The Legislative Struggle Continues
Late in the session, cable legislation became law. In the process, the various
contending interests were central players in crafting the compromises that always are at the
heart oflegislative struggles, especially those that address complex and contentious matters.
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The measure's effects included some unexpected turns leading, very soon thereafter, to
demands for a legislative adjustment.

The NLCActs

The NLC considered its fight over H.R. 4103 to be one of its highest legislative
priorities for 1984. 274 To that end, it promoted a grass-roots campaign by the cities in
opposition to the bill as drafted. Its members were urged to make every effort to meet with
their representatives in Congress as soon as possible to point out that the bill could
potentially end all rate regulating authority for municipalities.

Further, cities were

encouraged to enlist the support of cable subscribers, church members, unions, and
educational groups to express opposition to their representatives. City officials were urged
to speak to organized service groups, fraternal organizations, and speak on radio talk shows
as well as to generate support through local television appearances and press editorials.
Through this approach of lobbying the general public, the cities hoped to capitalize on the
fact that 1984 was an election year when congressional incumbents would be especially
sensitive to concerns expressed at the local level. The driving force for this undertaking was
NLC's belief that it was up against a powerful industry that was prepared to take every
advantage of the deregulatory atmosphere that prevailed in Washington. 275

Bu ilding a Coalition

In addition to the campaign within its member cities, the NLC also sought support
from other organized interests. Some of the organizations that joined the cities in opposition
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to H.R. 4103 were: the National Association of Counties; the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners; the American Public Power Association; the National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association; the National Black Media Coalition; the American
Library Association; the American Council on Education; the Consumer Federation of
America; the Communications Workers of America; the AFL-CIO; and the National
Federation of Local Cable Programmers. Also, organized representation of cities united
when the USCMjoined the coalition with the NLC after their collective opposition to S. 66
and H.R. 4103.
The opposition was encouraged when Chainnan Dingell made an important speech
at the January meeting of the USCM in Washington. 276 The chairman reiterated his dislike
for the bill as written, describing it as " unabashedly bad. " It did " not adequately address and
protect the legitimate interests of municipalities and consumers. "277 This was followed by
instructions to the mayors on how to lobby for their interests. Dingell believed they needed
to strengthen their lobbying efforts and urged the USCM to present a united front with the
NLC. He warned the mayors against speculating on whether or when the bill would be
scheduled and ifthere would be a tremendous clash in the full committee. He also stated that
ever since the NLC had reversed its position at its annual meeting in November 1983, it had
been woefully ineffective in persuading Congress that the status quo was acceptable and that
there was no need for cable television legislation. On the contrary, he reported that there
existed substantial sentiment in his committee that there were very serious problems with
regard to the granting, regulation, and renewal of cable franchises and that these problems
were not being adequately addressed, because of a perceived lack of capability to address
them at the local level. According to Dingell, it would be a very serious mistake to assume
216
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that the bill would not be heard by the full Energy and Commerce Committee or that no
cable legislation would be enacted in this Congress. He reiterated that the cable industry had
demonstrated in the fight in the Senate that it was a "formidable adversary with a politically
adroit trade association. " 278 He then reminded the mayors that they and their allies had a
fresh opportunity to present a unified case on Capitol Hill.

Toward Resuming Negotiations
While he was critical of the bill, Dingell did not take sides. He preferred a negotiated
compromise between the major interests and proposed that the two primary parties -- the
cities and the industry -- engage in good faith dialogue with the purpose ofreconciling major
differences. But he warned the mayors that any attempts to delay negotiations would be
unacceptable and suggested that the House committee's staff be allowed to monitor the
talks.279 As he concluded his speech, he stated his desire that the process go forward in a
fair and balanced way, with neither side having unfair leverage. "The industry," he said, "has
a legitimate fear that the cities might use any [negotiations] as an opportunity for delay,
hoping to run out the clock and thus kill any cable legislation" in this session. "On the other
hand, 11 he continued, "the message has been delivered to the mayors at various stages of the
legislative process that you'd better make a deal and cut your losses because the train is
pulling out of the station. "280
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The cable industry was beginning to sense that if the legislative effort failed, it could
take its case to the FCC where the Mass Media Bureau was showing an eagerness to
deregulate the industry. James McKinney, its chief, indicated that he would propose a rule
making in the summer of 1984 to free cable operators from some municipal regulations. The
NCTA also avowed that if the FCC didn't act, it would pursue the issue of local government
regulation of the industry in the courts. 281
On the other hand, the NLC took the position that ifthe FCC established rules on rate
regulation, the courts would provide protection for them. The cities believed that the courts
would conclude that the FCC lacked statutory authority under the Communications Act of
1934 to regulate cable television directly. The FCC's rule-making proposal, they believed,
was merely a pressure tactic.
The cities received another push from Dingell in remarks to a congressional-city
conference in early March. He again expressed his view that the Wirth bill was anti
consumer and inequitable and reiterated his commitment to opposing and voting against it
as it was then written. 282

He also told delegates to the conference that there was "no

constitutional precedent and no reason for Congress to want to tell local officials how they
can regulate an industry with such an impact on their localities. "283 In urging the resumption
ofnegotiations, Dingell said that the cities should not be forced to surrender to an agreement
if they could not live with it. Furthermore, he said, "Cities should negotiate from a position
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of strength knowing that they, as elected officials, have more power of influence on
Congress than any other group" if they used it. 284
It appears clear that Dingell intended to take the lead in passing cable legislation in
the House. He showed that he preferred a negotiated compromise, but he also laid out the
road map in such a way that the absence of such compromise would not stop Congress from
formulating policy in this area on its own in a fashion that it saw fit. This last aspect surely
established incentives for cities to participate in making the best deal they could. At that
point, negotiations resumed.

Another Round ofNegotiations

By the end of January, the NCTA, NLC, and USCM had agreed to another round of
negotiations to resolve differences that were preventing consideration of legislation in the
House. When negotiations commenced, the cities were interested in retaining regulatory
authority over rate increases, service quality, equipment enhancement and the granting of
franchises. They also opposed language in the House bill that allowed cities to escape from
franchise agreements for unforeseen changes in conditions that would be determined on
case-by-case basis. On the other side of the table, the cable industry wanted limitations on
the amount of franchise fees that cities could charge and assurances of franchisee renewals.
They opposed language that had been added to the House bill that required a percentage of
channel capacity be made available for third-party commercial access.
One significant departure from previous negotiations when the new round began was
the cities' use of elected officials as negotiators. A negotiating team was named comprised
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of three members from USCM and three from NLC. The negotiators for the local
government interests were: Dick Fulton, mayor of Nashville; Dick Callageri, mayor of
Pittsburgh; Paul Zeltner, councilman and former mayor from Lakewood, California; Tom
Volgy, vice-mayor of Tucson, Arizona, (he was the de facto chair for the group);Minette
Trosh, councilwoman from Charlotte, North Carolina; and Carol Bellamy, council president
from New York City. 285 For Tom Wheeler, one of the industry negotiators, three people
stood-out in his mind as having an impact on the negotiations. The first was Charles Royer,
the Mayor of Seattle and President of the NLC. Although not one of the negotiators, he was
closely involved. The second was Tom Volgy the city councilman from Tucson. (Mooney
remembered Volgy as a man of somewhat "mercurial" temperament. "He used to get quite
excited during some of these meetings, when we made a second deal."286) The third was
Susan Herman from New York City, who accompanied Carol Bellamy and provided staff
support. 287
Prior negotiations for the first compromise were conducted with regulatory stafffrom
a few cities and staff of the NLC. Since some of the larger cities that were not directly
represented balked at the first compromise, it was believed that representation by elected
officials rather than staff would result in a more acceptable outcome. Therefore, the NLC
Board wanted elected officials to negotiate this round.

As Jim Mooney

recalled,

This thing went through a couple of iterations. We negotiated a deal with
Cynthia [Pols] and George [Gross]. But between the Senate concluding
consideration of that bill and the House initiating consideration of that bill,
in the winter of 1983-84, there was a revolt inside the NLC in which a lot of
the people who were principals of the NLC -- you know, mayors, and so
forth -- said that they just weren't going to take the deal. They didn't care if
the NLC had negotiated it or not. So, we basically had to do it again" This
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time while Cynthia and George were present, it was really with a group of
four or five principles. 288
In this arrangement, the elected officials were expected to negotiate highly technical
issues regarding cable television deregulation. 289 Pols remembered the negotiations as a very
difficult process. "I was the technical expert but also the generalist. I was the only one who
knew the legal side, yet we had to bring in this gaggle of people -- to be political on our side
-- who didn't know the law or the legislative process, but we had to face people who devoted
their entire lives [to representing the cable industry interests]. "290 Unlike the first round of
negotiations, the cities would have 10 to 15 people at each session. In comparison, "after
Wheeler left the NCTA, it was only Mooney with just his attorney; and he knew exactly
what he wanted. " 291
We had this difficult process trying to get all those people to agree on stuff.
All of these people were trying to deal with these nuanced [sic] issues of
legislative language on the issue of regulation which wasn't something that
was their natural bailiwick. We were very much at a disadvantage from a
technical sense to be told you have to negotiate with these people and you got
to use elected officials when they're [cable industry] going to use their
specialists. It was always hard for us to get our people there, [on the Hill]
and they had to be prepared to move on a dime to talk about cable. We were
at an inherent disadvantage
in the process and it was a process that was
dictated by Congress. 292
Cynthia Pols felt there were many intrinsic power inequities in the negotiating
process.293 She believed that was because "cities don't ever give campaign contributions.
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Whatever relationship cities' officials have are a question of loyalties and political
relationships, not a financial one like the NCTA where they have established access to
legislators. Plus once we reached an agreement -- we had a pretty detailed agreement that
was close to legislative language, but it wasn't quite legislative language, and obviously it
wasn't legislative history."294 At that point, it was all provided to committee staff people to
tum into legislative language. They were on Wirth's staff and were
"totally tight with the cable industry. They [staff] were going off and having
fancy lunches while they were drafting the language -- getting clauses here
and there -- that weren't supposed to be there and trying to change things and
stuff that we hadn't talked about. Trying to get an advantage they weren't
entitled to. We actually had to bring our negotiators in after the agreement
was drafted to meet with Dingell to basically tattle on his staff people
because they had been doing all these things for the NCTA and I couldn't get
them to do the right thing." 295
This round of negotiations was lengthy, taking place over a nine month period in
1 984. At times the tone was strained. According to Jim Mooney, "There was very little
lightness to those negotiations. There wasn't much camaraderie in those rooms. Frequently,
in situations like that, the two sides can be pretty friendly with each other, on a personal
basis. But that really wasn't the case in this instance. There was something about cable TV
issues that leads . . . that causes emotions to run hot. "296 This temper ofthe negotiations lead
to an impasse in late March. The major sticking points were the franchise renewal and rate
regulation provisions in the legislation. At that point, Mooney said that the NCTA would
push hard for a bill, but would not accept just any bill.
Eventually, a second compromise agreement was reached among USCM, NLC and
NCT A on May 28. The compromise that resulted allowed cities to continue to regulate rates
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and service tiers for four years through franchises, rather than immediate preemption oflocal
authority. But after four years from enactment, they would no longer regulate the rates
charged to subscribers and the full deregulation of rates and tier structures would take effect.
Other features of the compromise included an agreement on administrative due processes
for cities to use in renewing existing franchise agreements and the continuation of existing
franchise agreements regarding services, facilities and equipment. However, facility and
equipment requirements for new agreements differed. Since the negotiators agreed to
differentiate between franchise agreements either in-place, or in the final stages of
negotiations, and ones that would be negotiated under any new legislation, the franchising
authority would be entitled to establish minimum facility and equipment requirements for
new agreements. It also allowed for negotiated contract modifications if circumstances
beyond the control ofthe system operator warranted. Franchise fees would be limited to five
percent of gross revenues from cable operations, and the federal government would be
prohibited from restricting the use of franchise fee revenues by cities.

For existing

franchises, the franchising authority would be entitled to enforce customer service
requirements. An important key provision of the proposed agreement was that all three
parties, NCTA, NLC, and USCM, would support the compromise all the way through
passage by the House and the House-Senate conference. 297 Pols said she thought the
compromise was "a fair package overall. " Len Simon, speaking for the USCM, said, "Given
the political situation and dynamics, this is the best deal we believe" could be achieved at
the time. 298 That accord was unanimously agreed to by all of the negotiators representing
the cities, but since the NCTA had not granted its negotiator authority to approve, it was
approved by the NCTA board.
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The House Bill Clears Committee
John Dingell, was credited with bringing the parties back to the table and making it
all happen. 299 Dingell said he would hold a markup on the bill in late June, but he also
recognized that other issues could still impede the process. It was noted that several
consumer groups had made it known that they were not entirely satisfied with the direction
the legislation was taking, and it was expected that Bell operating companies would strongly
oppose the bill and some of its provisions that allowed cable to transmit data without being
subject to state regulations. 300
On June 26, the House Energy and Commerce Committee reported H.R. 4103 . The
major change to the subcommittee bill was the inclusion ofthe compromise language created
in negotiations between the NLC, USCM and the NCTA. No changes were made to the
compromise and no language from other sources were inserted in the bill.

Compromise Breaks Down Again
Before the House bill could reach the floor, a significant event occurred that
ultimately caused the collapse of the second agreement. Jim Mooney recalled that within
a month of that deal being concluded, there was a decision by the Supreme Court, handed
down on June 1 8, which tossed the deal into a "cocked hat," because it fundamentally
undermined some of the legal assumptions about limits to the authority of the FCC which
were the basis of the agreement. Although the bill as negotiated between the two sides was
reported from the House Commerce Committee, that's as far as it went. Support for it had
pretty much evaporated on both sides in light of the decision. In Mooney's words, "So there
2
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we were at the end of June with everybody pretty much convinced that this process had
ended inconclusively and unsuccessfully. "30 1
The decision, Capital Cities Cable Inc. et al. v. Crisp, struck down Oklahoma's ban
on cable transmission of wine advertisements. 302

What was most damaging to the

compromise was not the issue of advertising wine, but rather the aspect of the ruling that
affirmed the authority of the FCC to preempt state and local regulation of cable television.
Even though Oklahoma did not prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages
within the state, it did, in general, prohibit the advertising of such beverages. In 1 980, the
Oklahoma Attorney General (Crisp) determined that the state' s advertising ban prohibited
cable television systems operating in Oklahoma from retransmitting out-of-state signals
containing such beverage commercials, particularly wine commercials. 303 Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. and other cable op�rators sued in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief when they were threatened by the state with criminal prosecution. After
winning relief in U. S. district court, it was reversed by the court of appeals. Capital Cities
appealed to the Supreme Court. It held that application of Oklahoma' s alcoholic beverages
advertising ban of our-of-state signals carried by cable operators is preempted by Federal
law. 304 The Court held that FCC rules permitted Oklahoma to regulate such local aspects as
franchisee selection and oversight of system construction, but requiring cable operators to
delete commercial advertising in signals carried in compliance with federal regulations
clearly exceeded its limited jurisdiction and interfered with an area that the FCC explicitly
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preempted. 305 It was also held that Oklahoma's advertising ban was in conflict with FCC
regulations requiring cable operators to carry signals from local broadcast stations in full,
and FCC rulings permitting and encouraging cable operators to import distant out-of-state
broadcast signals. 306 The Court's decision limited the scope of the local government
involvement in cable television to responsibility for "non-operational aspects of cable
franchising, including bonding agreements, maintenance of rights-of-way, franchisee
selection and conditions of occupancy and construction."307 It held that the FCC had
preemptive authority to assure the orderly development of new cable technology into the
national communications structure. 308 With such a clear decision from the Court about their
view of the limited authority of states and local governments while acknowledging the broad
authority of the FCC, many in the cable industry wanted to abandon the legislative route in
favor of pursuing their policy needs with the FCC.
Within five weeks of the Crisp decision, the FCC added to the confusion when it
issued a final rule in the Community Cable TV, Inc., case, also known as the Nevada
decision. The rule preempted vast numbers of state and local franchise agreements in ways
that substantially deregulated cable TV operators. Bolstered by the Crisp decision, the
FCC's final ruling, issued on July 25, 1984, included language that dismissed the NLC's
petition for reconsideration on procedural grounds. This occurred despite the fact that the
petition of the NCTA was accepted for consideration, even though it had not been filed in
a timely fashion. That final ruling reiterated a November 8, 1983 ruling that limited state
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and local regulation of rates to the first tier of service. 309 It also expanded the ruling to
nullify all franchise requirements which required the provision of particular services. 310 The
final ruling included a statement that, "Allowing market give-and-take to occur without
adding government as an additional participant is the better course in fostering development
of program services for the public. " 311
The combination of these rulings seriously jeopardized the compromise formulated
between cities and cable operators. Many in the cable television industry now felt that they
did not need to compromise with local regulators in the cities. Since the FCC was known
for its pro-deregulation stance during the early 1980s, some NCTA member companies
wanted to vacate the legislative approach completely and cast their lot altogether with the
FCC for full deregulation. However, the NCTA board recognized that while the FCC was
sympathetic to the industry at that time, future commissions might have a different
perspective. The board ultimately supported the legislative approach to create statutory
protection for the industry through statute law; something that regulatory agency rulemaking
alone could not do. However, it no longer supported the bill as written. It sought revisions
to H.R. 4 1 03 that were more closely aligned with the Supreme Court's Crisp ruling affirming
the authority of the FCC to preempt state and local regulators. . Seeking these revisions
effectively withdrew their support from the compromise. NCTA wanted less local authority
over subscriber rates to reflect decisions by the Supreme Court and the FCC. It also wanted
assurances of franchise renewal, restrictions on the use of franchise fees paid to local
authorities and free access to multi-family dwellings and apartment buildings. 312 The NCTA
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believed the cable industry was in a "no-lose" situation. If the legislation with the changes
it sought to reflect the Crisp decision became law, it would have a solid regulatory
foundation for building the future. If the bill were defeated, the cable industry could go to
the seemingly friendly courts and the FCC to solidify the recent deregulatory rulings by
seeking additional ones. 313
City officials remained committed to legislation to establish their authority over cable
franchises in light of the rulings by the FCC and the Supreme Court. To this end, the NLC
board reaffirmed its support for H.R. 4103 at a July 1 3 meeting and called for immediate
action by the House to pass the bill.
The influence of the Supreme Court and the FCC as other institutional actors in the
policy process had led to another breakdown in the legislative process. James Mooney
summarized the situation succinctly when he said, "What happened, of course, was that the
political and legal tidal wave set off by the Supreme Court's Crisp decision had swamped
the legislative boat. " 314

Resu"ecting the Compromise

Soon, however, caution overtook the cable industry. Concern developed within the
NCTA that pressing hard for much more than was then in the bill would disrupt what had
been a relatively smooth working relationship with Congress. Many were asking whether
the NCTA could succeed with its new demands without alienating its key congressional
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allies, especially Wirth who had authored the original House version. 3 15 While some in the
NCTA believed they were in a win-win situation from a business standpoint because of
deregulatory leanings in the courts and the FCC, others worried about the political aspects.
If they could not adequately justify reneging on key points in a signed agreement between
the NCTA and the cities, the industry's reputation on Capitol Hill and its ability to move,
block, or influence legislation in the future could be impaired. 316 Cable companies were
concerned about relying on regulatory rules and court decisions that could be reversed by
future commissioners or judges. Many still desired regulatory protection written into the
statute books, but protection now informed by Crisp.
When the compromise nearly collapsed, Senator Goldwater attempted to revive the
negotiations by repeatedly warning cities against abandoning the compromise process. In
a speech before the NCTA in July, he had warned cities that if they reneged again on the
compromise, he intended to use all of the resources at his command to ensure that the FCC
deregulated the cable industry and preempted state and local regulations to the maximum
extent allowed by its authority. 317 Seemingly ignoring Goldwater' s threats, the NLC and the
USCM told the NCTA in late July that they were not prepared to reopen negotiations on the
bill on the industry's conditions. Further, they intended to push for passage of the legislation
with or without NCTA's support. The NLC and USCM geared up to lobby Congress during
the three-week recess from August 13 to September 5, 1984, and even cities that had
opposed the bill prior to the compromise agreement were now pressing for its passage.
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Wirth also continued to pressure both the cities and the NCTA to resume
negotiations. He still felt there was time for both sides to bargain in their best interests. 31 8
So the door on renewed negotiations had not been completely shut. James Mooney of
NCTA said, "This bill has been pronounced dead by the trade press at least six times within
the previous eight months. Each time, lo and behold, it emerged from the ashes. "3 1 9
Additionally, Dingell issued a letter castigating the industry for "greed and arrogance" and
threatened that the ultimate victim could be the cable industry itself 320 Yet another tactic
intended to break the impasse was used by Goldwater. Following through on a threat he
made in July, he wrote a letter, dated August 10, to FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, in which
he expressed his anger with the cities for their unwillingness to negotiate changes to the
House cable bill that the industry wanted in order to reflect the conditions resulting from the
Supreme Court and FCC rulings .. He told Fowler, "If we don't get legislation out of the
House, I want you to throw the whole damn book at the cities and give cable everything you
can under your power. I've never seen such double-crossing, double-talk and downright lying
as I've heard from the cities. And, I think it's time we get the word across to them. " 321

The Third Negotiations
The board of directors of the NCTA voted in early September to authorize Jim
Mooney to again negotiate with representatives of the cities for legislative language
acceptable to both sides. 322 While the vote was not unanimous, it was a strong indicator of
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the desire to reach a viable compromise so legislation could be passed. Two provisions in
the House bill that were particularly difficult to accept by some in the NCT A were the
grandfathering of rate regulation for tiers and the continued regulation of and the structrure
of tiers for four years after the date of enactment. A group within the NCTA felt that since
the Supreme Court had, in the Crisp decision, affirmed the FCC's preemptive authority,
which was followed by the FCC's quick exercise of that authority with its Nevada decision,
that to give in on these issues in a legislative compromise would be retrogressive, given the
industry's regulatory position vis-a-vis these decisions. But even with the lukewarm
prospects of new talks, the chances of passing legislation were still small, as only three
weeks remained until Congress was scheduled to adjourn.
After the NCTA board indicated a willingness to modify some of its demands to
entice the cities to resume negotiations, Packwood stepped up the pressure. He stated in a
letter to the NLC that, "Next year may be too late. Our legislative schedule may prevent
consideration of cable legislation, and in the meantime, the courts and the FCC may further
define the limits of existing [municipal] regulations. "323 In addition, after the cable industry
showed flexibility on the issues, Dingell, who had castigated the industry by letter and begun
to favor the cities, strongly suggested to the USCM and the NLC that they resume talks with
the NCTA. Yet another factor in the decision by the cities to renegotiate was the awareness
of difficulties they would have in trying to pass the legislation without the support of the
cable industry. Because the bill had to pass through the House Rules Committee before it
could move to the House floor, and the NCTA had demonstrated that it had the political
leverage to block actions in the Rules Committee, the NLC and USCM realized they would
need to compromise. 324 It became a widely shared view that if a bill were to pass, it would
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have to take place before the end of the legislative session. Next year would bring in a new
Congress, and the process would have to begin anew, if there were interest in the
committees. The courts and the FCC might not wait until the next Congress could enact
legislation on cable telecommunications. Markey articulated this perspective when he stated
on the floor of the House during final consideration of H.R. 4103 that, "One result of the
deregulation mania is that unless Congress enacts a cable bill, the Supreme Court will do it
for us."325 In Markey's view, cities and consumers would not be included in the Supreme
Court's or FCC's considerations of cable TV policy. Mooney's recollections agreed with
that assessment of the policymaking environment at the time:
That view was pretty much the prevailing wisdom through July and most of
August. That's when people who are supposed to know their way around
Washington earn their money, and I earned my money. We got together
again, this time with Cynthia and George only and cut the deal that became
the 1984 Cable Act; that was in early September. Everybody understood that
not only did we have to move that billfast, because the session was coming
to an end, but you had to move itfast because the shelflife ofthese things
hadproved to be very short. Unless you got the damn thing enactedfast, a
new group of dissidents would spring up on one side or the other and start
picking it apart. 326 [Emphasis mine.]
The renewed negotiations did not always run smoothly. Even though the NLC and
the USCM had authorized their negotiators to approve any deals worked out, at least
preliminarily, the NCTA required approval by its board of directors, meaning no final
authority resided with Mooney as the negotiator. The negotiators reached an agreement on
September 19, but it was rejected by the NCTA board because some of the larger cable
system operators did not believe they really needed to compromise. They believed both the
courts and the FCC were on their side. The board's action prompted Dingell to issue a
strongly worded statement condemning the cable industry's "intransigence at the bargaining
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table" and expressing "only anger and disappointment at the greed and arrogance of those
leaders of the industry who have tied the hands ofthe negotiators. " 327 But on September 24,
the NCTA board approved a new position which incorporated the key provisions of the
NLC-USCM proposal. 328 Thus, by September 29, 1984, cities and cable TV operators had
agreed to their third compromise on cable television legislation. The compromise focused
mainly on H.R. 4103's provision to grandfather rate regulation of basic tiers of service and
franchise aspects that prohibited cable operators from removing programming from the basic
tier until four years after the law went into effect. The cities accepted the NCTA' s offer for
a more limited grandfathering provision to protect systems that had already repackaged and
repriced as a result of the FCC's Nevada decision. In return, the NCTA accepted the cities'
offer to reduce the period of continued municipal rate regulation from the four years
contained in H.R. 4103 as it passed committee to two years. 329

House Passage, Conference, and Enactment
The bill was scheduled for a House vote the first week in October. Then a procedural
compromise was formulated that allowed the measure to be brought up under suspension of
the House rules. This meant that debate would be limited to 40 minutes and amendments
could be offered only by the chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, Dingell,
or Wirth as the chairman of the Telecommunications Subcommittee. In return, a two-thirds
vote was required for passage. Opposition to the bill was expected to come by way of attacks
from the telephone industry over the issue of regulating data transmission services and from
the real estate industry over language regarding access to apartment buildings and other
327
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multi-family dwellings by cable operators. 330 However, the opposition was resolved through
last minute negotiations with those interests. 33 1
A compromise amendment negotiated by Swift resolved the telephone industries
opposition. Wirth explained the change in summarizing the bill on the floor.
Concerns expressed by the telephone industry with the original draft were
addressed and resolved during full committee consideration. To resolve the
concerns of the telephone industry, a compromise amendment by Swift
narrowed the definition of cable service and was adopted by the full
committee. 332
Rinaldo further clarified the compromise, "The Swift amendment limited the
definition of cable services to only include the type of video and other general programming
that are available to subscribers. "333 Additional language favorable to the telephone industry
was described by Dingell, language that addressed "protections for telephone companies
regarding cross-ownership and pole attachment rules. "334 Dingell stated that there was no
remaining formal objections from the telephone industry. The opposition from realtors
stemmed from a provision that prohibited owners of multi-family dwellings from preventing
of interfering with provision of cable service to residents. That opposition was eliminated
when Wirth and his staff deleted the section from the bill.
Other changes to H.R. 4103 after it was reported by the committee were explained
briefly by Wirth. "Under the most recent compromise agreement between the cities and
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cable industry, municipal rate regulation for basic service is grandfathered for two years, but
cable operators cannot be forced to retier, replace, or reprice services which have already
been lawfully changed. "335 The version considered on the floor would deregulate the rates
charged for basic cable service in two years in order to allow market conditions to dictate
prices compared to the reported verison that had a four year transitional period for municipal
rate regulation. 336
Several other changes also were made. These included clarifying renewal provisions
whereby franchising authorities and cable operators could agree to renew a franchise without
implementing administrative procedures and protection for cable operators against "unfair
denial of the franchise. "337 A provision was added to allow the FCC to grant waivers to
telephone companies allowing them to own cable systems where cable service would
otherwise be denied to local residents. A clarification was made in the equal employment
opportunity provision providing that a finding of failure to employ members of minority
groups and women at the prescribed parity levels did not by itself constitute a violation.
Additional clarifications addressed provisions that authorized the receipt of satellite cable
programming for private viewing by individuals, at Gore's behest, and a provision extending
the time for appeals of state pole attachment rules to at most 3 60 days if authorized by state
rules. In all, there were sixteen clarifying amendments that changed the bill from the version
reported by the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 338
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The House passed H.R. 4103 by the required two-thirds margin on October 1,
1 984. 339 Describing the major thrust, Wirth characterized the bill as setting "forth franchise
procedures and standards to encourage the growth of cable and to ensure that cable systems
are responsive to the needs and interests of the local communities they serve. "340
The differences between H.R. 4103 were notable. S. 66, as passed by the Senate,
included provisions on regulation of rates and services that allowed for franchising
authorities to regulate rates for basic cable services for five years following enactment. 34 1
Others included provisions on renewals, unauthorized interception of[stealing] cable signals,
protection of subscriber privacy, and finally, restrictions on the regulation of basic cable
services, facilities, and equipment. 342
Since the Senate had passed S. 66, the House was also considering that bill. Wirth
moved to amend S. 66 by replacing all language after the enacting clause with the provisions
ofH.R. 4103 that had just passed the House by two-thirds vote. 343 In this action, the House
approved S. 66 as amended by its bill H. R. 4103 . Next, the House and Senate appointed
conferees to resolve differences in the two versions of S. 66.
In the Senate, appointment of conferees was blocked by the opposition of several
conservative senators led by Senators Orren Hatch (R-Utah), and Jesse Helms (R-North
Carolina), who objected to equal employment provisions championed by Representative
339

Ibid, 27987.

340

Ibid, 27975.

34 1

Ibid, 27987-2799 1 .

342

Ibid.

343

Ibid, 27989.

167
Mickey Leland, who negotiated them with cable lobbyists. The guidelines were similar to
existing FCC regulations, but the Senate Republicans objected to what they viewed as
quotas. They used a Senate tradition of putting a "hold" on the bill to delay action. On
October 5, the bill's sponsors, Goldwater and Packwood agreed to strike the affirmative
action section. That prompted Senator Metzenbaum, a supporter of the provision to place
a counter-hold. On October 1 1 , Representative Leland and other House backers agreed to
drop all references to percentages ofjobs to be filled by women and minorities. Instead, new
language strengthened the FCC's power to enforce its then current regulations regarding
affirmative action. According to a Wirth aide, the passage of the '84 Act was a "battle
royale;"
At the last minute the conservative Republicans -- Jessie Helms-types -
suddenly discovered that this law contained the strongest affirmative action
provisions anywhere in any federal law. They said: Oh my God! What are
we doing here? Had you been there, you would have seen Tim Wirth,
physically, getting the papers from the Senate and walking them to the House
so that the bill could be passed. And had he not done that, and basically,
bludgeon -- not committee staff, but official floor staff, people to hurry up
and get the papers and stuff -- it wouldn't have passed! Just as an example,
the bill passed because at 1 0 o'clock that morning, a deal on affirmative
action was reached with Orren Hatch. It required Wirth to expend an
enormous amount of political capital to gain the support needed. 344
The law passed both houses on October 1 1, the last day of the session, after House
Democrats and Senate Republicans resolved differences over an affirmative action
provision. 345
Observations and Reflections

Clearly, the enactment of a national policy for cable television was not a
straightforward affair. There were many starts and stops. It seems evident, however, that
344
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the largest single factor that finally lead to passage was the strategy of focusing on cable
telecommunications in a specific manner rather than to include efforts to establish cable
televison policy within broader legislative actions intended to completely rewrite the
Communications Act of 1934. When the broad, comprehensive method was attempted, there
were too many other controversial issues to block enactment for reasons unrelated to cable
telecommunications. The focused approach allowed the main antagonists· to compromise
on provisions in a fashion that gave neither all that they wanted but yet provided for the most
favorable outcome that could be expected in the governmental policymaking environment
of the time. It also allowed certain peripheral issues such as copyright payments and "must
carry" rules to be sorted out in separate legislative actions in a manner which avoided
undermining the efforts to clarify and establish a national cable policy.
The new policy did involve other institutional changes that would soon come to the
fore. As LeDuc was to observe later, the legislative language ofthe Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 seemed to have established that Congress had reserved the right to
preempt any state or local regulation it considered to be in conflict with federal mass
communication policy. 346 By deregulating basic cable subscription fee controls and
establishing a nationally uniform procedure for franchise renewal, the federal government
seemed intent on expanding its jurisdictional base in an effort to free the cable industry from
I

as many of the varied franchise requirements as it could. "To accomplish that objective, the
federal government used an incremental process that would eventually deprive state and
local governments of any meaningful role in the regulation of cable telecommunications. " 347
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Moreover, the FCC's direct authority over cable TV as granted in the act strengthened
the capacity of the commission to use preemptive federal authority to diminish the role of
state and local governments in the field of cable regulation. There was reason to expect that
it would be used not only by the FCC but also by countless cable and pay-TV operators and
by satellite-dish retailers and owners, who would claim under the act the same rights in order
to attack a broad range of state or local operating restraints in the federal courts. 348

Who Won and Who Lost?
When a piece of legislation that is hard-fought by such polarized representation is
finally enacted, the inevitable question is, "Which interests won and which ones lost?"
Packwood addressed the question by saying "Clearly, cable TV was the winner on
deregulation. "349 From the perspective of the cities, Pols thought it ended up a 5 0-5 0
situation. "Cable did well with rate deregulation. Cable was content. Cities were content
initially, then the rates started to go up and up and up. In 1987 and 1988, cable rates started
to re-emerge as a problem. "350
Cable TV Industry

Speaking for the cable industry, Tom Wheeler reflected on the question saying, "I
hope we were the winners. It was a landmark piece oflegislation. " 3 51 He believed the cable
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industry was by far the winner because uniform policy was established. "The cable industry
finally held its nose and lost on some issues because of the greater good being served by
uniform policy being established. A couple of examples [where we lost] were the lease
access provision, . and Chairman Wirth wanted a provision for requiring access to a
percentage of channel capacity based on system size. "352 More favorably, on the issue of
franchising fees; there was a franchise fee cap put at three percent to five percent which, it
was widely accepted to mean, de facto, five percent. This was virtually an increase in fees
for all franchising authorities. "But it was clear that the cities would sign nothing that didn't
have that kind of cap in it. When you're running a multi-billion dollar business, five percent
of your gross is a LOT of money."353 These were the kinds of things where the industry had
to hold its nose and swallow hard. But, still the overriding necessity for the cable industry
was to have some kind of uniform federal policy.
Jim Mooney, who followed Wheeler as President of the NCTA, said he thought the
cable industry won in 1984 because "the cable industry was able to make a good case that
it offered the promise of improved television service in the United States;" that it offered a
greater diversity of programming choices to people at relatively modest costs.

It

successfully made the case that "its development was being hampered by the demands of
local franchising jurisdictions, who traditionally had been the licensing authorities for cable
systems, for all kinds of freebies and for gold-plated systems that were basically,
uneconomical. "354 He believed that the industry convinced Congress that something had to
be done to rein in the power of local franchising authorities because they had so complicated
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the business with uneconomic requirements and other difficulties. "If the technology and the
medium was to be able to grow and develop and flower," relief was essential. 355
Senator Packwood attributed the cable industry's success to their attitude. "Here's
something they passionately wanted. And passion is underestimated. "3 56 He did not view
the cable TV question as a truly large public issue. "It's not a major issue, it's not a Viet
Nam. In a climate of deregulation -- and certainly on the Commerce Committee at the time
-- they were pushing for deregulation. "357 And they were pushing at a time when it was
harder and harder to defend the theory of scarcity. "Certainly on cable it was hard to defend
the theory of scarcity. There was no scarcity of cable. Scarcity was disappearing as a
rationale. So they [ cable industry] wanted it badly, and there was less strong opposition. " 3 58
In Packwood's recollection, the cities wanted the money and they wanted the power.

Cities
Ward White saw cities as the losing interests in the enactment of cable deregulation.
"But, in the end, I don't think the cities lost that much. The cities might have lost some of
their regulatory controls but they complained that consumers were still holding them
responsible for rate increases. They couldn't do anything about it but they had to take the
rap. I suppose they could thank themselves. "3 59 White remembered that the subcommittee
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staff didn't pay too much attention to the cities. He recalled that some of the subcommittee
members did for personal reasons, but, it was not the staff's concern to look out for the cities.
We were more concerned with the authority exercised by the cities and the
idea that the cities and the cable industry were involved in a lot ofvery shady
deals here in the franchise wars and people were not happy with that. There
was a real effort at that point to take the authority away from the cities
because of that and that's one of the things that helped originate this
legislation in the first place. That was a different [time] back in the late 70s
and early 80s. 360
Broadcasters
Describing the National Association of Broadcasters perspective, Jack Goodman,
NAB's Vice President for Public Policy, said, "In 1984, the cable industry was clearly the
big winner, although they had to give up certain things to the cities." For the most part, they
got the cities neutralized and made it much, much more difficult for the cities to impose
onerous conditions on franchise renewal. "It made it much harder for them to even
challenge a franchise renewal. And they [NCTA] got price deregulation -- a major, major
victory in 1984. " 361 Broadcasters also lost in their attempts to get "must carry'' provisions
in cable legislation. The Courts had too recently struck down such requirements as
infringements on First Amendment rights of cable operators.

Telephone Industry
Regarding the telephone industry, Ward White believed,
The telephone industry, to some extent, was a loser because they were
permanently kept out of cable. Not that they would have gone into it, but
that they were kept out probably delayed their serious consideration of
getting into the video marketplace as a result. But they had a lot to do at the
time with the divestiture and all the other changes that were taking place in
360
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the industry. They probably were losers. They were always trying to get
their pound of flesh out of everybodt. They complained that they were left
out but they didn't try to get in on it. 62
The issue of most interest to the telephone industry was the potential for cable
systems to carry non-voice data transmissions. They did not want so much to exclude cable
from the market as much as they wanted to assure that the same regulations would apply to
cable systems carrying data transmission as did the phone companies. They did not want
cable to get what they viewed as an unfair advantage if cable were not subject to the same
state fee regulations for common carrier services. They attempted to get language in the
bills that would effectively subject data transmission services by cable operators to the same
requirements as phone companies.
According to White, one strategy that did not work well for the telephone interests
is that they set-up an organization called BellCore for joint marketing purposes, but also to
lobby. "It had a legislative operation, supposedly, representing all the Bell Companies who
owned BellCore."363 The Bell Companies were attempting to get what they could out of this
bill, even though this organization is not listed among hearing testimony. This strategy
failed when Pacific [Bell] lobbied members on their own "which irritated the hell out of
everybody else in the telephone industry. "364

Consumers and Pole Attachments

Consumers were not mentioned by any interviewees as either winners or losers at the
time of enactment of the law. However, it was a consensus that after full implementation
362
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ofthe bill took effect in 1987, that rates rose at a consistently steep rate. At that point, many
consumers believed they had lost in the deregulation effort. Certainly, interest groups that
claimed to represent consumers, such as the Consumer's Union and Ralph Nader' s
organization, believe from the onset that consumers were losers when deregulation was
enacted.
Another issue that received attention early in the efforts to develop cable television
policy was that ofpole attachment regulations. When local governments and cable operators
were first encouraged to participate directly in the legislative process, pole attachment rate
abuse was an important issue to operators. This can be attributed in part to the pending
expiration of laws that addressed pole attachment availablility and rates. However, as the
development of legislation waxed and waned, the issue of regulating pole attachment
agreements and rates evaporated from the agenda. The issue was dealt with by separate
legislation that renewed existing pole attachment laws before the 1984 Act passed, thereby
eliminating the question from consideration in cable deregulation efforts.

Other Views

Another slant on the question of "who won and who lost" was provided by David
Aylward, a former chief counsel and staff director for the Telecommunications
Subcommittee. For Aylward, the question was how the "prevailing political winds were
blowing?"
The biggest underlying theme for the politics [of the issue] and runs from '75
through the passage of the Act in '84, is cable [viewed] as the underdog.
Cable as the new kid on the block; cable as the potential solution to the
monopoly of the networks. Cable as the solution to the arrogance of the
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networks, and whether it's violence or politicians fearing three people
controlling news or whatever. 365
In Aylward's view, with the legitimation of cable as a competitive television
medium, the broadcast networks lost some of the perceived power they were believed to
have through their ability to control the presentation of political news.

Aftermath of Deregulation
Full implementation of deregulation under the 1984 Act was not in place until
roughly 1987, but by that time pressure from the public for reregulation had already begun.
That pressure came in the form of complaints to elected officials that the cable industry's rate
increases, as well as service deficiencies, were unacceptable. Furthermore, in late 1989, the
Congress began to consider reregulation of cable TV in response to growing complaints
about the cable industry's excessive control of the market for programs. By then, the major
foci of the legislative efforts were to both reregulate cable subscriber rates and bring control
over monopolistic vertical and horizontal integration within the cable industry.
Consequently, the Cable Communications Policy Act became more of a beginning than an
end in itself
Cable Advances

In the aftermath oflegislative enactment, the cable industry's position was solidified
by FCC decisions implementing the new law and by several judicial decisions advantageous
to it.
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The Federal Communications Commission. After enactment of the 1984 Cable TV
Act, cable deregulation rules were implemented by the FCC on April 28, 1985, when rate
regulation and other provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 began. In
response to public complaints about the cable television industry after deregulation, the FCC
modified the criteria for determining effective competition for cable operators. Their new
criteria established effective competition as either: (1) the availability of six unduplicated
broadcast television signals in the community or (2) an independently owned, competing
multichannel video delivery system available to 50 percent of the homes passed by the
incumbent system and subscribed to by at least 10 percent of the homes passed. However,
this effort on the part of the FCC to redefine effective competition did not adequately
diminish the complaints of excessive market control. Under the six-signal rule, the bulk of
cable subscribers were still dependent on unregulated services. 366 One significant note is that
when the 1992 act ultimately passed, it included a definition of effective competition that
was more stringent than the six-signal test devised by the FCC.
In October, 1985, under authority of the 1984 Act, the Commission eliminated
technical signal quality standards for cable TV systems. The FCC would retain authority so
local authorities could not impose technical standards more rigid than federal. 367 This
agency action was viewed as a win by the cable industry and a loss by local government
interests.
Such steady advances by the cable industry attracted the attention of television
broadcast interests. On March 24, 1988, a Notice of Inquiry was issued by the FCC
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requesting data, empirical studies, and other information concerning the availability of
broadcast signals on cable television systems. The commission sought information on any
specific harms that broadcast stations may have experienced as a result of not being carried
on a cable system within its service area or of being carried by a cable system on a channel
number other than which it broadcast over the air. 368 Apparently, this action resulted from
broadcast interests attempting to bring the regulatory powers of the FCC to bear on the cable
industry. Then, in August 1988, the commission requested further comments on a proposal
to eliminate the rule which prohibited common ownership of cable TV systems and national
television networks. This was viewed as a victory by broadcast networks over cable
interests.

But the rapid growth and integration of cable operations under deregulation also
brought negative regulatory action. The Time-Warner merger formed a cable television
entity with both the capacity to create programming and the cable franchises to distribute
it. 369 This caused executives from network affiliates and independent TV stations to fear an
,
"increased blurring of the dividing line between cable TV and broadcast TV_ mo To them,
the idea of cable operators setting up independent streams of programmng was a new and
serious threat. The FCC reacted in 1988 by imposing a syndicated exclusivity rule to protect
local broadcasters and the value of syndicated TV programs they purchase from cable
carriage . 371 It guaranteed local stations exclusive showing, in their geographic areas, of
reruns and other shows when purchased on an exclusive basis.
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Regarding telephone ownership of cable services, one of the things the FCC did
when implementing the 1984 Act was take the cross-ownership language from it and apply
it through a footnote to prevent any kind of telephone ownership. According to White,
"Telephone cross-ownership hadn't necessarily been contemplated by the Congress -- they
[FCC] went beyond what they should have." This tact by the FCC provided added incentive
for telephone companies to seek TV reregulation in the late 1980s. "Early on I was one of
the people that motivated, started agitating to change the FCC's rules which we got changed
in a 1988 [FCC] decision."372
Judicial Actions. Following enactment of deregulation, the cable industry also
benefitted from favorable rulings by the courts.

One case involved Preferred

Communications' denial of a franchise to expand cable service to a particular neighborhood
in Los Angeles , California. Preferred challenged the exclusive franchise system, claiming
it violated the company's First Amendment rights. Exclusive franchises were common
nationwide, so the case was important to both cable TV and to cities. At first, a federal
district judge dismissed the case, finding that the First Amendment did not apply as argued
by Preferred. But in March, 1985, the 9th U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and
reinstated the lawsuit. To the cable industry, the appeals court decision was one more step
toward recognition of cable TV as a form of "electronic publishing'' meriting the same
constitutional protections that newspapers enjoy. 373 On June 3, 1986 the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Los Angeles v. Prefe"ed Communications. 314 Ruling 9-0 in favor of
cable, the Court found that cable TV operators have First Amendment rights but declined
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to define their scope until lower courts decided whether a city may grant an exclusive
territorial franchise to a single cable company.
In another case, just a few months after the 9th Circuit ruled in Prefe"ed, the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down federal rules requiring cable
operators to retransmit the programming of all local television stations operating within their
service area. In 1985, in Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 31s the court concluded that the FCC's
regulation requiring cable TV systems to carry certain local TV stations was
unconstitutional. This court case was viewed as a win by the cable industry with respect to
the broadcast industry. The court said, these "must carry'' rules, in effect for more than 20
years, violate the First Amendment freedom of cable TV operators. 376 The FCC did not
appeal that decision. But the NAB did ask the Supreme Court, without success to review
and reverse. This, too, was a victory for the cable industry and a loss for broadcasters.
However, White said, "Must carry developed later on as more of an issue. As the more cable
improved, the more broadcasters were concerned about it. " 377
The FCC amended its rules in light of Quincy. These, too, were challenged. In
December 1987, the Federal Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit handed
down its decision in a case involving the revisions. Century Communications Corporation
and others sued the FCC claiming their First Amendment rights were violated by these
scaled down must-carry rules. The appeals court decided:
Although the FCC has eliminated the more extreme demands of its initial set
of regulations, its arguments in the case leave us unconvinced that the new
must-carry rules are necessary to advance any substantial government
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interest, so as to justify and incidental infringement of speech under the test
_ set forth in United States v. 0 'Brien. 378
On March 23, 1987, by a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which limited the power of states to ban or regulate
'indecent' programming on cable TV, striking down Utah's effort to confine such
programming to the hours between midnight and 7 am. Without issuing an opinion, the
justices upheld a lower court ruling that such restrictions violated the First Amendment. 379
This constituted a win by the cable industry over the states and over the concept of cable
being regulated by any entity other than the FCC. As expected, cable industry victories in
the courts ultimately led to the seeking of legislative relief by the aggrieved parties -- i.e.,
the losers.

Varied Assessments and Reactions to Deregulation: 1986-1987
There were a variety of events that precipitated the move to reregulate the cable
television industry. These included the regulatory rulings by the FCC and the winning
record that the cable industry enjoyed in the courts. Some believe that the winning record
that the cable industry amassed led to a certain degree of overconfidence which in turn led
to a steep and steady rise in rates charged to cable subscribers.
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Close observers, including interests affected by cable operations, had varying views
on the deregulated industry and its development. For one, Packwood' s view was favorable.
He summarized it this way, "Cable promised us in 1984 when they got deregulation there
would be more channels and better quality: better quality technically, and better quality in
programming. All of that I believe they delivered. They kept their end of the bargain,
therefore I believe the consumers came out of it better."380 He believed the services offered
began to blossom under deregulation. He continued, "They were really starting to move, in
that era, from just sort of re-broadcasting networks, or something like that, to do cable
programming. Unfortunately, because local cable ownership was more disparately owned
then, we had a few cable companies that would dramatically raise rates and that would
irritate some significant member of Congress." 381
In general, the more critical reactions were from two factions. One consisted of
competitors in the communications marketplace, particularly networks, broadcasters,
satellite service providers, and telephone companies. The other consisted of consumers
concerned with rates and services.

Competitors ' Reactions

The rapid success of cable systems under deregulation created tremendous economic
power for the industry and became problematic for competitors. Clearly, one of the driving
forces behind demands to revisit the deregulation of the cable television industry was the
broadcast television industry. Giving the cable industry' s perspective, Mooney listed the
critics as broadcasters, the telephone companies, some of the self-styled consumer
380
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organizations, and others who had either an institutional or commercial interest in seeing
cable reregulated. 382
In the pioneering days of community antenna TV operations, the broadcast networks
ignored the medium. But soon after the Cable Act of 1984 was fully implemented in 1987,
the success of cable television had become apparent, and broadcasters wanted their share;
the nation's "Big Three" television networks independently began to lash out at cable
television. The financial success of cable TV was reported by Nielsen Media Research as
54.8 percent of US households receiving cable by 1989, compared with only 18.2 percent
subscribing in 1979.383 Moreover, cable television systems had become extremely valuable
business assets. Indeed, cable systems had become among the most valuable media assets.
Fortune magazine reported that one corporation, TCI, had the potential to become the richest

media company in the US. In addition to generous operating margins, there was predictable
income year after year because the cable systems business was noncyclical,. TCI had
concentrated on building shareholder value by leveraging the business with debt in order to
buy new cable systems. 384 However, a public relations problem resulted from their success
and rough tactics had gained the company a reputation as a bully. 33s
Consumer Concerns

When asked what he believed initiated the movement to legislatively reregulate the
cable industry, Mooney replied,
382

Mooney interveiw.

383

Walley, "Cable TV: Wounded Networks Go for Jugular;" Advertising Age,
Vol. 60 sl-s2.
384

Knowlton, "Want This Stock? Its up 91,0000/o," Fortune, Vol. 20, Iss. 3,
July 3 1, 1989, April 10, 1989, 97-104.
385

Knowlton Ibid.

183
It's a complicated subject. There was a great deal of resentment among the
public about what people considered to be unreasonable rate increases and
poor customer service. And I think that feeling -- to a very substantial degree
-- provided the foundation, as it were, for elected officials in Washington to
take seriously the possibility that cable might be reregulated. 386
When asked if it was deregulation that caused consumers to be upset, Mooney
continued, "It wasn't so much deregulation they were upset about, it was the consequences
of deregulation; it was prices and customer service. They'd call their congressman, or write
to their congressman or make their views known to their local officials who would be in
touch with the relevant members of Congress. "387
Supporting Mooney's assessment, Roy Neel, former staff aide to Senator Al Gore,
Jr., was sure that Gore's staff got more than a couple thousand letters over a four year period.
And they almost always related to some abuse by a cable company in the
State of Tennessee or elsewhere. We had a notorious case in Tennessee. A
company out of Connecticut bought a system of small cable companies in
Tennessee. They came in and were arrogant and not only took cable
customers for granted, but were impersonal about it. And they, basically,
picked on the wrong state to do this, because that alone energized Gore.
They turned Gore into a real enemy. They grossly mishandled their politics
on this, frankly. Part of its easy [to say] in hindsight, but it was as "ham
handed" as it gets, by the industry and by individual companies. 388
Jack Goodman, of the NAB, recalled the level of consumer response as, "If you
talked to almost any congressman's office, they would have a stack of letters from
subscribers saying -- complaining -- about the outrageous cable rate increases. "389
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In addition to the letters received by members of Congress, the press also created
pressure for reconsidering deregulation. Jim Mooney recalled that the local press also liked
to "cable bash."
Complaining about cable rates was a favorite story of many daily newspapers
in the second part of the 1980's, and in the early 1990's. The Bureau ofLabor
Statistics even got into this a little bit, by highlighting the cable component
of its monthly consumer price index when they made their reports.
Presumably, because it thought there was popular interest in the subject. And
so every month, or every couple months, you'd see a story on the wire
services which would be reprinted by papers all over the country to the effect
that cable rates went up so much last month or so much within the past few
months. You know, two or three times what the increase had been in the
consumer price index. Stories like that never ever failed to get some ink.
There was also a lot written in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal
and nationally conservative press on the subject.390
If these sources of pressure weren't enough, Ward White admitted that the US
Telephone Association (USTA) helped create the history of rate increases which dramatized
this and made it clear to the Congress that there was a problem with rates.. According to
Ward White, "We did it through studies that we paid for and gave them the results -- it just
happened to be timing and knowing what motivates members. "391

Packwood downplayed the issue of rate increases, recalling,
Rates like this are like electric rates or telephone rates -- people pay attention
to them then think nothing of paying $3 for a gin & tonic, but if their bill
goes up $3 a month on cable, they're outraged [emphasis mine]. Most of the
cable companies raised their rates -- for one -- they've had their rates held
down for several years. And they raise their rates, but boy, they sure dig right
in and provide better technical equipment and better programs.392
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Eventually, concerns expressed by cities over deregulation led to calls for
considering several policy alternatives, including: 1) to let things continue as they were; 2)
to follow National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and FCC
policy positions, which viewed the franchise process as an obstacle to competition and the
expansion of viewer choices; or 3) to follow the NLC's proposal, which included greater
protection from First Amendment damage claims, broader authority for local governments
in franchise renewals, and restrictions on concentration of cable ownership. 11 393

Pressurefor Reregulation Mounts

Indeed, the financial success of the cable TV industry was clearly rooted in the rates
charged for their services. The "bully'' attitude was manifest in their rate policies.

As

a

consequence, the rate at which fees for cable service increased under deregulation had
become the "battle cry" of proponents of reregulation. However, another important cable
oversight issue before the Senate Communications Subcommittee was how to eliminate
discriminatory practices in the provision of programs produced by cable TV corporations.
It was believed that major cable operators were preventing competition from other
technologies by limiting their access to the programming needed to serve consumers.
Shirley Hobbs Scheibla described Congress' views on new regulation for cable in
Barron's writing that, "The Cable Act of 1984, which took effect December 29, 1986, was
supposed to spur the cable television industry's growth with the help of deregulation. As a
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result, cable now has control of much of the information and entertainment available. "394
Congressional leaders began to predict a new cable law by the end of 1990. For example,
one draft bill would have barred a cable company from controlling more than 10 percent to
1 5 percent of the national market and allow telephone companies to enter the market to
create competition. The industry' s view was summarized by TCI's Robert Thompson, who
saw "vertical integration as the most critical regulatory issue. " 395
When Congress began considering legislation to impose new federal controls on the
booming cable television industry, the measure was the most ambitious reregulation effort
undertaken during the Reagan-Bush era. 396 The legislative battle over reregulation pitted the
cable industry, its congressional defenders and the Bush administration against pro
regulation law makers, broadcasters, telephone companies, and consumer groups.
Proponents of the measures said new controls were needed to protect consumers and
competitors from price gouging, poor customer service, and discriminatory business
practices. Opponents to reregulation said the federal government should not interfere in the
cable market and warned that the legislation would increase cable rates, not lower them. 397
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Congress Considers Reregulation: 1988-1989
The various congressional hearings held between 1 987 and 1 990 tended to focus on
three general themes. One was the percentage increase in cable rates that occurred after the
end of rate regulation took effect in 1 987 in accordance with the 1 984 Act. The second was
the monopolistic characteristics of the cable television industry resulting from vertical
integration of programming, distribution, and local service provision; in particular, the
practice of volume discounting of programming to large multi-system owners (MSO) was
viewed by Congress as generally unfair to small cable operators. 398 The third was the lack
of programming availability to other media such as satellite dish systems and other wireless
television service providers.

Because he had a sizable rural constituency, Senator Gore soon became zealously
interested in how the satellite dish owners and the dish industry, as a whole, were treated by
cable operators. At one point in 1988, he became so adamant about the cable TV industry's
lock on satellite signals that he took an unorthodox approach when he proposed an
amendment to a tax bill (S. 223 8). His amendment required that satellite television
programming available to cable companies also be offered at competitive prices to
individual owners of satellite dish receivers, to ban discrimination against non-cable
distributors, to dish owners and to require the FCC to promote availability of satellite
network programming in rural areas. However, a motion by Sen. Inouye to table the motion
effectively killed the amendment by the vote of 43-36. 399
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A former assistant to Gore recalled that,
While I don't remember substantively where Inouye was on that issue. I
remember him as generally being supportive of the cable industry when they
opposed that floor amendment. So as a substantive matter, he probably didn't
like it. But probably more importantly, Inouye was the Communications
Subcommittee chairman in the Senate and it's considered a real legislative
insult to a committee chairman to use an appropriations bill as a vehicle to
get Se_nate �ssage of something that hasn't been voted out of the relevant
cornnuttee.
It is not unusual for the chairman of the relevant committee to oppose a substantive
amendment on an appropriations bill as being outside the normal course for enacting
legislation.
In reaction to negative assessments of the 1984 Act, by 1989 Congress was actively
considering reregulating the cable TV industry. Additionally, the FCC had opened a notice
of inquiry into cable TV providers' service performance. Another source of pressure for
change in the regulatory environment for the cable television industry came from the
telephone industry. On September 22, 1989, the FCC proposed eliminating rules prohibiting
telephone companies from providing video programming. The commission had previously
adopted a cross-ownership rule in 1970 which prohibited telephone companies from entering
the cable television market. That was because it was concerned that the monopoly position
of telephone companies would likely hinder the development of an independent cable
industry. However, by 1989, the FCC believed that the public might benefit from new
services and technologies provided over broadband facilities. 401 The telephone industry was
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anxious to capitalize on the perception of that opportunity. The troubles of the cable TV
industry were seen as opportunities for telephone companies. 402
Legislative Activities. In the early months of 1989 a flurry of bills were introduced
to address perceived problems with the deregulation of cable television, indicating a
substantial level of concern.
On January 25, 1989, S. 168 - The Cable Television Programming Competition and
Consumer Protection Act of 1989 was introduced by Senator Larry Pressler. It
prohibited price discrimination and exclusive distribution for satellite-delivered
programming.
On April 18, 1989 S. 833 -- The Cable Television Subscriber Protection Act of1989
was introduced by Senators Metzenbaum and Lieberman. It redefined the terms
"effective competition" under the 1 984 Cable· Act to allow regulations of basic cable
service unless the cable community was served by more than one multichannel, non
broadcast, video programming distributor. The bill was introduced after the Senate
Antitrust Subcommittee earlier examined anticompetitive practices of the cable
television industry.
On April 18, 1989 S. 834 -- The Competition in Cable Television Act of 1989 was
introduced by Senators Metzenbaum, Pressler and Lieberman.

It prohibited

unreasonable discrimination in the sale of programming to distributors, and
prohibited any one cable company from owning systems that served more than 25
percent of the cable subscribers in the country.This was clearly intended to limit the
402
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size of large MSOs.

It also contained provisions to reqmre fair access to

programming.
On May 3, 1989 S. 905 -- The Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1989 was
introduced by Lieberman. It amended Section 623 of the 1984 Cable Act to allow
regulation of cable rates and permit states or franchising authorities to regulate cable
service. It also authorized a state to deny a cable franchise renewal or transfer of
ownership or control of a cable system on the grounds of extensive media ownership,
and placed conditions on licensing upon compulsory carriage of local broadcast
signals. A companion version, H.R. 2222, was introduced in the House by
Representative Christopher Shays (R-Connecticut).
On May 18, 1989 S. 1068, an untitled bill -- Offered by Gore, it provided a
comprehensive multi-titled legislative solution to the problems that Gore he believed
faced the television consumer. The bill allowed franchising authorities in areas
without competition to regulate rates for the lowest-priced tier -- which Gore referred
to as the "life line service." That tier also included the local broadcast stations. In
addition to allowing telephone companies to provide cable services, it required cable
operators to provide access to the system for all programming services and ensure
that programming services affiliated with cable operators were available to all
program distributors on a non-discriminatory basis.
In addition to Gore, co-sponsors included senators Slade Gorton and Wendell Ford.
At the same time a companion bill, H.R. 2437, was introduced in the House by
Representative Rick Boucher (D-Virginia) with fourteen co-sponsors. These bills would
have rees�ablished local government regulation of cable rates in areas with only one cable
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system. But more troubling to the cable industry was the provision in both bills to allow
telephone companies to offer cable services as long as the funds were not provided by
telephone ratepayers. 403
Late in the year, two other major bills were introduced. On November 15, Senator
John C. Danforth, and Representative Jim Cooper {D-Tennessee), introduced S 1880 and HR
3826, respectively. Similar to the Gore and Boucher bills, these allowed local rate regulation
in areas with only one cable system and barred programmers with connections to cable
systems from discriminating against other cable systems. The major difference was, they
did not contain provisions to allow telephone companies to operate cable systems. 404
Provisions in the bills to restrain the cable industry's market strength included restoration of
"must-carry" rules, which required cable operators to air most local television broadcasters.
This provision was destined to be a problem since federal courts had struck down the must
carry rules in 1985 and again in 1987 after the FCC attempted to restore them under pressure
from Congress. 405 Another provision in Danforth's bill proposed to limit the overall number
of subscribers for any MSO to 15 percent of the national total.
Table 4. 1 summarizes congressional actions from 1989 through 1992 when
legislation passed. .
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Table 4.1. Congressional Actions Related to the Cable Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992: 1989 - 1992

I

YEAR
1989

1990

1991
,

1992

I

SENATE
January 25, 1989 - S. 168 introduced.
Hearings in April, June, October and
November.

I

HOUSE
Hearings held in June and August

I

No Votes Taken

April 1 8, 1 989 - S. 833 and 834 introduced.
May 3, 1 989 - S.905 introduced.
May 18, 1989 - S-1068 introduced
November 1 5, 1989 - S. 1880 is introduced.

May 18, 1989 - HR-2437 introduced
November 15, 1989 - HR 3826 introduced

Hearings held in March and April.

Hearings held in March, April, and May

July 1 9, 1990 - S. 1880 reported by
Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee.

July 13, 1990 - HR. 5267 introduced.
September 6, 1990 - HR 5267 reported by
House Energy and Commerce Committee.
September 10, 1990 - HR 5267 is passed by
the House.

Hearings held in March and June.

Hearings held in March and June.

January 14, 1991 - S. 12 Introduced.
June 28, 1991 - S. 12 reported by Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee.

No Votes Taken

January 3 1 , 1992 - S. 12 passed by Senate.
August 1 2, 1992 - Senate disagrees with
House Amendments. Agrees to a conference.
September 21, 1992 - Senate agrees to
Conference Report on S. 12.
October 5, 1992 -

July 23, 1992 - S. 12 passed by House.
Request for a conference.
September 14, 1992 - Submission of
Conference Report on S. 12.
September 17, 1992 - House agrees to S. 12
Conference Report.
October 5, 1992 - Presidential veto
overridden.

When the 101st Congress began in 1989, Senate assignments hardly changed.
However, changes in the House were "nearly impossible to keep track of"406 One notable
change on the House Committee on Energy _and Commerce was the appointment of
Representative Ed Towns (D-New York) to take the place of Mickey Leland who had died
in a plane crash in Ethiopia while on a trip to visit refugee camps. Towns' appointment was
backed by both Dingell and the Black Caucus.407
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With the Democrats now in control ofthe Senate, the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee had eleven Democrats and nine Republicans. Hollings was the
chairman of the committee and Danforth was the ranking minority member.

The

Communications subcommittee was made up of seven Democrats and six Republicans. This
was an increase over the 1988 subcommittee that had six Democrats and five Republicans.
The chair was Inouye and Packwood was the Subcommittee's ranking minority member.
Other Democratic members of the subcommittee that carried over from the 1 00th Congress
included Ford, Exon, Gore, and John F. Kerry (D-Massachusetts). Senators Bentsen and
John Breaux (D-Louisiana) were new to the subcommittee in 1 989, and Hollings left the
subcommittee when he became committee chair. The Republicans members, in addition to
Packwood, that returned from 1988 were Pressler, Stevens, and John McCain (R-Arizona).
Senator Pete Wilson (R-California) left the subcommittee and senators Conrad Bums (R
Montana) and Slade Gorton, who was returning to the Senate, were added to the
subcommittee. Inouye, Packwood, and Gore remained highly active on the issue of cable
television regulation.
The membership of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee continued with
fourteen Democrats and nine Republicans. Markey remained chair of the subcommittee and
Rinaldo was ranking minority member. Two Democratic positions changed when Wayne
Dowdy (D-Mississippi) left and Leland died. They were replaced with Thomas J. Manton
(D-New York) and Ron Wyden (D-Oregon). Two Republican positions changed also when
Dan Coats {R-Indiana) and Howard Nielson (R-Ohio) left and were replaced with Edward
R. Madigan· (R-Illinois) and Dan Schaefer (R-Colorado ).
Table 4.2, lists the congressional activities by committee and issues of major interest
as they considered the need to reregulate the cable television industry.
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Table 4.2. Hearings Related to the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992
Congress
101st

102nd

Date

Committee

Topic

April 12, 1989

Senato Judiciary Committee'• Subcommittee on
Antitrult, Monopolioa and Businoaa Rights

Competitive Problems in the Cable Television
Indusuy

Juno 14, 21, 22, 1989

Senato Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee'• Subcommittee on Communications

Media Ownorahip: Diwmty and Concentration

JW1e lS, 1989

Ho111e Energy and Commerce Committee'•
Suboommittoo on Telecommunication and Finance

Cable Television Foreign Ownenhip

August 3, 1989

Ho111e Energy and Commerce Committee'•
Subcommittee on Telecommunication and F"U1811co

GAO Cable Rate Survey

October 18, 1989

Senato Commorco, Scionco, and Tramportation
Committoo'1 Subcommittee on Communications

Commercial Time on Children'• Cable TV

October 25, 1989

Senate Commorco, Scionco, and Tnmaportation
Committoo'• Subcommittee on Communicationa

MustCany

November 14, 1989

Senate Judicimy Committee's Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Monopolioa, and Busineu Rights

Sports Programming and Cable Television

November 16, 17, 1989

Senate Commerce; Science, and Tranaportation
Committoo'• Subcommittee on Communicationa

Oversight of Cable TV

March 1 and April 19,
1990

HOUIO Energy and Commerce Committee'•
Subcommittee on Telecommunicati0111 and rmanco

Cable Television Regulation (Part 1)

March 21, 1990

Senato Commerce, Science, and Tnmspor1ation
Committee'• Subcommittee on Communications

FCC Syndicated Exclusivity Rules

March 29, and April 4,
1990

Senate Commorco, Scionco, and Transportation
Committoo'1 Subcommittee on Communications

Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989

May 9, & 16, 1990

HoUIO Energy and Commerce Committee'•
Subcommittee on Telocommunicationa

Cable Television Regulation (Part 2)

March 14, 1991

Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee'• Subcommittee Oil Communications

Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991

]\DlO 18, 26, 27, 1991

Ho111e Energy and Commerce Committee'•
Subcommittee on Telecommunicationa and rmance

Cable Television Regulation

June 20, 1991

Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee'• Subcommittee on Communications

Broadcasters' Public lntereat Obligations and
S.217, the Faimou in Broadcasting Act of 1991
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The Senate Antitrust Committee was also very interested in complaints against the
cable industry. They were particularly interested in charges of local cable systems operating
as natural monopolies raising prices because of the lack of competition. They were also
interested whether there were any antitrust violations in their programming sales practices.

Senate Hearings
The first hearing in 1989 was a one-day session on April 12, when the Senate
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights,
explored "Competitive Problems in the Cable Television Industry."

408

There were three

panels heard from: representatives of cities and consumers on one panel; organized cable
industry interests on another panel; and broadcasters and competing video technologies on
the final panel.
The Communications Subcommittee held hearings on three days in June. The
subject of those hearings was diversity and concentration aspects of media ownership. 409
Senate Subcommittee onAntitrust. Monopolies, andBusiness Rights Senator Howard
Metzenbaum presided at the Judiciary hearing with subcommittee members Strom
Thurmond (R-South Carolina), the ranking minority member of the committee, Dennis
DeConcini, (D-Arizona), Paul Simon (D-Illinois), Herbert Kohl (D-Wisconsin), and Arlen
408
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Specter (R-Pennsylvania) present. 410 The hearings came almost exactly one year after
similar hearings in 1988 on the same topic. In his opening statement, Senator Metzenbaum
listed the points of interest. They included: 1) the rapid rise in cable rates nationwide -- 20
percent in the first year of deregulation; 2) vertical integration that discouraged large
operators of multiple local cable systems from dealing on fair terms with competing delivery
technologies; and 3) the exclusion of local broadcast stations in favor of programming
owned and controlled by the cable industry. He viewed these trends as potentially
monopolistic and possibly violations of antitrust laws. 411 Nationally, basic cable rates had
risen 32 percent since deregulation. Metzenbaum contended that the price consumers were
paying for cable service had increased at a greater rate than any other commodity or service
in the entire United States. "Scores of local officials from communities around the country
. . . have written to me asking that something be done to restore the cities' regulatory
authority to restrain the rates charged by cable systems. "412 To Metzenbaum, the basic
premise for the Antitrust Subcommittee's review was "the realization and acknowledgment
that only with competition do you get the free enterprise system working well. The cable
industry should not be permitted to thwart [Congress'] will by denying competing
technologies the programming that is needed to compete. " 413 He believed the mistake made
by Congress was to let the FCC defi ne effective competition.
The Commission's definition does not comport with reality. The
Commission's definition was irresponsible. They failed to meet their public
responsibilities. Their definition provides that a cable system faces effective
competition if three over-the-air television signals are present in a particular
cable community. As a result, almost every city across the country is
prevented from regulating rates. It is axiomatic that if competition is not able
to restrain prices in a given product market, regulation may be the only
41 0
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alternative. I have not abandoned all hope that the market for cable
television can be competitive. But I am convinced that the FCC's mistake
must be corrected now. 414
DeConcini described the issues as he understood them. "I am sure all of my
colleagues receive, as I do, a lot ofcomplaints from my constituents about the cable industry.
The first problem is the concentration of ownership of cable television, a problem I think you
are delving into today; and the second is the dwindling number of large companies and the
integration of ownership of programming services and cable systems in a relatively small
number of major cable system owners. 11415 Furthermore, he continued, "I am also concerned
about two other problems related to competition in the cable industry. The first is the
problem of access to programming for non-cable providers, such as direct satellite
broadcasters. The second is the right ofbroadcasters, particularly independent broadcasters,
to be carried on cable systems. "416
Similar to the approach taken by Congress in developing .the 1984 act, there were
negotiations between representatives of the main organized interests aimed at responding to
the complaints so that new legislative actions could be avoided. DeConcini alluded to these
efforts, saying "I understand that negotiations are taking place between the Cable Television
Association and the broadcast industry today, and I hope that these negotiations are
successful in solving these problems. I am not one that looks to the legislature, the Congress
of the United States, to solve these problems. I prefer for the marketplace to do so. But I
agree with Senator Metzenbaum. The public interest is here before us today. " 417
414

Ibid.

m lbid, 23 .
41 6

Ibid, 24.

411

Ibid.

198
Senate Subcommittee on Communications. On November 16 and 17, the Senate
Communications Subcommittee held oversight hearings on the performance of the cable
television industry. Of particular interest was the rapid increase in cable rates and the
apparent restrictive access practices used by the industry regarding its programming.
Broadcasters, wireless cable providers, and satellite dish manufacturers complained that the
cable industry was "choking ofP' competition by keeping programming from competitors
and shutting out other program suppliers. Broadcasters also complained that cable operators
put them at a disadvantage by the placement of their channels on cable system line-ups at
locations other than their normal broadcast channel number. 418 For example, a local station ·
that broadcasts its signal on Channel 4 might be placed at position 44 on the cable system' s
channel selections. Another problem was exclusivity rights, where cable operators offered
syndicated programs in areas where broadcasters had exclusive program rights, monopoly
power (both vertical and horizontal MSOs), and access to satellite signals for competiting
media. Other issues were raised by members. For example, Ford commented on the buying
and selling of cable operations without making investments. 419 Senator Inouye indicated an
interest in introducing "anti-trafficking provisions" that would prohibit a purchaser of a cable
television operation from selling it within five years of the purchase date.420 They also
expressed larger concerns. Inouye stated, "At the beginning of the 101 st Congress, it was
apparent that many Americans were troubled about the market power of the cable television
industry and were hopeful that the Subcommittee would make an examination of this issue
a priority. " 42 1 Ford, in his opening statement, said that, "I have had some problems with the
philosophy of the big cable operators. I believe that their view of government relations is the
418
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' scorched earth theory,' in that they beat back every single legislative initiative or
suggestion."422 He made reference to Danforth's bill, S. 1880, introduced the previous day,
as evidence of general senatorial concern. "It had 1 5 co-sponsors, eight were from the
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee including members of both
parties. "423
Pressler, who co-sponsored S 1880, was concerned that between October 1986 and
October 1988, basic cable rates had increased 29 percent nationally. "This increase is
unwarranted and was made possible because of the lack of both competition and regulation
. . . We created an unregulated monopoly a�d this is the result. " 424 Speaking about the
apparent monopoly on cable programming, he said, "The MSOs and the programmers are
so corporately intertwined that 'outsiders' in the business have found themselves paying
much more for the same programming. In some cases they have found that they could not
get the programming they wanted at any price. "
Also concerned about the level of competition for cable television, Senator Gorton,
who had been instrumental in the 1984 deregulation, stated that, "According to the
Association oflndependent Television stations, of the more than 7,000 cable systems in this
country, only 36 have competition from other cable systems. " On the subject of rising cable
rates, Gorton believed that, "While each ofthe bills takes a slightly different tack, the central
message remains the same -- consumers are demanding an end to an unregulated monopoly
and Congress is listening and ready to respond. "425
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Table 4.3 . Cable Rate Increases in Tennessee: 1986- 1989426
City

Rise

Memphis

7 1%

Crossville

99%

Nashville

1 1 3%

Chattanooga

1 1 5%

Murfreesboro

1 1 7%

Knoxville

1 1 6%

One of the most adamant critics of rising cable rates was Senator Al Gore. During
his opening statement, he charged that cable TV was distorting the marketplace. "[We] now
have empirical evidence citing cable rate increases since the 1984 Act, which are vastly in
excess of inflation. " He referenced a Government Accounting Office report that showed
increases of 24 to 29 percent over three years, based on a voluntary survey. He also cited
the examples of rate increases in Tennessee as shown in Table 4.3 .
Gore criticized the "huge MSOs that get bigger and bigger; that exercised anti
competitive muscle. " In Gore's opinion, "The point of six bills . . . is to give cable consumers
and satellite dish owners some modest relief from skyrocketing rates and pervasive anti
competitive practices. 11427

426

Ibid' 4.

427

Ibid' 5.

20 1
Senator Bums, called for an examination of several negative aspects of cable TV
deregulation. First among his concerns was the lack of competition and the provision of a
full complement of channels of news, information, entertainment, sports and other
programming services. Second was the vast number of rural communities that remained
unserved or under-served by cable. The third concern he listed was the slow deployment of
fiber optics given the increased consumer services which fiber could provide. Lastly, he
listed the prospect of telephone company entry into the provision of video programming
services and whether telephone company entry might solve the problems that had arisen
since the passage of the 1984 Cable Act. 428
Senator Bentsen brought up a survey done by the U. S. Telephone Association. 429 It
showed that "cable rates in Texas have increased an average of 80 percent in three years.
e.g., Dallas $2. 95 in 1986 to $14.95, a 407 percent; Laredo up 1 50 percent; Wichita Falls,
$6.00 in 1986 to $1 8.69 in 1989, a 212 percent increase. 430 Breaux reported the average
basic rate in Louisiana in 1986 was about $9.00; in 1989, the average was nearly $16.00, an
increase of over 70 percent. In Shreveport, rates had increased $5 .00 to $17.00; over 200
·percent. 431
Consumer interests were present at the hearing to echo the complaints registered by
senators. Gene Kimmelman, legislative director for the Consumer Federation of America,
428
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testified on behalf of consumer interests. He stated, "I am here on behalf of the Consumer
Federation to endorse Senator Danforth's legislation S. 1 880, which has been co-sponsored
by Senator Gore, because we believe it would address consumers' major problems with the
cable television industry. "432 He reminded the panel that in the early 1980s, there was a lot
of talk about competition.
There was supposed to be direct broadcast satellite. There was supposed to
be satellite transmission, pay-per-view, pay-per-channel. None has
developed. Instead, we have seen cable industry's horizontal concentration
and vertical integration into a complicated web of video ownership which
controls a large portion of cable subscribers in this country and the most
popular programming that the American people want to see. 433
Furthering his case, Kimmelman said, "We have heard [at this hearing] discussion
about comparisons to the consumer price index. It sounds reasonable, but when one looks
at the cable industry, with the new technologies going into place, with expanding services
and expanding subscribership, it is clear that cable is a declining cost industry; that the price
per service and the price per subscriber is coming down. "434 Kimmelman continued,
So the rate increases that the American people have experienced have really
been a ripoff, Mr Chairman. Market analysis shows that with just half the
revenue stream of the cable industry cable operators would be able to earn
a reasonable profit. For consumers, this would mean that cable rates could
be reduced by 50 percent, with appropriate regulatory tools in S. 1 8 80, and
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the American consumer would save $6 billion in the video revenue that they
are currently handing over to the cable industry. 435
Kimmelman elaborated on the Consumer Federation's position in his submitted
statement: "If vigorous competition had developed, as the Cable Act envisioned, or its
surrogate in monopolistic markets -- effective rate regulation -- were imposed, consumers
would be paying about half of what they are charged today for cable services. " 436 Speaking
of Sections 9 and 10 of Senator Danforth's bill, they
would increase the diversity of programming available to consumers. By
preventing discrimination against wireless cable and satellite dish service
providers, Section 9 would increase the likelihood that consumers not wired
by cable would have an opportunity to receive a broad package of video
programming from non-wire technologies. Section 10 would then reduce the
largest cable operator' s incentive to maximize market power by limiting
channel availability. 437
Also speaking for consumer interests and against the perceived monopolistic position
of cable TV, Sharon Ingraham, Chair of the National Federation of Local Cable
Programmers, testified that, "Access [for Public, Education, and Government (PEG)
organizations] remains unavailable to at least three-quarters of the communities with cable
in this country. "43 8 She asked Congress to require PEG access in every :franchise and that
access programs be part of basic service tiers. Ingraham continued, "We ask you to amend
the Cable Act to allow for facilities, equipment and funding sufficient to let access continue
to thrive, and make it clear that this support should not be counted by cable operators as part
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of the franchise fee. "439 Ingraham' s group wanted Congress to limit the use of all franchise
fees to paying expenses of managing franchise agreements and to require cable operators to
fund production of local access programs with money other than franchise fees.
Continuing on the point of the cable industry' s monopolistic behavior, Gore
contended that the industry had an incentive to stifle the development of technological
competitor such as satellite dish systems. For example, he stated that only after pressure
from Congress did cable operators agreed to provide programming to satellite broadcast
distributors or rural electric co-ops to reach customers having no chance of cable extended
to their area "But the head of rural electric co-ops association came to testify and said it has
been a failure because of one simple reason. The cable programmers have stone-walled
us. "440 Rural electric co-ops charged that cable TV had given them a small trickle of
programming, and the wholesale rates were 44 1 percent higher than the wholesale rates
charged to cable systems for the same programming. Gore believed that because the cable
industry held economic control over the source ofprograms, it created an artificial distortion
in the price charged to the ultimate customer making it appear that it was more efficient to
have the distributor of programming to deliver it to the viewer. Gore said that situation " is
absurd and ridiculous on its face, but they come and seek to make that argument with a
straight face. I do not think it is credible. "44 1
In Gore's statement preceding his questioning of FCC Chairman Sikes, he recalled
that the "single most powerful individual in the cable industry"[Mooney] surprised many by
439
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endorsing action by the Congress to place limits on the number of cable systems an
individual company can own, and even contemplated divestiture in order to meet such limits.
Gore was referring to Mooney who, during his testimony, endorsed congressional action to
place limits on the trafficking in cable franchises; indicating that in his view the FCC had
not been active enough in overseeing the activities of the cable industry. Finally, he
contemplated more regulation, at least at the federal level, and identified market power and
market concentration as legitimate issues for attention by the Congress, whether in the form
of horizontal integration, or vertical integration. 442
Then Gore asked Sikes for his reaction to Mooney ' s statement, and Sikes responded:
I think that from what I understand of the testimony yesterday by the cable
industry, you are seeing what is frequently played out with the commercial
evolution of industries in America. An industry begins with certain benefits
conferred upon it by the government, in order to help it develop. It reaches
certain concentration levels, and then it rushes in seeking regulation,
believing that the bar.§ain will preclude new competition. My preference is
for new competition. 3
Sikes also addressed Mooney's comments about "trafficking,'' i.e., the quick sale of cable
systems for a profit after owning them for just a short time. He said, "I know of
municipalities that would have liked to have had current cable owners sell their systems, in
order to facilitate, new cable providers. "444
Sikes' testified that he was concerned about what seemed to be an effort to
reestablish municipal empowerment. In diplomatic fashion, he said it is important to
remember that the municipalities restrained the development of cable, "frequently extracting
a variety of revenue promises. " Senator McCain not so diplomatically interjected that he
442
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believed it was "extorted" rather than extracted. Sikes agreed, continuing, "As we go
through this, it is important, as some regulation is re-established that we think about what
jurisdiction is perhaps best able to do that. " 44s
Regarding the idea of telephone entry into cable service, Sikes said, "Turning to the
rule book question, right now, in most states, cable cannot provide telephony. There are a
few states, Illinois notably, where that is not true. So, as cable faces a legal block to getting
into telephony, I think we have to be concerned about letting the telephone company being
a fully vertical cable operator." 446 He continued, "It also strikes me that the legislative
approach would be less likely successful, because of the concerns of various media that
allowing that concentration of power through the local exchange, and through the
extraordinary revenue streams of local telephone companies, might be just
overwhelming." 447
Senator Stevens was next to address Sikes.Stevens was concerned with the treatment
of cable at the hands of municipalities. "
The problem that I have with these proposals [to reregulate the cable
industry] is I see more and more interference from the municipalities in
creating fiefdoms that you have to pay dues in order to get through. Have you
examined these to see what kind of roadblocks are going to be placed in the
way of the development of national cable as we have had national telephone
and nationalize other concepts? Or has the FCC taken a position on national
cable?448
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Expressing perhaps indirect agreement with Stevens, Sikes ' indicated that "the
municipal history in the area of cable has not been such that I would recommend a
significant re-empowerment of municipalities in the cable area. " 449
Several representatives of competing technologies participated in the hearing.
Edward 0. Fritts, head of the NAB, presented the concerns of TV broadcasters. For one,
" When the Cable Act was passed back in 1984 must carry was in place at the FCC. The
cable industry challenged those rules in court, and today local stations have no assurance of
carriage. What's more, many stations have been displaced from prime channel positions by
cable networks which are largely owned by the vertically integrated MS Os. " More
generally, he asserted, "Cable today stands as an unregulated monopoly. It is not regulated
by the cities. It is not regulated by franchising authorities. It is not regulated by the Federal
Communications Commission. It is not regulated by Congress, and it is not regulated by
competition. Cable, in fact, is the regulator of today's marketplace. In short, in our [NAB]
opinion, the 1 984 Cable Act has failed abysmally. " 450 Other competitors presented negative
assessments of the cable industry, including the Satellite Dealer Coalition, the American
Home Satellite Association, the Satellite Dealer Communication Association of America,
the Wireless Cable Association, and GTE Telephone Operations.
Clearly, if this hearing was indicative, there was much unhappiness with the recent
performance of the cable television industry. Most of the members of the Communications
Subcommittee were critical of the cable industry. They based their criticism on constituency
reactions to cable rate increases and a survey of cable rates conducted by the Government
Accounting Office commissioned by House Telecommunications Subcommittee Chairman
9
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Markey. Gore believed the "industry is severely distorting the marketplace. "45 1 Ford of
Kentucky accused the cable industry of following a "scorched earth theory. "452 Senators
Bentsen, Breaux, McCain, Pressler, Gorton, and Hollings all co-sponsored the Danforth bill
aimed at reregulating the cable industry, as did Gore and Ford. Subcommittee members
Inouye, Bums, and Kerry, while expressing concerns regarding complaints about rate
increases, wanted to investigate the conditions more objectively and had not joined in co
sponsoring Danforth' s S. 1 880. 453 Stevens and Packwood were the only two members ofthe
subcommittee at the hearing who could be considered defenders of the cable industry.
In more than six hours of testimony on November 16, cable interests offered a
spirited defense against their critics. Mooney was first to offer testimony to defend the cable
industry. "Basic service is only one component of most subscriber bills" he said. 454 The
average monthly subscriber bill rose from $21 . 58 to $24.68 over the same two year period,
an increase of fourteen percent or seven percent a year. From 1 972 through 1986, when
deregulation took effect, cable' s basic rates ran 72 percentage points behind the consumer
price index. 455 Cable deregulation has led to improved cable programming. "Cable
operator' s spending for basic programming has increased from about $3 00 million in 1984
to nearly $1 billion [in 1989]."456 Moreover, the average subscriber in 1989 received 32
channels, as compared to 27 channels in 1986. The average cost per channel has remained
45 1
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relatively flat: 46 cents in 1989 to 44 cents in 1986. Mooney believed the "spurt in basic
rates which occurred in 1987 and 1988 were a post-regulatory adjustment." 4s7 Mooney
testified that according to the BLS, the overall CPI figure for the first nine months of 1989
was up 3.7 percent while cable rates were up only 2.3 percent during that same period . . At
the heart of cable's defense against the charges of unreasonable rate increases was the
increase in numbers of channels offered to subscribers. Mooney pointed out that ''basic rate
increases have been matched by an increase in the average number of channels received by
subscribers. [Even] the GAO found that the average cost per channel has remained at
approximately 45 cents since rates were deregulated."4 s8 Mooney went on to list other
benefits from the deregulation of the cable industry, including his claim that vertical
integration in the industry led to increased amounts and qualities of programming available.
He also emphasized that the franchise fees paid by cable operators amounted to significant
general revenue sources for local authorities.
In 1984, prior to enactment of the Cable Act, municipalities received $200
million in franchise fees and were required to devote the money to
administering cable franchises. Since passage of the Cable Act, from 1985
through 1989, cable systems have paid an estimated $3 .053 billion in
franchise fees. That money is available for any municipal use. 4s9
As for charges that the cable industry was monopolistic because of a lack of
competition, Mooney's response was that since the 1984 Act cable now faced a growing
number of competitors. "The number of independent television broadcasters had tripled to
417. Since cable had finished wiring most of the major metropolitan centers, there are
[ 1989] 9,000 cable systems serving over 50 million households. VCRs are a major means
of video distribution, increasing from 1 . 1 million units in 1979 to nearly 60 million in 198 9.
4 S7

Ibid.

ss Ibid, 14.

4

459

Ibid, 66.

210
VCR penetration grew to 65. 8 percent . . . surpassing the growth of cable during the 1980's.
Home satellite dishes, legalized by the 1984 Act, grew from less than 800,000 to nearly 2.6
million. 460
Regarding charges of the monopolistic aspects of vertical integration, where MSOs
invest in creating programming, Mooney pointed out that, "Three of the five largest
networks (ESPN, USA Network, and CBN's [Christian Broadcast Network] Family
Channel), have no operator investment yet have wide distribution." 46 1 Conversely, some of
the most popular cable programming exists only due to cable's vertical integration. For
example, Nickelodeon, Black Entertainment Television (BET), C-SP AN and C-SPAN II
(funded by the cable industry), Bravo, Turner Network Television (TNT), the Discovery
Channel, and Cable News Network (CNN), would not exist without the investment by cable
operators to create the programming. 462
John Malone, chairman of TCI, focused his testimony on the business aspects of the
cable television industry and defended it against charges that it was reaping huge profits as
a result of monopoly power. He stated that, "As further proof in our market economy that
our product is successful, the penetration of CATV has actually been accelerating, rather
than decelerating, as the industry matures."463 He believed this was indicative of their
product/price relationship being more appealing on the margin to consumers than before.
Answering charges that cable's prices are too high, Malone retorted that "the cable TV
industry has the lowest return on invested capital of any media or communications
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industry. "464 He described how five to six years before, large industrial companies such as
General Electric, Westinghouse, American Express, and Capital Cities were in the cable TV
business. They all exited "citing low return on investment."465 Continuing, he cited statistics
from an unnamed communications industry report "which indicated that regulated local
telephone companies had a return on invested capital, . . . pretax profits divided by average
assets, of 14. 9 percent. The radio and broadcast industry had a return of 10.9 percent and
the cable industry had a return of 7. 3 percent. "466 Describing the specific circumstances of
TCI,
Our cumulative retained earnings over 20 years is zero. We have plowed
everything back into growth and renewing our technology. Our technology
is evolving so rapidly, that we cannot wait the fifteen year franchise cycle in
order to provide good service. Most of our rate increases in TCI have
reflected direct programming cost increases. We have typically added two
or three cable networks each year. 467
It seems, however, that the cable TV industry's defense was a shovel full of
information thrown against a land-slide of charges about rate increases and monopolistic
control of the market.
House Hearing

Earlier in the year, the House Telecommunications Subcommittee had used a GAO
survey of cable TV rates to aim criticism at the !ndustry's performance since deregulation.
In April 1988, Representative Edward J. Markey, chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications requested the Government Accounting Office (GAO) "to conduct a
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nationwide survey of cable television rates and services. "468 The survey report was issued
by the GAO on August 3, 1989, and Markey' s subcommittee held a one-day hearing the
same date. It would be the only hearing on the House side in that year.
Markey presided at the hearing and noted that the attendance by eighteen of the
subcommittee' s members was the largest number for any hearing that year, a gauge of
interest in cable issues. 469 It was attended at various times by seven of the fourteen
Democrats on the subcommittee and eight of the nine Republicans. The GAO's report was
presented and testimony received from the agency officials who conducted the survey and
authored the report. Additionally, cities, state regulators and the cable industry were
represented in a second panel. The fundamental conclusion of the report was that "monthly
rates for the lowest price basic cable service and the most popular cable service increased
significantly by more the 25 percent or four times the rate of inflation from 1986 to October
1988." 470 The panel was questioned by Markey and several other members in obvious
attempts to paint the rate of rate increases as abusive actions by an industry turned into a
monopoly by the deregulation of 1984.

Representative Swift and Don Ritter (R

Pennsylvania) were the only subcommittee member who questioned the GAO panel in a
manner that revealed that the numbers could also have an interpretation that rates, when
controlled for inflation, had increased in line with other consumer prices. Representatives
from the cities, while sensitive of the complaints they were receiving from local citizens, did
not believe reregulation was warranted. Rather, they expressed the view that actions to
468
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introduce competition were more likely to resolve the seemingly rapid rise in rates
charged. 471 The industry witnesses testified that the conclusions ofthe GAO were erroneous
interpretations of the survey. To support that position, Mooney submitted for the record a
survey conducted by the NCTA to refute the governments findings. 472

Conclusion
A strong reaction to the 1984 law emerged quickly and powerfully so that by the end
of 1989, reregulation by Congress was a distinct possibility. This reaction was initiated by
a number of interests with serious complaints. Primary among the concerns were increases
in cable television rates. Additionally, many believed the issue of monopolistic behavior
was equally important.

This concern was articulated as the vertical and horizontal

monopolization of cable television The charge that cable TV engaged in anti-competitive
monopolistic practices included two subcategories. One was the negative impact from the
horizontal concentration resulting from greater numbers of local cable operations being
owned by a small number of large multi-system operators. The other was the negative
impact of vertical concentration of programming by large corporations that owned both the
programming and the distribution systems. Cable system owners in this latter category
controled both the distribution and the pricing for their programming.
Regarding rate increases, consumers began complaining frequently and loudly to
elected officials. Soon after the full implementation of rate deregulation took effect in early
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1 987, subscription rates increased steadily. A survey conducted by the GAO found that the
rate increase was greater than the rate of increase for inflation. Consumers also accused
cable operators of poor service and ignoring subscriber's complaints. This was believed to
be a result of almost all of the nations's approximately 1 1,000 cable franchises operating
without direct competition because of the definition of effective competition in the 1 984 Act.
Even though consumer interest organizations tried to establish themselves as representing
subscribers, there existed no truly organized group for the expressed purpose of representing
subscriber's interest The most effective representation of consumers was the NLC and
USCM who also claimed to be the principal voice for subscriber interests.
Another set ofinterests that complained to policy makers were potential competitors
using newly developed technologies such as the home satellite dish industry as well as
microwave and wireless cable services. These interests defined the policy issue as a
monopolistic industry using anti-competitive practices.

They complained that cable

programming companies charged them up to 500 percent more than cable operators paid for
the same program, on terms that kept many programs out of the reach of competitors.
Additional complaints were heard from broadcasters, the main competition for cable
television. The chief issue for broadcasters was requiring cable operators to carry local
broadcasters' signals, also known as "must carry. 11 473

This question also had two

subcategories. One was the adverse effects on local broadcast stations of cable TV
retransmission from distant broadcast stations that negatively impacted exclusivity
agreements local affiliates had with their parent networks. The other was the perceived
473
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unfair advantages for cable TV industry resulting from free access to broadcast signals.
Broadcasters also felt that there was not a level playing field since cable TV was deregulated
in 1 984, yet they were subject to much more rigorous regulation at the hands of the FCC.
For cities and municipalities, the major issues were the provisions in the 1 984 Cable
Act which affected local :franchise authorities, the fees they could charge, and how they
could calculate them. The final, but by no means the least of the issues, was the question of
allowing telephone companies to provide cable services using the emerging broadband
communication technology.

216

CHAPTER V
CABLE TELEVISION CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
COMPETITION ACT OF 1992

Less than a decade after cable television was deregulated in 1984, The Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act was enacted in October 1992 over a

presidential veto. The reregulation of cable television was driven by several factors,
including those discussed in the last chapter. The new law, it should be emphasized, did not
reregulate by restoring prerogatives to :franchise authorities that the 1984 law took away.
Basically, reregulation was national in character manifested in congressional mandates and
enhanced FCC capability.
Specifically regarding the FCC' s role, the act required nearly all of the nation's cable
operators to follow rules of the FCC on pricing of basic program packages and equipment
rental. Additionally, it allowed the FCC to delegate rate regulation to local and state
:franchising authorities upon written request with a subsequent finding by the commission
that the state and local laws and regulations conformed to those of the FCC and that the
:franchising authority provided a level of consumer protection required by the commission. 474
474
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The FCC would establish standards for cable system customer service and signal quality.
In addition, it prohibited those who produced and sold cable TV programming from refusing
to provide their products to other video distributors and prohibited cable TV operators from
discriminating against unaffiliated cable TV program networks. On a stronger note, the act
directed the FCC to issue regulations to limit children's access to indecent programming.
Another provision in the act intended to "enhance effective competition"47s by requiring the
FCC to prescribe rules and regulations establishing reasonable limits on the number of
subscribers and the number of channels carrying programming in which the system owner
had a financial interest. Congress had in mind the public interest objectives of"ensuring no
cable operator . . . can impede . . . the flow of video programming to the consumer." 476 It
also required the FCC to report to Congress on migration of sports programming from
broadcast TV to cable networks and pay-per-view systems. Lastly, it obligated the
commission to establish equal employment opportunity standards for cable systems and and
authorized it to establish rates and terms for leased access to cable channels, particularly for
qualified minority or educational programming.
The act required cable TV systems to carry established local broadcast stations,
including public TV stations, and limited the authority of cable operators to change channel
positions of the local commercial stations. It also directed cable operators to obtain the
consent of those broadcast TV stations to retransmit their signals. Another provision
required cable operators to allow customers without charge to block channels which showed
sexually explicit content as part of a premium package. The act established restrictions on
cable operators that prevented them from selling cable systems for 3 6 months following
acquisition or new construction, and there were restrictions on cable operator ownership or
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control of other video programming services within a franchise area. The new law also
authorized cable operators to prohibit indecent programming. Franchising authorities were
enjoined against awarding exclusive franchises and unreasonably refusing to award
additional competitive franchises. Limits were provided to the liability of cable franchising
authorities in lawsuits arising from cable service franchising and regulation. This last
provision was supported strongly by local governments who were vulnerable to charges of
anti-competitive practices over granting exclusive franchises for cable TV operations. 477
In the category of "public interest, 11 the act mandated that providers of direct
broadcast satellite video services reserve a portion of their channel capacity for
noncommercial educational programming, and it established certain privacy-rights
protection for cable service customers. An additional aspect of the legislation permitted
broadcasters, who since 1965 had been required by the FCC to allow retransmission of their
programs by local cable systems, to charge cable operators for use of such programming,
known as "must carry." However, any station that feared it might be dropped by a local cable
company could forfeit that right in return for having the cable operator transmit the station's
signal for free.
Two years of intense politics were to move regulatory policy for cable television
from the disaffection of 1989 to enactment in 1992.

The United States Supreme Court held in Community Communications Co.,
v. Boulder; 455 U. S. 40 (1 982), that "Boulder's moratorium ordinance is not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the Parker doctrine". 48-57.
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Legislation Begins in Earnest: 1990
After full-implementation of the 1984 Act took effect, it became evident that the
behavior of the cable TV industry under deregulation was in need of attention. By January,
1990, the FCC had issued a notice of proposed rulemaking intended to examine the
"effective competition rules" regarding regulation of basic cable service in light of changed
circumstances in the video marketplace since 1985. The notice sought comments on
alternative definitions of effective competition. m This clearly constituted an attempt by the
commission to interject some regulatory control over cable industry which was viewed by
many as a non-competitive medium. But by July, the commission issued findings and
recommendations on the state ofthe cable television industry, concluding there was no need
to reregulate. 479 Certainly this outcome had to be seen as a victory for the cable industry.
The summer of 1990 was a very active period in the effort to reregulate the cable
television industry, and legislation came close to passing in September. In July, H.R. 5267
was introduced in the House, the FCC's Report on Cable TV was released, and on July 19,
the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee reported S. 1880 out of
committee. On September 6, H.R. 523 7 was reported by the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, 480 and only four days later, the bill was passed by the House. However, after
floor debate was blocked on September 28, S. 1 880 died and the Senate took no further
action on cable during the session.
478

199 1 .
479

FCC, 56'1' Annual Report, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office.
Ibid, MM Docket 85-3 8; Ml\1 Docket 88-138; MM Docket 89-600, 27.

° Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1990, House Report 1 0 1 -682 on
H.R. 5267, 101 st Cong., 2nd sess., (CIS90:H363-33).
48

220
Issues, Bills and Positions
In the evolving debate over cable television, two central issues became the nearly
exclusive foci for critics of the industry. Those were rates and alleged monopolistic or anti
competitive practices. Clearly, cable rates had risen dramatically since 1984, but there also
had been expanded programming. Among the anti-competitive practices with which the
industry was charged were denying access to, and discriminatory pricing for, programming,
especially prices private satellite dish owners were charged for programming. Charges of
anti-competitive practices grew as the industry had become highly concentrated. One anti
competitive aspect was the increasing vertical integration of the industry where cable
operators and cable programmers have common ownership. Another was widespread
horizontal integration where large cable companies owned many systems in numerous cities.
Such vertical and horizontal integration created potential barriers to competing systems
from entering the market, thus reducing the diversity of programming available. 481 Also
contributing to anti-competitive practices was multichannel programming distribution. This
involved distributors who broker multiple channels of video programming between
producers and programming providers. This practice was also known as "third-party
packaging" of programming. Such packaging was typically provided to subscribers as _
"premium tiers."
There were also issues of concern other than rates and anti-competitive practices.
These included concerns about the constitutionality of must-carry policies. The industry
questioned whether the imposition of such requirements violated their First Amendment
rights to free speech. Members of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee had
concerns about such broad issues as whether to allow foreign ownership of cable systems
481
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and whether cable television would "siphon" sports programming from over-the-air
broadcast stations by outbidding broadcast networks for the rights to televise important
sports events. Lastly, the issue of allowing telephone companies to enter the cable TV
market was of significant concern. Having upgraded their systems using fiber-optics
technology, telephone systems became capable of carrying video programming. They then
pursued entry into the video programming market to help recoup their costs. Telephone
industry interests as well as cities also supported allowing such entry as a means of
introducing competition for cable operators.
The two major legislative vehicles for considering reregulation during 1990 were S.
1 880, authored by John Danforth and H.R. 5267, authored by Ed Markey and Matthew
Rinaldo. 482 Both contained provisions to control cable rates. In areas of providing
programming to other video distributers and must-carry provisions, the two bills were nearly
identical. Regarding controlling anti-competitive practices, language in both bills prohibited
cable TV networks affiliated with cable TV operators from refusing to provide programming
to other video distributors and prohibited discrimination against unaffiliated cable networks.
Similarly, both bills required cable TV systems to carry local broadcast TV stations. The
only notable difference on this specific issue was that H.R. 5267 included public TV stations
in its must-carry provision.
Each bill required the FCC to ensure that rates were not unreasonable or abusive.
However, they differed in the means for accomplishing this objective. S. 1 880 would have
the FCC apply such regulations only to systems not subject to effective competition. H. R.
5267 required standards and procedures applied to all systems to prohibit unreasonable or
abusive rates.
482
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governments where they petitioned to do so, but the House bill did not include such authority
to delegate rate regulation.
As the legislative process progressed, various interest groups became involved.
These included, in addition to the cable industry and broadcasters, wireless cable operators,
the satellite dish industry, the telephone industry and cities. Consumer organizations that
claimed to represent cable subscribers contended that the costs to operators for providing
cable service was declining yet, because of the cable industry's monopoly position, charges
were rising at a pace greater than the national consumer index of prices.
Broadcasters and the NAB supporting Danforth's S. 1 880 with its must-carry
provisions and limits on cable conglomerates, as did the cities. In addition, a newcomer
group, the Wireless Cable Association, also supported such limits as did the Satellite
Broadcasting and Communications Association. Such non-cable distributors of satellite and
wireless cable programming complained that exclusive arrangements between cable
operators and cable programmers such as HBO and Showtime, locked them out of
programming.
The U. S. Telephone Association actively backed Gore's S. 1 068 and H.R. 243 7
introduced by Boucher. Both allowed telephone companies to offer cable services to hasten
competition and new services through fiber-optic technology. This view was also held by
the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference ofMayors. 483 [Ward White became
active in the U.S. Telephone Association upon leaving the Commerce Committee staff.] 484
However, the idea of allowing telephone companies to compete in offering cable services,
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would ultimately take a back seat to other reregulation efforts. Dingell said House action
on telephone ' s entry into cable markets would be considered only after work was completed
on legislation to lift restrictions on Baby Bells entering new businesses. 48s One example of
the cable industry' s view on this issue was provided by NCTA President James P. Mooney
when testifying at a hearing on November 16, 1 989. He told senators that choosing between
the two major legislative options -- reregulation or allowing telco competition -- was like
choosing between "being boiled in oil or vinegar. " 486
The cable industry was neutral on HR. 5467 since they viewed it as less aggressive
on reregulation than S. 1 880. Conversely, they actively opposed S. 1 880. Their opposition
was caused by language in the bill that prohibited cable operators from refusing to deal with
other multi-channel video programming distributors.

They objected to provisions

prohibiting exclusive agreements between cable programmers and cable operators. In
hearings, Mooney pointed out differences between the original version of S. 1 880 and a
staff-authored draft revision. "The two documents are different in that the staff draft tends
to place major responsibility on the FCC for devising methods of handling [rate increases]
whereas the original version effectively gives that authority back to city councils. " 487
Desiring to avoid a retreat to local level regulation, cable TV interests supported the staff
version of the bill.
48

s In keeping with Dingell ' s prediction, by June 27, the House Energy and
Commerce Committee withdrew an amendment to allow telephone companies
into cable markets.
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In an interesting combination of interests, the cable industry was joined by the
newspaper industry in its opposition to allowing telephone companies to enter the cable TV
service. The newspapers wanted to keep telephone companies out of information services
because they were fearful that they could provide video text and become an alternate to
printed news services. 488 Also in opposition was the Consumer Federation of America
because of doubts about adequate assurances to prevent telephone ratepayers from
subsidizing cable ventures by telephone companies. 489 It was indeed a rare situation to see
organized consumer interests on the same side of a question with the cable industry.
The positions taken by both the Bush administration and the FCC were to oppose the
efforts to re-establish regulation of cable rates. The administration wrote letters opposing
the legislation prior to committee mark-up sessions. It argued that deregulation had resulted
in substantial benefits and that reregulation would put those gains at risk. Additional letters
from Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher and James Rill, head of the Justice
Department's antitrust division, called instead for "emphasizing competitive principles such
as promoting new entry" into the markets. 490 Possibilities included allowing telephone
companies into the cable business. This was a clear indication that the battle lines were
drawn.
The FCC's opposition to reregulation was based on a study of the effects of the 1984
act issued by the Commission in July. 491 It generally promoted competitive markets over
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reregulating the cable industry. The report concluded that deregulation had fostered growth
in cable service. It advocate legislative provisions that promoted easier entry for cable
competitors, for example, removal of barriers that prevented other multichannel providers,
such as satellite dish systems and wireless cable, from entering the market. It "supported
legislative limits on anti-competitive practices" such as limiting vertical and horizontal
integration. The FCC also believed some form of must-carry requirements were needed. 492
The report was issued the day before the House Commerce Committee mark-up of H.R.
5267.

Senate Hearings
In March and April of 1990, the Senate Subcommittee on Communications held
hearings on S . 1880. Danforth's original bill was introduced in November, 1 989. However,
the hearings considered a staff draft bill, offered as a substitute for S. 1 880. The March 29
hearing provides some indication of the temper and tone of the debate over reregulation.
One of the first witnesses at the March 29 hearing was Mooney. His testimony was
clear regarding the industry's position on regulation, "Excepting matters such as 'must
carry,' we would prefer that the cable industry be allowed to continue to be deregulated. " 493
Additionally, Mooney summarized the industry's opposition to reregulation of cable TV
emphasizing three points:
First, cable is a national as well as a local medium. To turn control of our industry
back to city councils would, in our view, merely recreate the irrational and haphazard
conditions which existed prior to 1984. Our experience is that city councils are
political bodies with none of the quasi-judicial qualities normally found in regulatory
agencies. Second, the programming side of our business is just now beginning to
492
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flower and is still very fragile. Finally, we respectfully urge that as you consider
proposals intended to stimulate new competition for cable, you also keep in mind
that we bear unique regulatory burdens and costs under the Cable Act which are not
shared by our competitors. 494
The specific example given of "unique regulatory burdens" was the 14 percent of
gross revenues paid to Montgomery County, Maryland for franchise fees, access fees and
other truces, none of which applied to cable TV's competitors such as broadcasters.
Testifying at the same hearing, Thomas Burchill, President and CEO, Hearst/ABC
Viacom Entertainment Services described the growth experienced by the industry under
deregulation. According to Burchill, "The Cable Act has had a favorable effect on cable
programming networks, allowing them to produce distinct and high quality television. " 495
His testimony traced the history of his company as an example of how deregulation was
working for the consumer. "We choose to operate as a niche business, becoming a targeted
or vertical channel. Our mission is to be the first channel choice of women, providing
programming dedicated to the special information and entertainment needs of American
women." To that end, "LifeTime [a cable channel] was launched in February 1984 as a
merger of two failing cable programming ventures called Cable Health Network and
Daytime. After a fitful start in the days prior to deregulation, LifeTime grew and achieved
its first full year in profitability in 1986, thanks to the addition of affiliate fees which
supported the enhancement of our programming. "496 Burchell continued with his vision of
the effects reregulation would bring:
The prospect of rate reregulation will choke off those aggressive levels of
programming investment. Rate reregulation forces downward pressure on
affiliate fees. It discourages aggressive programming investments by cable
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networks such as [LifeTime]. In fact, the programming most likely to
disappear first from the TV screen in [ a reregulated] environment is the
narrow appeal for public service product. Rate reregulation will also slow
system rebuilds, limiting channel capacity for carriage of existing networks
and with no channel capacity for news networks. The system begins to work
against the interests of the consumer and the programmer if, as part of a rate
reregulation tier, we stand to lose affiliate income for programming
investment or if, as part of a higher tier, we lose the distribution we count on
for advertiser income, it becomes a negative vicious cycle. The marketplace
solution creates the best incentive for business arrangements that reflect our
costs and the right kinds of distributor promotion and marketing plans for
[LifeTime] network. 497
The cable spokesmen were bombarded with questions about fees. Answering such
charges about rate increases, Mooney testified, "While there occurred a spurt in cable prices
in the two years immediately subsequent to deregulation, those prices have now leveled off
Cable consumer fees in 1989, increased at a rate less than the overall rate of inflation. " 498
In follow-up questions to the panel of witnesses, Mooney addressed the history of rate
increases and admitted that there was "no question but that basic cable rates went up
significantly over all during the first two years subsequent to deregulation, and we think that
was not altogether surprising since during the fourteen years prior to deregulation we had
run 72 points behind the CPI as a consequence of the city councils holding our rates down.
However, 1989 was the third year you saw those rates level off " 499
Another defense for rising cable rates was offered by Amos Hostetter, Chairman and
CEO of Continental Cablevision, Inc. His testimony was that "while our rates have gone up
less than 5 percent a year, our operating expenses per subscriber have increased nearly 7
percent a year. u soo Hostetter also offered a somewhat longer-range view on rate increases.
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"The first systems we built in northwestern Ohio were turned on in 1964, and we charged
$4.95 for a nine-channel service." He testified that if the industry had increased those rates
to keep up with changes in the Consumer Price Index, by charging at a constant dollar
amount, the rate would come out to be something in the range of $20. "Our actual basic rate
companywide average is $16, so we have lowered our rates by about 25 percent, and our
average system now delivers over 30 channels. So we have increased the service by
threefold and in real dollars lowered the rates by 25 percent over a 25 year period. " 501
Danforth, author of the original version of S. 1880, addressed the question of
monopolies to James Mooney, "The theory of the legislation is that unregulated monopolies
are wrong, and that cable television does constitute a monopoly within each community and
unless there is an alternative multi-channel provider, there should be regulation. 11 Mooney
was asked to explain his view. He responded, "I think I have really given up arguing
whether or not cable is a monopoly because I think the relevant analysis has to do with
whether there are things in the marketplace, things that are substitutes or near substitutes to
cable, that act as a check on cable penetration and cable pricing. 11 502 Mooney continued,
It is apparent to me - and I must say it is apparent to most ofthe people that
I represent - that having argued this case for quite a while now, there is
sufficient concern in the Congress, likely to result in legislation of such form.
And we are not going to take the attitude that sometimes is taken by the
business community to the effect that oh whatever you do to us, any little
change is going to kill us, we are going to see what can be worked out, and
we will try to the greatest degree we can to cooperate with you. 503
Mooney believed that, "If you live and work in the television world, you find that
these businesses are very hotly competitive. If it were not hotly competitive you would not
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have the broadcasters up here involving themselves in the issues like rate regulation and the
circumstances under which our franchises are to be renewed and whether we can have
exclusive rights to our product because otherwise they would not care. But I think their
vigorous presence in this is in itself a kind of negative testimony to the degree to which these
businesses . . . . 1 1 Danforth cut Mooney off by saying; "I would doubt that. I mean it seems to
be [the case] that one industry can affect the health of another industry and still constitute
a monopoly, and I of course would argue that it is a monopoly. 11504
The tone of the hearing became sharper quickly when Mooney was questioned by
Gore. The Tennessee senator asked if he thought it _was "anticompetitive for a direct
broadcast satellite [DBS] company to refuse to sell its signal except through local cable
companies [disallowing private dish owners from receiving signals directly]?" Mooney
replied not necessarily. It would depend on how they might use the technology. Gore then
asked Hostetter ifhe was "aware that the cheapest rate [to purchase cable programming] that
DBS had been able to get from the cable industry was 42 1 percent higher than the rate
charged to cable franchises?" Hostetter responded that he was not privy to the rate packages
from cable TV programmers that were distributed by satellite signals. Gore related the
circumstances where the DBS industry said,
Oh this is great, cable has negotiated with us and we are going to distribute
this to satellite dish owners. But after one year's experience they came back
and said these people are impossible to deal with. They are arrogant, they are
monopolistic, they will not be fair with us and the cheapest deal they will
give us is 421 percent higher than what they give their cable companies.
They have asked us to pass legislation. It is just ridiculous that they will not
be fair. 505
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Gore tried to establish that cable operators were attempting to exclude competition
from others who were developing new programming. He then spoke about NBC' s effort to
secure cable access for its CNBC venture. "Now NBC was told . . . by the cable industry we
will not put you on our cable system if you plan to compete with CNN because that will cut
into our share of the profits from CNN. " 506 A major cable system, TCI, had an ownership
interest in CNN.
So if you plan competition you can just as well forget about being on cable
television. So the mighty NBC was brought to its knees and forced to sign a
formal agreement that they would not in any way compete with CNN. They
launched the venture with a very ill-defined mission of providing business
consumer news, and they will work up the courage to sort of nibble at the
edges of their noncompete clause. But basically they agreed to a provision
that deprives the public ofthe competition that would otherwise come if they
had not been forced to agree not to compete. 507
Mooney responded that he knew of no testimony before the committee to the effect
of a noncompete clause. He tried to explain his view of the exchange with Gore, "What I
recall is Bob Wright [of CNBC] sitting in front of a Congressional committee one day a
while ago and being repeatedly and forcefully asked if he thought that anything untoward
had happened in that matter. He kept saying, no, and finally he just stopped saying anything.
I suppose people could have drawn an inference to the contrary. " 508 Gore disagreed, saying
he did not remember it that way, but he recalled that the message was, "Do not embarrass
me by asking me to just spell it out A to Z, but essentially, Senator [Gore], that is exactly
what happened. " 509 Gore contended that no premium program that is not owned by the cable
operators is allowed on cable anymore. No new ones have been allowed on in quite a while.
"The problem with CNBC was that it was going to compete with a service that the MSOs
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owned and profited from. Now we can argue about the appearance of this thing all day long,
but we both know what happened on this. " 510
Mooney continued to disagree with Gore ' s interpretation of the situation, but Gore
insisted, "Well, everybody else knows what happened. " At that, Hostetter responded that he
was also in the group that does not know. "We have an investment in Turner, and we were
approached by CNBC to carry their service. While some if not most, of your facts are right,
I do not think the characterization is correct. " 511 But Gore continued to pursue the point.
You see, you did not have to participate in the dirty deed because there are
some ringleaders who are the lead horses. TCI led the way on this. They said,
CNBC, you are going to have to change and not compete or else you will not
get on the cable. I mean, that is what happened. The larger issue which it
represents is the one that troubles us. An unregulated monopoly is inherently
against the public interest, because even if there are good guys in the
business -- and there are lots of good guys in the business.
Here is what Mr. Wright said, here is my question, Did you agree not to
agree directly with CNN in making CNBC a full-scale news operation in
direct competition with CNN because TCI owns part of CNN's parent
company? Was this part of the arrangement that also guaranteed you access
for CNBC? Mr. Wright said, "We have a provision in our affiliation
agreement that was requested, required if you will, by most cable operators
that we not enter into general competition with CNN. Is that not anti
competitive? Well, it is not exactly what we would have preferred. Can you
understand that language, Mr. Mooney?512
Mooney responded that it appeared to him that Wright did not want to be tied up any
more than he had to be in his response to Gore ' s question. Gore retorted sharply, "You
really are going to earn your pay today if you can put a bright face on that statement. " 51 3
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Gore summarized his views saying he believed that the temptation to come in and
make a fast buck was overwhelming, that there was a temptation to shake down
programmers who want access by demanding some of the ownership or else they will not
be given access, and there was a temptation to shut down potential sources of competition
like the satellite dish industry. Finally he said, "There is a temptation to shake down
customers and to raise rates as swiftly as possible to whatever the traffic will bear." 514 After
describing these temptations, Gore offered no evidence that these tactics actually were being
employed.
Packwood seemed to come to the rescue of Mooney when Gore finished his
questioning by asking him to explain what Gore meant about equity values in the past
months. 515 Mooney responded that cable stocks had been off as much as 30 percent at the
same time that money available for loans had become scarce. He believed it was partly, but
no� entirely, due to the uncertainty over regulation of the industry. Packwood asked if he
believed that profits would fall "precipitously'' and cable would not be as good a lending risk
if it were regulated. Mooney responded that it was not if the industry were regulated but
how far the regulation may go. "I think there is a fear the regulatory changes might go too
far. "s16
Packwood then quizzed Mooney about the monopoly argument. "What am I missing
. . . then, in the allegation that you have such a lock that there simply is no other competitive
programming, no other competitive delivery system, and it is unfair to consumers?" Mooney
responded that it was hard for him to make the argument from the other side.
514 Ibid, 144-145.
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I think that people somehow sometimes instinctively mistake subscription
television for a distinct market of its own, but that is not how people treat
TV. People hooked up to a cable system sit there with that remote, and they
dial through the broadcast channels and the cable channels and the pay
channels as if they were all just TV. That is how the public treats television.
To say that cable is without competitors and has a unique hold on video in
the home I think just does not comport with reality. 5 17

Senate Committee Action
After the hearings were completed, committee chairman Ernest F. Hollings,
subcommittee chairman Inouye, and Danforth drafted another substitute version ofS. 1 880.
The Senate Commerce Committee approved this substitute version on June 7 by a vote of
1 8- 1 . Packwood cast the only dissenting vote. 5 1 8 One thing in the substitute version that
the cable industry preferred over Danforth's original bill was that it shifted rate regulation
from local governments to the FCC. The NCTA came close to agreeing not to oppose the
measure, but held back because of its objection to language barring cable operators from
"unreasonably" refusing to deal with other multichannel video programming distributors
such as DBS, satellite broadcasters, and independent cable operators. 5 19 Its objection was
based on the lack of any definition or examples of "unreasonable." The failure to obtain
agreement with cable "at the very last minute" on this anti-competitive provision angered
Gore. In return, he offered an amendment to delete the introductory "finding" that would
have sanctioned exclusive agreements between producers of cable programming and cable
operators, which limited the availability ofthe programming to competing system operators,
as a "legitimate competitive strategy."

His amendment also included another anti-
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competitive provision that required the sale of cable TV programming, transmitted by
satellite, directly to home satellite dish users. It was adopted by voice vote. 520
However, another potentially explosive amendment was diverted. It was authored
by Burns and allowed telephone companies to provide cable services. Hollings and Inouye
persuaded him to withdraw it because it would impede passage of the bill. m

Hou se Hearings

Hearings were also held in the House in March and April 1990 by the
Telecommunications Subcommittee. 522 Most of the subcommittee members favored some
degree of reregulation. As in the Senate, the major issues discussed were rate increases and
anti-competitive practices. There was also an interest on the part of the members to discuss
whether the cable industry had delivered on its promises under deregulation.
Chairman Markey presided at the hearings and listed the issues he was concerned
about in his opening comments. They were, primarily, cable rates and anti-competitive
practices.

523

He recounted that competition between cable companies was an expectation

of deregulation in 1984. " Yet today [1990], in 99 percent of the communities served by
cable, there is only one cable operator." 524 He took the position that "until there is a truly
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competitive market place, some form of reregulation is necessary to protect consumers. " 525
On this latter point, Markey supported allowing telephone company entry into the cable TV
market place to promote competition. He also supported must carry of local broadcast
programming.
Statements by other subcommittee members regarding rates included that from
Representative Jim Cooper, who agreed with the Consumer Federation of America in their
beliefthat reregulation ofrates would lower charges to American consumers enough to save
$6 billion a year. He believed it was possible to cut cable rates in half if Congress could find
a way to inject competition through reregulation into the situation. 526 Contrasting Coopers
view on rates was Representative Bill Richardson (D-New Mexico). Richardson took the
stance that competition, not reregulation, was needed, with some rate regulation. He did not
want to change the act. He believed that cable operators were victims of a vicious public
relations campaign. 527
Various subcommittee members believed that the cable industry could practice anti
competitive tactics because of the lack of regulation under the 1984 Act. Representative
Rick Boucher emphasized the lack of competitiveness in the cable service industry when he
charged that "Cable today is an unregulated monopoly. " 528 Boucher had introduced H.R.
2437 to provide for rate regulation in the short term so that local govenments could set rates
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until competition could emerge. It would also introduce such competition by allowing
telephone companies to enter the cable service market. 529
Representative Christopher Shays (R- Connecticut), who was not on the
subcommittee, spoke as a guest at the hearing. He portrayed the development of cable TV
as being at the expense of franchising authorities. In his view, state governments gave away
cable franchises without obtaining anything significant in return. Then cable operators
became the beneficiaries of 1984 deregulation when Congress deregulated regional
monopolies allowing them to change services and increases prices at will. As a result of
anti-competitive practices, cable operators became multi-millionaires when franchises that
were purchased for $600 per subscriber were sold for $2,500 per subscriber. "Cable
operators can't have it and shouldn't have it both ways: no competition and no regulation. "530
Representative Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (R-Virginia), spoke of subscriber fees for cable
television services from a more cable-friendly perspective. He wanted to temper the
criticism directed at cable rates by comparing what the industry had done to enhance the
product they offered. Referring to the 1989 GAO study on cable rates, he acknowledged that
the costs of basic services purchased by most customers rose 26 percent. That same study,
he continued, "found that when you take into account the number of channels provided in
those basic packages, the cost remained constant at approximately 45 cents per channel per
month. " 531 Bliley argued that as a result of deregulation, cable operators were able to attract
the capital investment necessary to expand their program offerings, and that while rates
increased, services were also increasing.
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House Committee Action

On June 25 the Telecommunications Subcommittee approved an unnumbered
substitute measure introduced by Chairman Markey and ranking Republican Rinaldo. It was
so new, members still did not have a final draft in front of them when the subcommittee
markup started. 532 Ultimately, the bill, HR. 5267, granted certain concessions to the cable
industry.

For example, the bill now contained the explicit protection of exclusive

programming agreements that were denied to the cable industry in the Senate bill. It allowed
cable companies to continue to enter exclusive agreements with video programmers, such
as Home Box Office, as long as the cable market was deemed competitive. 533 Such language
had been struck from S. 1 880 by the Senate Communications Subcommittee, causing the
cable industry to oppose the measure. Also the bill's approach to limiting monopolistic
practices was less aggressive than that in S. 1880. 534 The House bill differed from the Senate
bill by directing study on how to limit horizontal and vertical integration. S. 1880 required
the FCC to develop rules to restrict the number of channels a cable operator could provide
to an affiliated programmer. 53 5 The House favored a market solution rather than regulations
to address charges the cable industry acted as a monopoly through vertical and horizontal
integration. Regarding rates, the House bill, as in S. 1 880, required cable systems to offer
a basic service tier of programming which was to include local broadcasters and public
access channels and for the FCC to regulate the rates of the basic service tier. 536 The bill also
532
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included a compromise reached among cable, broadcasters and public television only days
before on must-carry that provided for cable operators to devote about 25 percent of their
channels for local broadcasts and to carry those broadcasts on the same channel number that
the TV stations used. 537
Similar to the Senate experience, the question of allowing telephone companies to
enter cable was deferred when Boucher admitted he did not have the votes to support an
amendment to that effect. 53 8 On June 27, just two days after, the full Commerce Committee
approved the subcommittee's bill by a voice vote with little change.

Floor Actions

House leaders brought H.R. 5267 to the floor on September IO under suspension of
the rules to limit debate and prohibit amendments. Despite Bush' s opposition and a veto
threat, the bill passed by voice vote. 539
The legislative process did not run as smoothly in the Senate. When Majority Leader
George Mitchell (D-Maine) sought to bring S. 1 880 to the floor under a procedure requiring
unanimous consent, he was unable to do so when Wirth, Packwood and Malcolm Wallop (R
Wyoming) gave notice that they would object. Wirth acknowledged the importance of the
cable industry to his state saying he supported a bill to deal with complaints about rate rises
and service deficiencies, but criticized the provisions that would have denied the right to
enter into agreements to provide exclusive programming to certain cable operators and
537
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charge discounts to larger cable systems that purchased programming in volume even though
smaller systems not buying in volume were charged more. According to Tom Rogers, who
was at the time a Telecommunications Subcommittee staff member, Wirth opposed the bill
in part because as an author of the 1984 deregulation legislation, S. 1880 would, in large
part, have eradicated his work. "Wirth was of a view that cable was something that would -
that deregulation would benefit competition in the telecommunications industry, and its
reregulation would thwart the development of new programming sources in the cable
industry. So it was in keeping with his authorship of previous legislation." s4o In his
objections, Packwood referred to the bill as an overreaction, and Wallop shared this view. 541
On October 11, in an effort to salvage some legislation that session, Wirth and Gore
reached a compromise over preserving some forms of exclusive agreements between cable
operators and cable programmers. Gore was an advocate of emerging technologies,
particularly those that served rural areas such as satellite and wireless cable systems. Wirth
was interested in a compromise because his state of Colorado was home to large cable
companies. But 24 amendments on file from Democrats to further tighten regulation
effectively bogged down floor consideration and their compromise and S 1880 died in the
process. After the measure died, supporters said they planned to push their proposals in the
102nd Congress. Moreover, cable opponents promised hearings on the issue of allowing
telephone companies to operate cable systems. s42
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Summary
The momentum for legislation to reregulate the cable industry was fueled by the
activities of several organized interests. With the upgrading of telephone lines with fiber
optic cables, the telephone industry initiated attempts to allow them to compete in the
lucrative cable service market. Additionally, because of the perception that rates charged
to cable subscribers were out of control, cities received the brunt of subscriber's complaints.
For that reason, interests representing cities were among the strongest advocates for
reregulation. Organizations claiming to represent consumers remained active through their
testimony at hearings. The main thrust of their argument was that rates could be slashed in
half. However, they also opposed efforts to allow entry into the cable market by telephone
companies for fear ofthe emergence of an even more powerful monopoly. Broadcasters, for
their part, wanted assurances that their programming would be carried on cable to prevent
a decline in advertising sales in local viewing areas. Lastly, other competing technologies
pushed for provisions that would require the cable industry to share programming at fair and
competitive prices.
Regarding the regulation of rates, both S. 1 880 and H.R. 5267 contained provisions
requiring the FCC to ensure that rates were neither unreasonable nor abusive when cable
operators did not have effective competition. They also addressed competition in a similar
manner by both prohibiting cable TV program networks from refusing to provide
programming to other video distributors and from discriminating against unaffiliated
program networks. Both would require cable TV systems to carry local broadcast TV
stations with H.R. 5267 explicitly adding public TV stations in that requirement.
There were differences in ways to eliminate regulating anti-competitive practices.
S. 1 880 contained a provision to limit the size of operations by restricting the number of
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subscribers a single operator could reach nationwide and the number of channels that could
be used by affiliated cable programmers. It also prohibited cable TV operators from owning
satellite or wireless cable TV systems servicing their franchise area. HR. 5 267 did not
contain either of these two provisions. In contrast to S. 1880, H.R. 5 267 contained several
provisions not addressed in the Senate bill. For example, the House bill required the FCC
to establish standards for customer service, signal quality, and assess the needs for requiring
equipment compatibility among cable systems. It required regulation of rates for use of
cable systems by nonaffiliated cable networks and to set aside channels for commercial
leasing. It also prohibited cable operators from selling systems for 3 6 months after
construction or acquisition and restricted foreign ownership. It addressed equal employment
opportunity standards and required cable networks to make programming available at
reasonable rates to satellite dish owners. Probably the most significant difference was that
H.R. 5 267 would require cable systems to offer a basic service tier to include broadcast TV
and local PEG programming and require the FCC to regulate the rates charged for this basic
tier.
The two bills considered in 1990 had received some support from the cable industry
early on as the NCTA tried to calm the concerns of investors by reducing the regulatory bite
of any new legislation through compromise on provisions. However, after H.R. 5 267 bill
passed the House by voice vote, the cable industry withdrew its support of continued
legislation because of language in S. 1880 assuring competitors open access to cable
programming by prohibiting exclusive agreements and a deal that would have forced cable
operators to carry broadcast channels. The industry then began to oppose any reregulation
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efforts. As one observer reported, "Feeling burned, [by this change in attitude] Senate
sponsors promised the 1991 bill would include even weightier regulatory language. " 543

The Battle Lines Are Drawn: 1991
Maintaining their opposition as the 102nd Congress began, the cable industry was not
expected to cooperate in any reregulation efforts. Furthermore, the Bush administration' s
continuing support for measures to stimulate competition rather than reregulation lent
support to cable' s resistance. There was considerable continuity in the new Congress in the
identity of the major congressional players in cable legislation. New cable reregulation bills
in the form of S. 12 and its companion H.R. 1303 were introduced. These bills essentially
reflected the bills that failed in 1990 except that S. 12 was a little tougher on cable. 544
In March, the Senate Communications Subcommittee held hearings on S. 12, but
members of the subcommittee were responding in a more partisan fashion on this round of
attempts at reregulation.

Danforth, as the bill's chief sponsor, had only two other

Republicans siding with him. In 1990, he had six that supported his efforts. Most
Republicans on the Telecommunications Subcommittee opposed the bill in the March 2 1
hearing. This took place after they met on March 6 with senior White House officials who
encouraged them to fight the bill. 545
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On May 14, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee reported
S. 12 by a vote of 1 6 to 3.
The House Telecommunication Subcommittee held hearings in March and June to
consider H.R. 1303 and H.R. 2546. These two bills would be replaced by H. R. 4850,
introduced by Ed Markey and reported in June. However, after subcommittee passage,
House supporters of the measure decided to wait for the Senate to act first because of the
late-session collapse of cable reregulation efforts at the end of the previous Congress. 546
However, the Senate did not act in 1991 when in November of 1991 a banking deregulation
bill was taken up, leaving no time on the schedule for cable. 547

Recurring Issues
As new rounds of legislative effort began, local governments continued to seek
reregulation of cable and restoration of local "control over cable television operations. " 548
A record had now been developed adding weight to the claims of the cable industry. The
199 1 report by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on S. 12
said, "While deregulation fueled explosive growth, it has led to abuses and problems" 549 and
the stakes were large. Since Congress deregulated cable, it had grown into a $20 billion
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industry. It was available to 90 percent of all homes in 1991, and 61 percent of those
households subscribed. sso
Sensing how the political winds were blowing and to counter claims of economic
abuse, the NCTA had adopted voluntary service standards in 1990, which were accepted by
85 percent of cable operators. However, the Senate report said local governments had
adopted standards that were more sensitive to consumers' needs than the NCTA's and that
strong mandatory requirements were necessary. 55 1 Similarly, The FCC acted in June of 1 991
to tighten the standard which cable companies had to meet to avoid regulation to six stations.
Still, only 1 8 percent to 34 percent of the nation's 1 1 ,000 cable systems were subject to
regulation under the existing commission standards. 552

Congressional Actions in 1991
By early 1991, the debate became more partisan and heated.

The Bush

administration still strongly opposed any reregulation as both houses of Congress remained
under Democratic control. Furthermore, the cable industry refused to cooperate as it had
through most of 1 990, adding to the intensity of conflict. 553 David Alyward explained one
cause of the resistance as an arrogant attitude on the part of the cable industry.
By 1 990, the cable industry had gone from a zero bank account [of political
support] to a huge deficit in its bank account on Capitol Hill. They had a
whole lot of people really really upset. And merely, I think, over the issue of
rate increases. But also because they couldn't wear that "we're the little
guys" [label] anymore. They had passed that point on the development
sso Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1991, 1 58.
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curve. Will McGowan, who had founded MCI, use to come in and lobby.
He was the start up guy. I mean, MCI can't walk around now and say:
"Yeah, I'm the little start-up guy, help me out. " They've ji0t office buildings
all over the place. That's [also] what happened to cable. 5
Even though realizing that they had not adequately cultivated the necessary support
on Capitol Hill, James Mooney offered further explanation of why the cable industry
continued to be uncooperative in the legislative process.
The industry's unwillingness to compromise on any form of reregulation
proved fatal to its interests; I mean my board just didn't want to compromise.
They just said "No. " And they thought that George Bush was going to save
them with a veto because George Bush's guys had promised that he would. m
Regarding the new bills, in the Senate, S. 12 was introduced by John Danforth. It
was cosponsored by Hollings and Inouye. ss6 In the House, H.R. 4850 was introduced by
Markey, but Rinaldo, who had co-authored the 1990 bill, did not co-sponsor the 1 991
version. The sole co-sponsor was Dingell, chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee.

Legislative Proposals
Senate Bill. Senate bill S. 12 sought to strengthen FCC regulations for basic cable
service. The bill was similar to S. 1 880 in its provisions for FCC regulation of the basic tier
of service when not subject to effective competition, including allowing the FCC to delegate
such regulation to local and state franchising authorities. It retained S. 1 880's prohibition
on denying cable programming to other video distributors and discriminating against
unaffiliated cable networks. To control horizontal integration, it also required the FCC to
limit the number of subscribers a single operator could reach nationwide and restricted cross554
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ownership of satellite or wireless systems in their franchising area. One difference between
S. 12 and S. 1 880 was the approach to "must-cany." As a result of the must-carry
compromise that collapsed at the end of 1990, a provision in S. 12 did not require carrying
local TV stations, but did require cable operators to obtain the consent of local broadcast
stations and limited cable operator's in changing channel positions of broadcast stations.
The additional provisions in S. 12 included authorizing the FCC to establish rates and terms
for leased access to cable channels and limiting the liability of cable franchising authorities
in lawsuits that might be brought by cable operators charging violations of their First
Amendment rights. This latter provision was one desired by cities. The bill also added to
the definition of effective competition the presence of another video programming
distributor, such as satellite or wireless cable that served at least 1 5 percent of area
households and was available to more than half of them. 557
House Bill. H.R. 1303, was essentially the same as H.R. 5267 from 1990. One

different provision was that H.R. 13 03 required the FCC to regulate basic rates for all cable
operators regardless of how competitive their markets were. However, this bill would
eventually be replaced with H.R. 4850 as a subcommittee substitute amendment in April
1992. That version would contain several changes from H.R. 13 03 that will be discussed
later.
Senate Hearings. On March 14, the Communications Subcommittee held hearings

on S. 12, the Cable TVConsumer ProtectionAct of 1991. 558 Senator Inouye presided at the
hearing, with Exon and Breaux present. As the hearing progressed, Packwood, Danforth,
ss, S. Rpt. 102-92.
sss Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Communications, 102nd Cong., pt sess., March 14, 1991, (CIS9 1 :S26 1 -56) 538.
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and Pressler also participated. The subcommittee heard testimony from a balanced set of
organized interests. First were witnesses who represented the views of municipal and local
governments. Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Connecticutt), then testified on why he
supported S. 12 and why reregulation was needed. The next panel represented the cable TV
industry and another represented the broadcast industry. A mixed panel presented views of
consumers, community broadcasters, and the telephone industry. The final panel consisted
of representatives of competitors to cable operators.
David C. Adkisson, the Mayor of Owensboro, Kentucky, and Sharpe James, the
Mayor of Newark, N.J. representing the NLC and the USCM, gave the initial testimony.
They testified about the problems posed by lack of competition and excessive subscription
rates in community cable TV systems. They supported the importance of S. 12's provisions
to promote competition and the need for regulation to offset the economic power of cable
TV systems. Adkisson shared the frustrations he and his constituents faced regarding the
cable television industry, including stating, "During the past year we have had two rate
increases in our community'' amounting to a forty percent increase over the past twelve
months. " 559 The second problem he described was the lack of authority that cites had over
cable TV since passage of the 1984 Act. "We are held responsible. We are expected to
control rates. But cities are absolutely helpless when it comes to controlling rates of cable
television."560 The other problem Adkisson discussed was franchise renewals. With no
competition available to existing cable operators, the cities have no negotiating strength
when renewing franchise agreements. He concluded by saying, "The 1984 Cable Act was
just that. It was a cable act. In 1991 this bill is a cable television consumer act. The
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difference is highly significant. " 561 Mayor James described the 46 percent rate increase the
Newark had experienced since 1986. But he focused more on the anti-competitive aspects
of the cable industry. He testified that, "Local governments believe the renewal amendments
,,
in S. 12 are essential to any cable legislation_ 562 By supporting S.12 and its "comprehensive
approach to resolving concerns resulting from horizontal and
vertical integration" cities believed that stimulating competition would help with the
franchise renewal problems.563
,
In Lieberman s view, Congress should act rather than await FCC action, because
"cable companies offered a truly monopoly product in their multi-channel programming
packages." 564 He described the problem as,
Under the 1984 Act, no one can legally regulate that full package. The FCC
is actually prohibited by the 1984 Cable Act from reviewing the rates
charged for services other than those that consumers can already get free with
an antenna. That is, local broadcast television. Under the 1984 Act, cable
companies can deregulate some of their most popular offerings, such as
MTV, CNN, Nickelodeon, or ESPN simply by placing that program in a
separtate teir from local broadcast services.The FCC has no power to alter
this restriction on its own powers through [rule making] alone, and that is
why regulation must be adopted by Congress.565
During Lieberman's testimony, Senators Danforth, Packwood, Pressler and Bums
arrived at the hearing. Danforth had actually taken the chair while Lieberman was testifying.
A very interesting development occurred next. Danforth, the sponsor of the bill, recognizing
that the minority had assumed control of the committee, attempted to report the bill. 566 But
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Packwood, as the ranking minority member, corrected Danforth by stating that he would
take the chair. He next stated that, "As I do not like this bill, the hearing is adjourned, and
we will have no further hearing." 567 Burns seconded his motion. Packwood preceded to
make an opening statement in which he said that he could "see no justification for this bill
or any step backward into reregulation." 568 Subsequently, while he was making an opening
statement, the majority returned and the chair reverted to Exon. When Packwood attempted
to adjourn the committee at that point, he recognized, "Oh, there is a majority here. I cannot
do that."569 The hearing continued with Exon presiding. Packwood and Burns took the side
of the cable industry by linking the increase in channels provided by operators to what they
saw as reasonable price increases. They tried to bring out this point in their questioning of
city witnesses. In similar fashion, Danforth, Exon and other supporters tried to use
testimony by the cable industry to establish they were participating in anti-competitive
practices.
Next to testify was a panel representing the cable TV industry consisting of James
Mooney, President of NCTA, James C. Kennedy, Chairman and CEO of Cox [cable]
Enterprises, and, R. E. (Ted) Turner, ill, President and Board Chairman of the Turner
Broadcasting System. They provided their review of improvements made in cable TV
programming and consumer value because of deregulation and expressed their collective
opposition to S. 12. This panel anticipated adverse effects on cable TV industry investments
in programming and technological improvements if Congress passed S. 12. They were
critical of provisions that mandated competitor access to cable programming. Mooney
emphasized the enhanced product that cable subscribers receive over that of six years ago.
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He also pointed out that the industry was on the threshold ofanother technological upgrade
through the use of fiber-optic cable to carry even more programming to its customers. 570 He
also mentioned that provisions in S. 12 on "must-carry'' did not reflect agreements reached
on S. 1880 with cities in the waning hours of the 101st Con�ess. 571 Kennedy emphasized
increased channel capacities that would not have materialized without the investment
available to a deregulated cable industry. His fear was that reregulation would stem further
technological growth for cable TV. 572 In closing, they emphasized that competition for the
cable TV industry did indeed exist. Specifically, Turner pointed out that "basic cable
receives strong competition from broadcasting." 573 He testified that "In 1990, broadcast
stations had a 70 percent share of all television viewing in the United States, and basic cable,
including super stations, had a 24 percent share." 574
Representatives of the broadcast industry testified next. Edward O. Fritts, President
of the NAB and James B. Hedlund, President, Association of Independent TV Stations
represented these interests. As expected, they expressed their support for S. 12 and the need
for legislation requiring cable TV operators to carry local programming. A detailed analysis
of anticompetitive trends in the cable TV industry was presented, including the practice of
repositioning of channels for local stations. 575

Broadcasters believed this was an

anticompetitive practice, charging that it confused viewers. The panel also described what
they believed were adverse economic effects of cable TV practices on non-cable TV stations
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and networks. They presented their views on the impact and importance of S. 1 2's
provisions for the future of free TV. 576
The fourth panel of witnesses represented a mix of interests. The three witnesses
were, Gene Kimmelman, Legislative Director for the CFA, D. J. Everett, ill, President,
Community Broadcasters Association; and John Sodolski, President, U. S. Telephone
Association. This panel collectively supported S. 12 because of its perceived benefits to
consumers. They also supported its proposed controls on rate increases and on
anticompetitive practices.
The final panel included Robert L. Schmidt, President, Wireless Cable Association
International and

Bob R. Phillips Ill, CEO, National Rural Telecommunications

Cooperative. The basis of their support for S. 12 was the status given to the satellite-TV
industry as an alternative to cable television. They believed it important for S. 12 to ensure
access to programming for alternative distributors on reasonable terms. To make their point,
they told of problems with obtaining satellite TV programming for distribution in rural areas.
S. 12 Clears Committee. On May 14, the Senate Commerce Committee approved
S. 12, by a vote of 16-3 after a mark-up of the bill. Among the more interesting aspects of
the politics involved in marking up the bill between the subcommittee hearings and full
committee consideration concerned the "must carry" issue. Support from broadcasters for
the bill was enhanced when Inouye inserted a "retransmission consent" provision into the
bill. It was a new approach to the "must carry" requirement that had generated so much
conflict over the years. lnouye ' s measure gave broadcasters the choice of either forcing
cable operators to carry their signals free or forfeiting that option and asking cable operators
576
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to compensate them for their programs. The measure attempted to heal a rift within the
broadcast industry over whether to force cable systems to carry local broadcast stations. On
the one hand, powerful broadcast stations wanted to sell their signals to cable operators.
Conversely, smaller, independent stations perceived the so-called ' must-carry' option as
more beneficial and wanted retransmission of their signals to be compulsory.m They feared
that cable operators would drop them rather than negotiate to buy their signals. Inouye' s
amendment, approved by voice vote, was an effort to please the two factions in the broadcast
industry by including both options in the bill.
lnouye's move gained support from among broadcasters, but there was an
unexpected backlash from the film industry. It opposed the measure because studios would
not receive any of the new revenues from retransmission payments. Ironically, this cast the
powerful lobby for the movie industry as an ally of cable television in opposing passage of
the bill. 578 The retransmission approach also provided organized cable industry interests
with an historical basis for opposing the bill. It was able to emphasize that "must carry'' had
been tried before, but was struck down by the courts. As early as 1965, the FCC had
required cable systems to carry local stations. However, two federal courts rejected those
rules in 1 985 and again in 1987, saying they violated First Amendment rights of cable
programmers. 579 The NCTA strongly objected to the new provision. Moony characterrized
the "supposed ' consumer bill' as a boondoggle for cable's main rivals." 580
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Thus, much of the concern over the bill in the Senate Commerce Committee markup
focused on the legal effects of the Inouye provision. 581 A number of variations on the "must
carry" concept were offered as amendments. In one particular case, the power of the
subcommittee chair was demonstrated when Inouye denied a request by John B. Breaux to
offer an amendment that excluded home-shopping stations from the benefits of the must
carry provision. Breaux had singled out the Home Shopping Network, a Florida-based
broadcaster that sold merchandise over its own television stations. Breaux said it should not
be accorded the same status as other over-the-air stations. Another variation involved
Senator Ford when he offered a must-carry amendment that included low-power television
stations. He wanted stations that had locally generated programming to be included under
the definition of the over-the-air broadcasts signals that cable operators would be forced to
carry. His amendment was adopted by voice vote. 582
S. 12 set its own new standard for effective competition.

It would consider

competition adequate when at least half of an area's households are served by other
competitors such as satellite systems or other cable operators with at least fifteen percent of
the market share in the area. This standard was expected to bring a larger percent of cable
operators under rate regulations. The bill also increased local authority to regulate rates and
service and encouraged cities to seek second cable franchises to increase competition. The
bill also included a new provision that would limit the ability of cable operators to avert
regulation by shifting their most popular programming to another package. In addition, it
would prohibit cable programmers from 'unreasonably' refusing to sell programming to
competitors. It also prohibited cable programmers from discriminating against competitors

58 1

Ibid.

582

Ibid.

254
in pricing and terms on programming and ensuring that satellite networks did not favor cable
operators over distributors for home satellite dishes in prices and programming access. 583
Although Commerce Chairman Hollings expected changes to the essential provisions
of the bill before it went to the floor, he still opted to report it, but not without complaints
that the action was premature. In responding to this criticism, proponents asked to delay
Senate floor action to see what steps the FCC would take to toughen regulatory guidelines
for cable operators. While proponents waited, opposition to the bill became more intense. 584
House Hearings.

As the House awaited Senate action, members of the

Telecommunications Subcommittee held hearings on March 20, and June 1 8, 26, and 27.
Markey introduced H.R. 13 03 as a starting place for considering reregulation . 585 The bill
as introduced was nearly identical to H. R. 5267 that passed the House in 1990. 586 However,
most Republicans who spoke at the March 20 subcommittee hearing opposed Markey' s bill.
Matthew J. Rinaldo, ranking member ofthe subcommittee, was not a cosponsor ofthe House
bill, as he was in 1 990. The sole co-sponsor was Chairman John Dingell. The partisanship
that was developing around this bill was similar to that evident in the Senate. 587
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On March 20 the subcommittee heard from cities who mainly listed again the
problems they had with cable operators. Collectively, they tried to paint a picture of the
FCC as ineffective in regulating rates for cable service. m · The only other witness to testify
was FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes. In his testimony, he urged the committee to allow the new
FCC rules raising the criteria for effecitive competition to six other video sources to take full
effect before legislating again. s89
In the 1990 House bill H.R. 5267, a balance was achieved when a fragile agreement
was reached between broadcasters and the cable industry that required cable operators to
carry local broadcast stations. 590 However, the willingness of cable interest to cooperate on
any provisions was squashed when, on June 27, Markey added provisions to H.R. 1303
requiring the FCC to regulate basic rates for all cable operators regardless of how
competitive their markets. The NCTA urged the subcommittee to not adopt a must carry
proposal that was similar to the one Inouye placed in S. 12. James Mooney, speaking for the
association, likened the provision as "imposing a surcharge on the community antenna
function of cable systems." 591 Conversely, Laurence Tish, chairman of CBS defended the
retransmission consent plan as important to the future viability of free broadcast television.
The hearing on June 26 considered H.R. 2546, a bill introduced by Representatives
Boucher and Oxley. Their bill intended to allow independent telephone companies, and in
some cases, Bell companies to carry video programming, own up to 25 percent share of the
programming they carried and set up franchises to compete with cable operators. In return
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the telephone companies would build a nationwide broadband communications system.
Gore and Bums had offered a companion bill in the Senate. 592
The remaining hearing sessions focused on the demands made by broadcasters and
phone companies to allow them to compete with cable operators.

The Administration 's Role
The White House. In 1991, the administration opposed bills more actively and at an
earlier stage in the process. 593 Senior White House officials met the week of March 6 with
some Republicans on the House Telecommunications Subcommittee to encourage them to
fight the cable reregulation. On March 13, the administration wrote to Congress on its
position that "more competition rather than more regulation, was needed. " In addition, the
administration expressed its preference for removing restrictions prohibiting telephone
companies from entering the cable programming industry. 594
Federal Communications Commission Action. On June 13, 1991, the Commission

adopted new rules that redefined effective competition, established guidelines for the
regulation of basic service rates in the absence of effective competition and revised the
procedural requirements for franchising authorities regulating such rates. 595 Supporters of
reregulation claimed the FCC ruling would improve, not diminish, support for new
regulations. The agency tightened the standard that cable companies must meet to avoid
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regulation. Under the 1984 Act, the FCC did not regulate rates for cable television service.
After the effective date in 1987, rates for basic cable service were regulated by local
franchising authorities, but only if the cable franchise area was served by fewer than three
unduplicated broadcast signals. In 1 991, the FCC increased the threshold to six signals,
boosting the percentage of cable systems subject to local rate regulation from only 3 percent
to an estimated 34 percent. 596 However, what may appear as a loss for the cable industry
might actually have been an attempt to stem the flood of legislative actions by acquiescing
to a tighter set of agency regulations that could be open to negotiation at a later time.
However, the Senate gave serious consideration to the GAO report which demonstrated that
the FCC's June (1991) effective competition decision did not address the problem of
runaway cable rates. According to the GAO report, under this definition, 80 percent of cable
subscriber rates would not be subject to rate regulation. 597 Convinced that the FCC actions
were too little too late, S. 12 included its own more rigorous criteria for effective
competition.

Summary
During 1991, the debate over cable TV reregulation became more partisan. The Bush
administration strongly opposed reregulation of the industry. Ironically, the basis for the
Bush administrations opposition was its preference for introducing competition into the
cable area rather than more regulation. This included allowing telephone companies to
compete with cable operators. The administrations strong stance against reregulation
encouraged the cable industry such that they refused to cooperate in any way in preparing
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new legislation. If no legislation could be passed, neither could telephone companies enter
the cable service market.
Senate bill S. 12 was introduced primarily to strengthen FCC regulations for basic
cable service. It established more rigorous criteria for effective competition. The provisions
in the 1984 Act that allowed cable operators to be considered subject to effective
competition when as little as three broadcast stations were operating in the area had resulted
in regulation of rates to apply to only a very few cable systems. There was a lack of
confidence in the ability of the FCC's new rule to raise the number of stations constituting
competition to six to produce the necessary regulation of rates. Although it was introduced
early, S. 12 never reached the Senate floor because of other pending business at the end of
the session and because of the threat of many amendments to weaken the regulatory
provisions. Additionally, many Republican opponents wanted the Senate to wait to vote on
the bill until after the FCC had the opportunity to issue new regulations of their own. While
one bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, the only actions taken was to hold
hearings. Many members of that chamber wanted to wait to see what action the Senate
would take.

Reregulation is Passed: 1992
Enactment of The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
occurred after the following key congressional actions in 1992. On January 3 1, the Senate
overwhelmingly passed S. 12 by a vote of 73 to 18. This vote occurred after the Senate
rejected a weaker substitute measure offered by Packwood. On July 23, the House passed
H.R. 4850 by a vote of 340 to 73 . The Senate failed to pass the House version of S. 12 (as

259
amended by passage of H.R. 4850) on August 12, thus establishing disagreement between
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The Senate did, however, agree to a conference
on the legislation. On September 14, the Conference Report on S. 12 was submitted to the
House and three days later, on September 17, it was adopted by a vote of 280 to 1 28. The
Senate adopted the report on September 22 by a vote of74 to 25 and sent S. 12 to President
Bush for signature. However, as he had threatened, Bush vetoed the bill.
President Bush' s veto came on October 3, very close to the end ofthe congressional
session when many members were anxious to leave in time to tend to election business. But
on October 5, just before Congress adjourned, both houses voted to override the President ' s
veto, the Senate by 74 to 25 and the House by 308 to 1 14. 598 The heat of the battle to
override the veto overshadowed the fact that the enactment was the "only large scale
reregulation of any industry in the Reagan-Bush era. "599 It was also the first and only
override of a veto by President Bush. Thirty-two days later, on November 7, 1992, George
H. W. Bush lost the presidential election to William Jefferson Clinton.

Senate Action
On January 3 1, the Senate overwhelmingly passed S. 12 by 73- 1 8 with Senator
Inouye serving as the floor manager. 600 Consideration of the bill began on January 27 and
ended on January 3 1 after twenty-one amendments were offered.

598

Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1992, 1 7 1 .

599

Ibid.

600

Seventeen of the

Congress, Senate, 102nd Cong. 1 st Sess. 13 8, Congressional Record,
(January 3 1, 1992): S 71 1 .

260
amendments were adopted, two were withdrawn, and two were rejected. The most notable
of the rejected amendments was a motion to consider a substitute version of the bill.
Senate Floor Debate.

Senator Inouye, Chairman of the Communications

Subcommittee served as the floor manager for the bill. Senator John Danforth, was the
sponsor of the bill, and senators Inouye, Hollings, Gore, Gorton, Lieberman, and
Metzenbaum, were the original co-sponsors of the bill. Six other co-sponsors were added
in the year after introduction. However, of those six, only Gorton and Hatch were
Republicans. S. 12 was very similar to S. 1880 which was approved by the Commerce
Committee in June 1990 by a vote of 18 to 1. The focus of the bill, like S. 1880, was to
address consumer's problems with rates and services while at the same time promoting
competition. 601
As the floor manager for the bill, Inouye was clear about his position.
I believe that the cable industry has begun to take advantage ofits popularity.
In certain instances, . . . rate increases have been excessive and, for many
systems, customer service has been abominable. Programmers argued that
they could not get carried on cable systems without relinquishing control of
their product. Competing video distributors alleged that the programmers
refused to deal with them. In general, it appeared that the cable industry
possessed undue market power. Over three years, the Communications
Subcommittee held 13 hearings on cable related issues. They listened to over
50 hours of testimony from 113 different witnesses. At last, the bill passed
the committee by a vote of 16 to 3 . 602
The amendment offered as a substitute to S. 12, was proposed January 3 0 by
Packwood, Wirth, Stevens, Bums, Dole, Shelby, Rudman, Simpson, Breaux, senators Wyche
Fowler Jr. (D-Georgia), Jake Garn (R-Utah), and John Kerry (D-Massachusetts). It
Congress, Senate, Senator Inouye of Hawaii speaking in favor of adoption
of S. 12 during floor debate, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess. , Congressional Record,
January 29, 1992: S561.
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attempted to weaken the regulatory provisions of the bill. It eliminated language aimed at
giving cable competitors better access to cable programs and contained no limits on cable
system ownership. It contained favorable language on franchise reform that fundamentally
favored cable ' s renewal rights. It also contained extremely liberal language in defining
effective competition as at least "one or more independently owned multichannel video
programming distributors."603 On January 3 1 , The amendment was soundly rejected by 3 554. 604 Though the substitute was rejected, sponsors agreed to add two ofits provisions to the
main bill to encourage the administration's support. One would prohibit local governments
from awarding exclusive cable franchises. A second would broaden an exemption to a 1 984
ban on telephone company entry into the cable business by allowing rural phone companies
in areas with populations of 10,000 or less to offer cable services. 605
With the exception ofthe Packwood substitute amendment and another amendment
by Jessie Helms, all amendments were disposed of by voice votes. Six of the adopted
amendments dealt with prohibiting violence, indecency or unsolicited pornography in cable
programming. The Helms amendment was approved 95-0 and allowed cable operators to
ban pornographic programs and require operators to place such shows on one channel
available only upon subscriber request. 606 Another amendment, offered by Fowler and
approved by a voice vote, allowed cable operators to ban the use of any public educational
channels for programs containing "obscene" material. Ofthe two amendments rejected, one
was the Packwood substitute and the other was offered by Brown and intended to modify
provisions related to the "must-carry'' provisions in S. 12. It was rejected by voice vote.
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During his urging for floor passage, Inouye promoted his provision addressing
retransmission consent for broadcasters. "I want to respond once again to the cable
industry's campaign of misinformation about its effect on consumers' cable rates. One
fallacy they promote is that S. 12 will allow the TV networks to add a '20 percent surcharge
to cable subscribers' bills. "'607 He believed the cable industry had misinterpreted the
provisions and encouraged the NCTA to study the measure carefully. In defending the
retransmission provision, he stated,
Gone are the days when the broadcasters received their revenues from
advertisers and cable received there revenues solely from subscribers.
[Today] as we all know, cable competes with broadcasters for local and
national advertising. The retransmission provisions of S. 12 will permit local
station� not national networks, as I have indicated, to control the use oftheir
signals 8
To eliminate any doubt about this issue, Inouye offered a manager's amendment to
the bill to make certain that retransmission consent did not result in rate increases. In
addition, the FCC would be required to regulate the rates for the basic tier -- this is the tier
that contains the broadcast signals -- to make certain that those rates remain reasonable.
Thus, the FCC had a clear mandate to ensure that retransmission did not result in harmful
rate increases. 609
S. 12 was then sent to the House with a request for concurrence.
House Action
The House waited until mid- 1992 to weigh in on the increasingly controversial cable
debate. On March 25, Markey introduced an unnumbered bill, later to become H. R. 4850.
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It was adopted by the subcommittee in the form of a substitute amendment for H.R. 13 03 to
reregulate cable TV. He vowed to "rein in the renegades" who charged "exorbitant rates,
provided poor service and hoarded programming." He believed the bill was "pro-consumer,
pro-competition legislation. " 610
Markey's bill was the product of subcommittee "Democrats, backed by the lobbying
support of consumer groups, labor unions, and -- most importantly -- the National
Association of Broadcasters. " 611 This pitted a coalition of powerful lobbying organizations
against the cable industry and its allies.
Subcommittee Republicans were cool to the bill and had not been involved in its
preparation. In fact, no Republican attended a March 25 briefing on the bill. And indeed,
key Republicans on the subcommittee met with White House Chief of Staff Samuel K.
Skinner on March 25 to discuss strategies to defeat the bill. In the end, the bill did move
from subcommittee to committee, then to the floor and passage.
At the Committee Level. An early complication concerned the struggle among
broadcasters, Hollywood studios and cable operators for use of over-the-air signals. Similar
to the Inouye retransmission consent provision in S. 12, Representatives Markey and Dennis
E. Eckart (D-Ohio) sought to give broadcasters the option ofnegotiating with cable operators
for permission to retransmit their local signals for a fee, or simply allowing the cable
operator to carry the signal for free. 612 The movie studios had tried to revise the provision
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in the Senate bill that allowed broadcasters to negotiate fees when their signals are carried
by cable operators. The studio interests contended that the bill, as written, diminished their
control over copyrighted programming. Jack Valenti, the major lobbyist for the motion
picture industry, sought help from the House Judiciary Committee, which had jurisdiction
over copyright issues. 613 This produced a jurisdictional conflict. Jack Brooks (D-Texas)
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and Intellectual Property Subcommittee Chairman
William J. Hughes (D-New Jersey) opposed the retransmission consent provision on the
grounds that the copyright claims of film producers were ignored, and copyright matters
were within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee. They wanted language that would
produce revenue for local broadcasters and for Hollywood. 614 In the end, Markey prevailed
when he insisted that retransmission consent fell fully within the jurisdiction of
Telecommunications Subcommittee and was unrelated to copyright questions. 615
A markup on the bill was scheduled for March 30, but was delayed for a week
because it became apparent that several Democrats were siding with Republicans to push for
a weaker bill. 616 On April 8, Markey had to struggle to muster the votes to get his bill out
of his subcommittee. The panel approved the draft by a vote of 17-7, after rejecting a
weaker alternative by Representative Norman F. Lent (R-New York) by a 12 -14 vote.
Markey' s bill prevailed despite the defections of Democrats Thomas J. Manton and James
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H. Scheuer of New York and Bill Richardson ofNew Mexico. The three Democrats voted
"present" on the final bill, while three Republicans switched to support the measure. 617
The divisive actions of the subcommittee centered on two of the bill's key
provisions: One would require the FCC to set rates for broadly defined basic cable service
that would include local and distant over-the-air signals and possibly even the most popular
cable channels such as CNN and MTV. Lent's alternative, backed by the cable industry,
accepted the notion of basic rate regulation but proposed limiting the definition of a basic
program tier to only broadcast and public, educational and government channels. 618 The
other provision most objectionable to opponents would ban cable affiliated programmers
from unreasonably refusing to sell programming to cable competitors such as satellites and
so called wireless microwave cable systems. 619
Questions were raised about why Richardson, Manton and Scheuer so strongly
supported the cable position for weaker regulation, particularly because none of them had
overtly sided with cable in the past. In reaction, consumer groups launched a media
campaign to criticize the Democrats, with whom they had largely been allied on other issues.
For New Yorkers Manton and Scheuer, the hometown influence ofTime-Wamer Inc. played
a role. The nation' s second-largest cable operator controlled systems in Manhattan,
Brooklyn, and Queens. "Like all congressmen, we take into account the hometown
industry," Manton said, adding that "Time-Warner employed about 2,000 people in his
district, while complaints about cable rates had been few. But there wasn't any pressure. I
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keep my own counsel. " 620 A Scheuer spokesman said any implications that his vote was tied
to campaign contributions was "stretching it. His only motivating factor was to get a bill
that could pass. " 621 Richardson said he wanted to "ensure that cable operators would not be
banned from negotiating exclusive deals with program providers. "622
Markey's only defeat came with the rejection, by voice vote, of a provision that
established local citizens' groups to monitor local cable operators and franchising
authorities. The groups would have no authority to lodge complaints about cable abuses.
The provision was pushed by consumer organizations, including Ralph Nader' s Public
Citizen Group. 623 A similar provision was proposed to the Senate Commerce Committee
staff by the CFA, according to Ward White. "There were some things that people tried to
get in [the bill] that would have killed it if they had gotten in. For example, the consumer
federation wanted a CUB [Citizens Utility Board] put in. Well, I told them that if they
wanted that, the bill would never go anywhere."624
H.R. 4850 went next to the full Energy and Commerce Committee for consideration.
On June 1 7, it approved a scaled-down version of the bill. Two controversial provisions
were eliminated which Chairman Dingell said would cause the bill to get bogged down by
opponents on the Judiciary Committee. One was the broadcast retransmission consent
proposal. The other provision was to bolster competition by giving satellite distributors and
other potential competitors lower-priced access to cable programming.
620

Ibid, 945.

621

Ibid.

622

Ibid.

623

Ibid, 946.

624

White interview.

267
On the other side, the bill was amended to make it tougher on the industry. 625 An
amendment by Jim Cooper authorized the FCC to order refunds to consumers for any rate
increases collected by a cable company after a complaint was lodged until it determined
whether price-gouging had occurred. It passed by voice vote with little debate. Another by
Ralph M. Hall (D-Texas), allowed local broadcasters to expand the number of cable systems
that would be forced to carry their signals under the so-called must-carry requirements if
they transmitted between two large metropolitan areas. It also was approved by voice
vote. 626
Other amendments adopted by the Energy and Commerce Committee included
requiring the FCC to study the migration of sports programming from free broadcast
television to subscription cable and pay-per-view television; allowing cable franchise
authorities to set local rates for pay-per-view events that involved any professional sports
championship featuring their hometown team, and requiring broadcasters to comply with
equal employment opportunity guidelines. 627
An attempt by Cooper to set up consumer watch dog groups were defeated by voice
vote.
The full committee approved the bill 3 1 -12. A substitute was offered by Lent that
was similar to that offered in the subcommittee, but it was rejected by a party-line vote of
1 5-27. Four Republicans crossed party lines to support the final bill: Matthew J. Rinaldo,
Carlos J. Moorhead (R-Califomia), Michael Bilirakis (R-Florida), and Fred Upton (R625
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Michigan). Democrats Manson and Scheuer ofNew York, and Richardson ofNew Mexico,
who had supported Republicans wanting a weaker bill in the April 8 action of the
subcommittee, switched back to vote with their party. 628
House Floor Action. On July 23, the House passed the cable bill by a vote that was

viewed as a solid victory for cable TV's opponents, broadcasters and consumers. Markey
was the floor manager for the bill. Ten amendments were offered. Three, offered by
Dingell, Slattery (R-Kansas), and Billy Tauzin (D-Louisiana) were adopted. Four offered
by Oxley, Shays, Manton, and Lent were rejected.

And three amendments were

withdrawn. 629
The first real sign that President Bush was on the losing side of the cable issue came
on a crucial amendment by Tauzin to replace the program access provision dropped from the
bill by the Energy and Commerce Committee. Tauzin' s amendment received overwhelming
backing 23 8-68. 630
Before consideration of Tauzin' s amendment, Manton had offered an amendment to
weaken an anti-vertical integration provision in the bill regarding programming access. He
called the Tauzin amendment "far-reaching and radical," saying it would set a government
mandated price for programming and cause program creators to lose control over their
product. Manton stated that the satellite industry wanted "more than a jump start, they
wanted a free ride." 631 His amendment was less restrictive than Tauzin's. It would bar any
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programming vendor "controlled" by a cable operator, rather than "affiliated," from refusing
to deal with cable competitors to restrain competition. It also did not address discrimination
in the prices, terms or conditions of program contracts. It also allowed programmers and
operators to enter into exclusive contracts. Manton ' s amendment was backed by Dingell,
members of the House Democratic leadership and the cable lobby. Yet, after impassioned
speeches by both Tauzin and Manton, the Manton amendment failed by a vote of 1 62-24 7. 632
In comparison, Tauzin ' s amendment would bar cable affiliated programmers from
refusing to sell programs at fair prices and terms to home satellite dish and wireless cable
industries. It would also allow exclusive contracts between programmers and operators only
if the FCC determined they were in the public interest. 633 The Administration opposed the
Tauzin amendment because it restricted the discretion of cable programmers in distributing
their product. Requiring programming networks that are commonly owned with cable
systems to make their product available to competing distributors could undermine the
incentives of cable operators to invest in developing new programming. 634 Nevertheless, the
amendment passed overwhelmingly, 23 8-68 635
After adoption of the Tauzin amendment, the House considered an amendment
offered by Lent. 636 Supported by the Bush Administration, it eliminated or significantly
modified many of the excessively regulatory provisions ofH.R. 4850. It reduced the use of
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exclusive local franchising which the White House saw as one impediment to competition
in the cable industry. It was still defeated by a vote of 144-266. 637
The bill, as amended, then passed the House by a wide margin of 340-73 . 638 Ninety
eight Republicans joined with 24 1 Democrats in voting aye. Many of these defectors were
from rural areas where broadcast signals could not reach and viewers had to rely on cable
and satellite television for reception639 Coupled with a voting margin of 73- 1 8 for the
Senate's companion bill, a confrontation was set up between Congress and President
Bush. 640 The Bush administration continued to voice its opposition to reregulating cable TV
until competition was established. In that regard, the White House pointed to a July 16
ruling by the FCC that allowed telephone companies to carry video programs over a "video
dial tone. "641
Easy passage was attributable to the fact that sponsors had succeeded in keeping
some controversial issues out of the debate, the telephone-cable issue, for one. They also
avoided a fight with the Judiciary Committee over how to compensate broadcasters who
provided programs to cable operators. Furthermore, the Rules Committee declined to allow
two competing amendments to the bill: One was the Eckart retransmission consent provision
dropped in the committee markup. The other was Hughes' that would overhaul the entire
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copyright royalty payment system while requiring the cable industry to pay broadcasters,
program creators and sports leagues for use of broadcast programs. 642
Sponsors were confident that the broadcaster retransmission consent provision that
was in the Senate bill would be retained in the final conference version. Even though
Judiciary Committee Chairman Brooks promised to continue to fight against the provision
in the conference committee stage, he ultimately declined to attend the conference meetings
after he concluded he did not have the votes to prevail on the issue. 643

Final Action
As the two bills headed for conference, the differences in the bills were, as expected,
concentrated in the areas of rate regulation and competition.
Differences. Regarding regulating rates charged for cable service, the House version

authorized the FCC to set maximum prices and to ensure that rates for basic packages
offered by cable systems were reasonable. H. R. 4850 defined basic packages to include all
broadcast signals carried by a cable operator, and all public, educational and government
access channels. Local franchise authorities would enforce the basic service prices by using
FCC guidelines. To monitor prices of other program packages, a franchising authority or
a state or a local government could protest unreasonable cable prices. Subscribers would be
eligible for a refund for the undefined "unreasonable" portion of any rate deemed unfair by
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the FCC. The automatic annual rate hike of 5 percent allowed under the 1 984 Act was
repealed. 644
In S. 12, the FCC would ensure that basic cable rates were reasonable, and at a level
that would be left up to the agency to define. Basic cable service simply included at least all
local broadcast signals. Local government :franchise authorities would be able to regulate
basic rates as long as such authorities followed FCC regulations. To monitor prices for
packages other than the basic tier, excluding premium movie channels and pay-per-view
events, cable subscribers and :franchising authorities could protest to the FCC about
unreasonable rates, and the FCC could lower rates it found excessive. 645
An issue related to rates was the topic of basic packages. In the House bill, cable
operators were required to offer all local and distant broadcast signals as part of their basic
package, including so-called superstations. Also, within five years, or where technically
feasible, cable operators were banned from forcing customers to subscribe to a higher-priced
package in order to receive a premium movie channel, such as HBO or Cinemax, or a
pay-per-view event.

The Senate version limited cable operators from avoiding rate

regulation by turning their basic program packages into stripped- down, unpopular packages,
by applying rate regulation to the lowest-priced cable package subscribed to by at least 30
percent of all customers. 646
The provisions to control of competition provided the most significant differences
in the bills. The House bill contained a provision intended to give cable competitors, such
644

CQWR, July 25, 1992, 2164.

645

Ibid.

646

Ibid.

273
as home satellite dish program packages and microwave "wireless" cable systems, better
access to cable programming at fair terms. It barred cable-affiliated programmers from
unreasonably refusing to deal with cable competitors in the price, terms and conditions of
programs. But cable-affiliated programmers would be able to set different prices, account
for differences in the cost of creating, selling, delivering or transmitting programs, and offer
volume discounts. They also could enter into exclusive contracts when the FCC finds such
contracts to be in the public interest. 647 The Senate bill included a similar program-access
provision, but it had fewer allowances for price differences and would offer no explicit
permission to enter into exclusive contracts. In a key difference with the House bill, the
Senate bill also would give broadcasters the power to extract fees from cable operators. The
so-called retransmission consent provision, authored by Inouye, would allow broadcasters
to either force a cable operator to carry their signals free of charge or to forfeit that option
and negotiate with the cable operator to receive compensation for the retransmission of its
signal. This provision did not make it into the House bill because of an effort to avoid a
jurisdictional dispute with the Judiciary Committee. 648
In the House bill, franchising authorities would be prohibited from granting exclusive
franchises to cable operators. Cities and towns would be allowed to establish and operate
competing cable systems. However, in S. 12, franchise authorities would be barred from
unreasonably refusing to award additional franchises. Cities would also be allowed to
establish and operate competing cable systems. 649
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H.R. 4850 included a provision for the FCC to study the impact of cable operators
owning programming, or vertical integration, and limit their control over large shares of the
nation's subscribers, or horizontal integration. In the Senate bill, the FCC would limit
vertical and horizontal integration within the cable industry. 6so

Conference. On September 9, House and Senate negotiators approved the conference
report for S. 12 by voice vote. In a rapid two and a half hour meeting, conferees settled the
few substantial differences between the two bills that had not been resolved by the respective
staffs over the August recess. 6s 1 Issues settled before the conferees met included the
provisions for rate-setting and granting cable competitors better access to cable-originated
programming. 6s2
Regarding the regulation ofrates, the conferees adopted the language from the House
bill with two changes. One was to state specifically in Section 623(b) that the FCC shall
regulate rates for basic service tiers to ensure they are reaso_nable. The other was to add a
provision that directed the FCC to seek to reduce the administrative burdens on subscribers,
cable operators, franchising authorities, and the Commission. 6s3 The conferees agreed to
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permit subscribers, as well as franchising authorities or other relevant state or local
government entities to file complaints with the FCC. 654
Regarding anti-competitive measures, the conference agreement adopted the Senate
provision that bars national and regional cable programmers affiliated with cable operators
from unreasonably refusing to deal with any multichannel video programming distributor
and in discriminating in the price, terms, and conditions in the sale of their programming to
multichannel video distributors to avoid impeding retail competition. m
The House version required that any television broadcast station signal carried by the
cable operator be provided in the basic tier, including superstations. The conferees agreed
to delete the requirement that superstations be carried on the basic tier. The conference
agreement allowed cable operators to decide whether to carry superstations in the basic tier
or on other tiers in their own discretion. 656
Two controversial provisions were dropped from the final bill by the conferees. One
in the House version dealt with the migration of sports events from free television to pay
per-view charges. It was dropped from the final version by the conferees agreeing to rely on
the Senate ' s provision on uniform rate structure. 657 Another dealt with a House provision
to bar foreign ownership of cable systems. The conferees adopted the Senate position, which
was silence on the issue. 658
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The home satellite-dish and wireless cable industries enjoyed an advantage in their
effort to gain cheaper access to cable programming. The conferees accepted House
language, similar to the Senate bill, that would bar cable operators who owned a financial
interest in programming from improperly influencing decisions regarding the price, terms
and conditions of program sales to non-cable competitors. 659 Also a House provision that
would have allowed local governments to set the price for pay-per-view championship
professional sporting events was rejected because of opposition from the Senate conferees
and House Republicans. However, conferees did agree to allow the FCC to study the
issue. 660
The provision from S. 12 to broaden an exemption to a 1984 ban on telephone
company entry into the cable market by allowing rural phone companies in areas with
population of 10,000 or less to offer cable service was dropped from the bill in conference
committee.
On September 17, the House adopted the final version of the conference committee's
cable bill. 661 Even though continuing intense opposition from the cable industry and the
movie producers, causing 5 8 House members who had voted for passage to vote against the
conference report, the House passed it by 280-128. 662 The strength of this vote indicated that
the House could still manage the two-thirds votes necessary to override a threatened veto by
President Bush. 663 Bush sent a letter to Republican leaders that same day saying, "My vision
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for the · future of the communications industry is based on the principles of greater
entrepreneurship and less economic regulation. This legislation fails each of these tests and
is illustrative of the congressional mandates and excessive regulations that drag our economy
down."664
On September 22, the Senate passed the final version of S. 12 by a vote of 74-25.
The vote for passage represented more than the two-thirds majority that would be needed to
override a veto by the President and included many Republicans. 665

The Bush

administration, however, did not back away from its threat to veto the bill.

Veto Override

On October 3, President Bush vetoed the bill stating that the burdens ofreregulation
would cause cable television rates to rise, and not decrease as proponents claimed. 666 Bush,
his Chief of Staff James A. Baker ill and Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kansas),
worked hard to persuade enough senators to abandon their support for the legislation. In
doing so, the White House cast the showdown vote on the cable bill as a critical test of
presidential loyalty. But on October 5, the Congress resoundingly rejected the argument in
overriding the veto. 667 Both chambers surpassed the two-thirds majorities needed for the
first override of 3 6 vetoes, despite intense pressure on Republican senators to side with the
president just weeks ahead of the November 3 national election. 668 Minority Whip Al
Simpson, who supported the bill, but offered to switch his vote in behalf of Bush, said the
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White House came close to winning the 34 senators needed to sustain the veto. "We never
could bump up past 33 votes, said Simpson, who ended up voting for the final bill. But if
we had two or three more votes, we'd have made it. "669 In the end, only 25 senators took the
President's side.
The House followed by voting to override by 308-114. That was a greater margin
than the 280-128 vote in the House when it adopted the conference report on September 17.
No members switched their votes to the President's side, but 14 went from ' nay' to override
the veto. 670

Conclusion

During this round of legislation, the cable industry lost on nearly every policy
position they supported. The results were directly opposite to the outcome of the 1984 Act
when the cable industry received a real boost from Congress. This outcome was rooted in
a number of the cable industry' s actions. One was the rapid manner in which operators
raised rates while failing to pay attention to the need to educate the subscribing public to the
increases in programming and channel capacities that drove those increases. In fact, the
industry was often accused of being arrogant in dealing with customers. Similarly, it did not
cultivate the support of elected officials until too late in the reregulation effort, depending
too heavily on the anti-regulatory, pro-market philosophy of the Bush Administration. This
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false sense of security extended to the belief that the FCC and courts would strike down
regulations that could be found to violate First Amendment rights of cable operators.
On the other hand, consumers and broadcasters were winners on issues important to
them. They were successful in defining the policy issue as the need to control a powerful
monopolistic industry. Here it is clear that the cable industry failed to realize the importance
of the majority party change in Congress and what that meant in terms of a preference for
regulatory policies. The rapid economic success for the cable industry did not provide the
necessary political savvy to assure a continuation of that success. As a result, the new policy
was a boon for broadcasters.
It is easy to view these outcomes as a "war'' between large competing industry
interest groups. However, it was more of a struggle between advocates of regulation and
advocates of competitive market approaches to eliminating or avoiding potentially
monopolistic industries. The policy struggle was fought over defining the issue. Advocates
for regulatory policies were successful in defining the issue as a consumer protection
function and were willing to support the policy needs of cable' s main competition in
exchange for their support in framing the issue as protecting American consumers . .
Conversely, interests that supported policies directed at creating more competition were
unsuccessful in making their case to allow free-market approaches to control any long
standing dominance by any individual industry or technology. Advocates of this approach
envisioned free competition that would allow new technologies to develop, flourish, and
replace older technologies. These in turn would be replaced by even newer technologies.
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Thus the winners were those who defined the policy issue in terms best understood
by the masses. However, this did not deter the inevitable continued development of new
telecommunications technologies.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

This chapter presents an analysis of the case studies conducted. It will examine the
cases in terms of general aspects of cable television regulation issues and some of the
problems Congress faced in establishing a national regulatory policy. It discusses the
essential features of the politics of cable television regulation in relation to the literature on
group interests. Observations about the deregulation and reregulation experience are
compared with some of the primary theoretical models of interest group activities. Finally,
the relationship between politics and policies are discussed in terms of outcomes of the two
cases.
In the general realm of studying regulatory policy development, focus is on the
actions of Congress in deciding whether or not the cable TV industry should be regulated,
and if it so, how regulatory policy should be structured.

Regulatory Policy for Cable Television as a Case Study

This study is essentially the story of the difficulties regarding formulating a national
policy for a relatively new industry that relied on a rapidly developing technology and that
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lacked a mature regulatory structure. These two aspects serve as crucial influences
throughout the quest to resolve the policy issue and caused the development of regulatory
policy to follow a jagged path. Regulation of the industry wandered from little or no
regulation, to a hodge-podge of regulation at the state and local levels, to a national policy
of deregulation enacted after contentious legislative battles. After becoming deregulated in
the first phase of national policy, the industry soon faced political charges of operating as
an unbridled monopoly, gouging consumers and systematically excluding competitors.
Congress then reregulated the industry less than ten years after deregulation occurred. The
path proceeds from early rule making by the FCC to rulings by federal courts through
campaigns by organized interests to stymie the growth of the industry, on to negotiated
compromises with the major opposition interests, to finally surviving attacks by rival
communications competitors.
As one former staff aide described the progression of communications policy, "The
key to understanding communications problems in politics is not to focus on one institution.
It's to focus on the interplay of Congress, the FCC, and the courts."671 This study begins with
the time when several federal institutions were struggling with the need to change the
regulatory scheme for the communications sector. The FCC, the courts, and the Department
of Justice were trying to modify the manner in which the dominant telecommunications
monopoly, AT&T, would be regulated as a result of unprecedented challenges from newly
developed technologies. In response to those changes, certain policy entrepreneurs in
Congress, who believed that starting over was the only way to create an effective national
communications policy, attempted to completely re-write the Communications Act of 1934.
These entrepreneurs also tried to include cable television in their revision of the act. The
time in which these efforts took place coincided with a wave of deregulation in the late
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1970s and early 1980s. Deregulation had already taken place in other economic regulatory
arenas such as motor carriers and airlines.
The journey · took place amidst rapid technological changes in the industry and
uncertainty as to how best to regulate the medium. Similar to the telephone industry, the
issue of regulating cable TV became problematic as rapid changes occurred in the
technology used. The initial methods were simple. Community antenna television used tall
towers to receive signals and used cables to extend television programs into areas that could
not receive broadcast signals. They usually provided four to six local channels through
connections to a community distribution system. Then, the development and use of satellite
broadcasting to transmit programming enabled cable operators to import additional signals
from distant markets and to provide twelve or more channels of entertainment to any who
wanted to subscribe. Finally, when broad-band transmission capabilities were developed,
twenty-four to forty-eight or more channels were offered along with the possibility of two
way communications. The first of these technologies had been in place since the early
1950s. The second phase in the technology development occurred in the late 1970s and early
1 980s when Congress sought to establish a deregulatory policy for cable TV. The latter
phase occurred during the time the industry was considered deregulated between 1987 and
1992. These rapid technological advances in cable capacity had a severe impact on, among

others, local broadcast stations. The FCC found that importation of distant television signals
could seriously degrade the programming product offered by broadcasters, causing a
reduction in advertising revenues for service to households not subscribing to cable systems.
Cable TV was in serious conflict with broadcasters for local video entertainment markets.
In the context of rapid technological changes that were taking place, there existed a
great deal of uncertainty regarding regulation of cable TV. Since there existed no national
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policy on regulation ofthe industry, and the courts had at various times ruled the FCC lacked
authority over the medium, the existing regulatory vacuum was filled by local and state
governments. However, lacking any cohesive national policy, the regulation of cable TV
evolved inconsistently across states and municipalities, resulting in many dissimilar
schemes. Generally, local governments regulated cable TV through provisions in franchise
agreements negotiated with individual cable operators. Each franchising authority imposed
a different set of rules and obligations on its cable system providers. Many times these terms
reflected political considerations more than economic factors or consumer demand. This
variation from city to city produced uncertainty in regulatory restrictions which, in turn,
inhibited development of the cable television industry because of the difficulty in attracting
capital investment. The situation became one where the interests of municipal regulators and
cable system owners differed sharply on how cable TV should be regulated. These two
groups became the main protagonists in the battle to deregulate or, more accurately, relieve
the industry of the burden of local regulations in 1984.
At the heart ofthe regulatory uncertainty for cable television was how its technology
differed from others in the communications sector. Early interpretations of the FCC's
jurisdiction over cable derived from the requirement of the Communications Act of 1934 to
oversee interstate communications by wire or radio. What was complicated about this was
that cable operators provided television programming to consumers, but not by use of the
frequency spectrum. The result was an FCC attempt to apply a regulatory scheme based on
a "spectrum scarcity rationale" to a medium that did not use the spectrum. Conversely, even
though cable used "wire" to deliver its programming, it did not fit into the FCC's regulatory
framework for common carriers as did telephone companies. Probably more significant was
the question of whether the Commission even had the authority under the Communications
Act of 1934 to regulate the CATV industry as common carriers. As a consequence, in April,
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1958, the FCC declared that CATV systems were not common carriers, because their
customers did not select the particular messages they could receive. Also, since they were
not regulated as broadcasters, because they did not use the frequency spectrum, cable TV
was essentially allowed to compete with broadcasters without having to satisfy the same
regulatory requirements. Consequently, broadcasters turned to Congress for relief
Eventually, the characteristics of a rapidly emerging and developing technology and
the lack of an existing regulatory structure steered the parties with interests on both sides of
the issue to seek a national policy. As is typical for cases where the regulatory bodies are
inconsistent and the courts fail to establish precedent, interests turned to Congress for a
resolution. But the lack of an existing policy structure proved problematic for Congress in
dealing with the issue. As we have seen, the operations of the cable television medium did
not fit at all well into the two existing regulatory structures for common carriers and
broadcasters. The earliest attempt to legislate a national policy for cable TV was in 1958,
when a few members of the Senate from western states tried to establish a regulatory
framework but were defeated. The leadership of the NCTA at that time willingly supported
federal regulation of CATV. Its motive was to centralize regulatory authority at the federal
level and avoid the variations and complications of state and local regulations that were
expanding with each passing year. However, the supporters from the broadcast and cable
industry groups who advocated federal intervention could not persuade the rest of the
members from their own organizations to accept their positions. They represented only
small but vocal portions of their respective industries. The western senators who developed
the legislation to address a problem unique to rural western areas were a minority in the
Senate and could not garner the necessary votes without the full support of either the NAB
or the NCTA. When the first cable bill failed it was not so much from opposition as from
lack of interest among senators whose constituents had no interest in the question. The
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rejection of that first legislative attempt was because ofthe collapse ofa compromise among
a minority ofinterests rather than a victory for, or defeat of, any particular faction. It should
be noted that it was the larger cable companies and the broadcast networks that formulated
the first legislation. Both would be considered "powerful industry interest" groups in the
view of elitist group interest theory.
The next notable attempt at formulating a policy occurred almost a decade later, in
1966. The House ofRepresentatives held hearings that resulted in a bill to extend the FCC's
statutory authority to include CATV. During that time, the FCC also began to review and
approve cable TV franchise agreements as they were granted or renewed by local
governments. The Commission attempted to extrapolate its authority over CATV from the
1 934 Act in a piece-meal fashion as a reaction to its lack of explicit statutory authority to
regulate cable television. This was the prevailing approach until a very important decision
by the Supreme Court in 1968. In that case, the Commission's regulation of cable television
was affirmed in United States v. Southwestern Cable, when it upheld the authority of the
FCC to impose restrictions on the number of distant signals a cable television system could
import and make available to its subscribers. 672 The Court held that the Commission had
jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1934 to promulgate such regulations, but the
Court warned that the Commission's authority was limited to areas reasonably ancillary to
discharging responsibilities for regulating television broadcasting.
Another decade passed before the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, in March 1977, held that neither the Communications Act nor the First Amendment
authorized the FCC to promulgate restrictions on program availability to Cable TV
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operators. 673 The FCC, the NAB and ABC appealed this ruling. But the Supreme Court
refused to hear their arguments and in October, 1977 left standing the appellate court
decision that the FCC lacked the authority to restrict the programs offered by cable television
stations. The industry was again without any national policy.
In 1979, requirements for cable operators to provide access to their channel capacity
by other programming entities again brought the issue of the FCC' s authority regarding
cable before the U. S. Supreme Court in a second case involving Midwest Video. This time
the Court ruled that access requirements that could not be imposed on broadcasters could not
be imposed on cable systems either. But most importantly was the statement by the Court
that, "The Commission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may
not impose such obligation on television broadcasters. We think the authority to compel
cable operators to provide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must come
specifically from Congress. " 674
Some of the basic problems that faced congressional policy makers included: Should
the industry be regulated at all at a time when the trend in national policies was toward
deregulation of industries so they could compete in open markets. Another problem was
how to generate a policy structure for an industry where none existed before? If the industry
is to be regulated, what should that look like? Should it be applied at the federal level, the
state or local government levels?
The question of whether regulation was even necessary had been raised as early as
the mid-1 970s when President Gerald Ford's Domestic Council Review Group on
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Regulatory Reform (DCRG) in March 1976 concluded that "rules on signal use over the
cable should in good part be eliminated. " 675 This conclusion was part of the general
deregulatory trend during the late 1970s. Historically, however, when important industries
are involved and when their development and operations are seen to be impeded by state and
local regulations or no regulation at all, the answer to the question about the need for
national policy usually has been yes. Examples of this include industries such as railroads,
motor carriers, airlines, banking, securities and broadcasting. In the case of cable TV, early
regulatory attempts by states proved difficult and were by their nature inconsistent across
the nation. It was difficult simply because in general, their regulatory experience was in
controlling large corporations providing electric power and common carrier communication
services. On the other hand, local government control over cable TV was based on the
authority to grant franchises for the use of local streets and rights-of-way as well as access
to poles to attach the cables. As cable regulation developed in its early years, franchise
agreements became very creative. Cable companies tended to bid for exclusive franchises
by offering increasingly greater services and in-kind perquisites to communities. These
offers in many cases failed to materialize. This in tum raised complaints about unfulfilled
promises by cable operators. Simultaneously, members of Congress were sensitive to the
desires of their constituents in the form of local elected officials who had become somewhat
dependent on the revenue generated by local franchise agreements with cable operators.
Most wanted no change, or at best, to preserve the franchise arrangements as part of any
newly developed policy. Clearly, a cohesive and comprehensive national policy was needed.
At the suggestion of the courts and initiatives by cable TV industry interest seeking
consistency, Congress sought to establish that national policy.
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Once it was clear that a national policy was needed, the next question to address was
the form it should take. The answer was influenced by prior deregulation efforts by
Congress. However, the debate over cable television that occurred in the 1980s differed
from other debates over deregulation that started in the mid-1970s. The conventional view
of deregulation as a policy alternative had involved economic arenas that were marked by
long standing relationships within "subgovemments" comprised of legislators, regulating
bodies and the regulated industry. Some notable areas include trucking, airlines and banking
services. Many differences existed in the case of cable television. One was that the
deregulation of the 1970s occurred for industries that were seen as affecting the general
economy through non-competitive pricing structures and exclusionary practices sanctioned
by the agencies charged with regulating them. The result, in the eyes of critics, was that
customers and interstate commerce were burdened by long-standing relationships between
the involved industries and the agencies responsible for regulating them. The prevalence of
these kinds of arrangements in economic regulations were generally believed in the 1970s
to produce negative impacts on the national economy. Cable TV differed in two ways. One,
there was no "cozy'' relationship with a regulatory agency. The other was that the initiative
to regulate cable TV did not come as a result of its pricing structures or any exclusionary
practices. It came from the industry itself to gain relief from the widely varied application
of franchise agreements.
Until the Cable Act of 1 984, there existed no true national policy on cable television.
The FCC had established various regulations through rulemaking and courts had reviewed
them, supporting some and rejecting others. Cities were an immediate regulatory presence
for increasingly larger cable enterprises who argued the need for policy that allowed the
industry to grow effectively and efficiently without the kinds of regulations that prevented
them from competing with the broadcast industry in a fair and equitable manner.
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So, in 1984 Congress determined that a national policy was required. The policy
established was, in essence, a policy to reduce what was seen to be burdensome local
regulation. While it was called deregulation, it established a regulatory framework at the
national level that allowed greater growth and technological development for the industry
and severely restricted the force ofregulation by local governments. Conversely, in the 1992
policy revision, this approach was changed to a system of tighter regulatory authority to be
exercised nationally by the FCC.
The distinguishing features of a rapid and continually developing technology in
combination with unique regulatory aspects clearly justify the study of cable television
deregulation and regulation as worthwhile cases to examine. Now we will discuss how the
essential features of the politics of cable regulation fit into the existing literature on interest
groups.

Essential Features of the Politics of Cable Regulation
Another purpose of this study has been to compare the insights and observations
drawn from these case analyses with the literature reviewed. This is accomplished by
comparing the activities of interests against the framework of a number of interest group
theories. The first observation is that the cases discussed are varied in their particulars and
in the perspectives set against the interest group literature. A second is that the literature on
group interests does not distinguish between emergent and mature policy regimes. In the
case of cable television, there was no mature system in place. The situation of interest
groups -- in many ways, powerful interests -- competing to establish policy regimes is
fundamental to this study. A third observation is that a critical variable at the heart of
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dispute over cable television policy is not well treated in the literature. That variable is
technological change and its effects. In general, the question then is, how does the cable
case fit with the literature?
Starting with basic areas of interest group literature, one would ask, do the efforts to
deregulate and then reregulate the cable TV industry fit better into the pluralist, or the closed
elitist model of interest group politics? David B. Truman believed pluralism was a
characteristic feature of the governmental system in the United States in that its
decentralized nature contains a multiplicity of independent centers of power and vantage
points to secure access to the national government. 676 For Truman, the success of groups in
gaining access to governmental institutions comes as a result of interactions among complex
factors which he places into three categories: (1) factors related to the strategic position of
the group in society; (2) factors related to internal characteristics of the group; and (3)
factors that are particular to the governmental institution that is the target of access by the
group. 677 This view of pluralism is furthered by the writings of Robert A. Dahl in his
conclusions that through bargaining and compromise among groups and politicians, public
policy decisions are made without any single group always being dominant. Pluralistic
politics typically result in decisions that involve limited, acceptable degrees of change in
small increments, or incrementalism. 678 What we have seen in this study is the presence of
multiple access points and multiple interest groups bargaining to reach compromises in the
fashion of an open system, without any one group interest dominating the agenda. In the
cases of the cable industry and cities in 1984 and again with the cable industry versus
broadcasters in 1 992, this framework served to limited the policy debates to those that
676

Truman, 507.

677

Ibid, 506.

678

Dahl,

Who Governs.

292
multiple factions could accept rather than result in wholesale loss of policy positions by
main interest groups or one of the competing interests gaining all advantages sought. A
dominant interest would not have to negotiate multiple times to continually reach consensus
agreements.
In the cases addressed in this study, pluralistic characteristics were manifest in the
propensity to negotiate compromises on legislative issues. In the 1980s, as the issues
became more contentious between the main antagonists of cable TV operators and local
governments, congressional leaders encouraged the two sides to negotiate. The objective
was to establish legislative language that they could both live with through a consensus
compromise. After several iterations of compromise agreements, S. 66 passed the Senate
on June 13, 1983 .
Antithetical to pluralism is the elitist model of group interest theory. This model is
based on powerful interest groups interacting with government institutions in a manner
similar to the "capture of government. "679 The cable TV industry's experience in the
regulatory struggles reveal anything but a "capture of government," especially during the
reregulation efforts of the early 1990s. Indeed, none of the interests involved in the
deregulation of 1984 nor reregulation of 1 992 could be found guilty of capturing the
policymaking process.
Another variation on capture theory is Emmette Redford's "subsystems" discussed
in Chapter I. His three defining aspects of regulatory subsystems are first, they serve to
provide stability and equilibrium in a particular policy area. Second, they provide access and
representation for non-dominant interests, but third, they also prevent substantial changes
679
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in the equilibrium of interests. Jeffrey Berry extends this definition of subsystems to include
interest other than those directly regulated. His subgovernment models lead to or give the
appearance of closed systems which limit access to participate in policymaking efforts.
This was not the case in considering policy for the cable TV industry. The experience seems
quite open to participation for any who were interested. Additional interests that participated
other than the cable industry, cities and broadcasters included consumer interest groups,
newly developing competing technologies, and interests supporting public, educational, and
government access to cable systems for local PEG programming.
Let us now examine how the cable TV cases fit with regulatory politics schemes of
Theodore Lowi, Randal Ripley and Grace Franklin. As presented in Chapter I, Lowi' s
category of"regulatory policies" are characterized by decisions that directly raise costs and
reduce or expand alternatives of private individuals. These policies are distinguishable from
the "distributive types" in that they involve direct choices as to who will be a loser and who
a winner. Lowi' s regulatory policy area involves participation of a multitude of groups that
interact in conflictual interplay so that policy tends to be a residue of the compromises
formed to accommodate coalitions seeking preferred policy outcome. This arena is best
described by the pluralistic model. Similarly, Ripley and Franklin define "competitive"
regulatory policy as involving competition between prospective deliverers of goods or
services for the right to deliver them by winning the competition for the right as it is held by
a government regulatory agency. Ripley and Franklin state that the policies in the
competitive subarena are typically routine and very protective of well established interests
represented therein.
These categorical policy areas described by Lowi and Ripley and Franklin, also fit
reasonably well with the cable television cases which concerned competitive subarenas of
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the telecommunications arena. Multiple interests were involved in an open process, and the
outcome was the result of negotiations between the main interests. In the context of choices
made in legislation, on the major points of dispute there were winners and losers but, as
noted previously there was no winner take all.
Another perspective to consider is issue networks. Hugh Hecla defines an issue
network as "a shared knowledge group" that ties together large numbers of participants with
common technical expertise. They are made up of technical specialists, journalists,
administrators and political entrepreneurs working out of varied institutional settings. Issue
networks are characterized by sloppy and ill defined organizational boundaries; participants
move in and out easily. Issue areas overlap; as an issue develops, new coalitions form in
response. Networks are distinctive in terms of their large size and accessibility to new
participants. They tend to be shaped in two ways: (1) a central grouping involved in .a wide
range of issues such as when trade associations act as brokers of information or provide lines
of communication on an issue; or (2) clusters of individual groups that share common
interests and concerns and form coalitions. Issue networks can be highly conflictual when
diverse viewpoints are represented. Another distinction is that they lack the stability of
subgovernments.
For Thomas A. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker issue network systems
are fluid, shifting, conflictual, and characterized by multiple access points for organized
interests. 680 Authority is fleeting. The "insiders" of legendary iron triangles would not be
familiar with the rapid formation and mobilization of the new coalitions that are constantly
emerging and dissolving. The authors believe most important changes in the 1980s in public
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policy were fashioned within issue networks. They also contend that one of the most
important causes of this change is the rapid expansion in the number and variety of interests
that have achieved formal representation in the American system. In addition, as the range
ofissues have increased, single subgovernments have gradually lost the capability to manage
the issues. Mass media gets involved with distributing information about the policy
questions and who is involved. More citizens are motivated to make their preferences known
to their elected representatives and the widening of the participation in the conflict includes
outsiders of the policy area.
Many but not all characteristics of an issue network were evident in the cases
presented in this study. The issues involved in cable regulation were highly conflictual,
which in tum enticed Congress to consider negotiated resolutions among the major factions
within a telecommunications issue network. As described by Jim Mooney of the NCTA,
"If there is going to be a bill, and both sides are willing to sit down at the table, most
frequently Congress will allow -- within reasonable limits -- the rival commercial interests
to work out a solution. That was something that was pretty much done between the two
industries"681 in 1 992. The tendency for Congress to take this approach was a strong one,
"especially in matters which are basically regulatory statutes. And which involve highly
technical areas of the law. Which are to a very significant degree, battles between rival
commercial interests. "682
In the case of deregulation in 1984, there was a shared knowledge group, with large
numbers of participants having common technical expertise. When the reregulation effort
began, it can be argued, that there existed a more visible network of technical specialists,
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journalists, administrators and political entrepreneurs working out of varied institutional
settings. In the deregulation case, the issue network involved murky organizational
boundaries; with participants moving in and out easily. With reregulation, there seemed to
be more structured stability. Related to this, the congressional component appeared to be
stronger as a result of several years of experience with cable issues.
In this connection and among those involved, policy ideas also played an important
role in the development of national policy for the cable TV regulation. John Kingdon
characterizes ideas as tools of policy entrepreneurs who are members of a community or
network of specialists in a particular policy area. They are researchers, staffers, bureaucrats,
academics, lobbyists, and legislators. Ideas as solutions to policy problems emerge in such
communities. He discusses the aspect of "ideas" as goals or motivations in the sense of
rational-choice theory other than the classic, more narrowly focused self-interested quests.
He argues that "argumentation, persuasion, the construction of effective appeals, and the
evocation of values and ideology seem as important as interest group pressure, reelection,
career advantage, and the pursuit of power'' in the motivation of political behavior. 683
Senator Tim Wirth is an example of a policy entrepreneur who cultivated a particular
idea to solve a policy problem. He clearly supported the cable industry throughout the
process. His former aide, David Aylward, recalled that he had a public interest goal in
promoting the idea of diversity of programming. "Wirth had in his head that the goal was
not to regulate networks; it was to create alternatives to networks. " 684 In the mass media
area, he focused on the issue of television violence. He was concerned about what violence
on TV was doing to children. It became apparent to Wirth that attempts to regulate content
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were a waste of energy. Eventually his idea about the amount of violence on TV was
matched with the idea of developing an alternative new industry in cable television. Wirth's
strategy was to get as many channels as he possibly could. It was not to defend the NAB; nor
to develop new revenue sources for the cities; it was to remove barriers to the commercial
entity investing in the capacity, which then will create the opportunity for programming and
then somebody will fill the programming and if they can charge money for that, that will
create more programming.
Another prominent example of a member of Congress as a policy entrepreneur was
Senator Al Gore. After election to the Senate, he decided to become a champion for satellite
dish users who were predominately rural residents, a major part of his Tennessee
constituency. Satellite dish manufacturers as well as distributors wanted legislation to force
favorable distribution agreements with the cable programmers. Mooney characterized Gore
as an astute politician who realized that the "degree that other groups of people who had a
bone to pick with cable could be united under one broad measure to punish the cable
industry for its various sins, that there would be a greater chance of something happening
to relieve the particular interest group he was concerned about which was the backyard dish
people." 685 This was a populist position which meshed well with partisan Democratic
politics.

The Part Played by Partisan Politics

Partisanship joined with ideas was important in Congress' actions in setting cable
policy. Generally, the partisan dimension of cable issues was shown in the political
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philosophies of many Democrats who were in favor of regulation and Republicans who
generally favored deregulation. More specifically, it is noteworthy that in 1984, Republicans
controlled the Senate, and in 1992, the Democrats were in the majority. However, at the end
of the process in both 1984 and 1992, partisan lines were not sharply drawn. Votes in 1984
were divided more along regional lines and perceptions of constituency interests. In 1992,
the bipartisan outcome was the result of proponents of reregulation successfully
characterizing the bill as a consumer protection measure at a time very close to a national
election. Actually, most partisan phases in the evolution of policy were at times when bills
were introduced to either deregulate or reregulate the industry. Over time, as differences
were worked out, extreme positions were moderated.
Opinions on the influence or degree of partisanship overall, varied. Former Senator
Packwood recalled little partisanship. To his recollection it only existed to the extent that
Democrats are generally for regulation and Republicans are against it. As an example of
bipartisan acts, he recounted that, "Tim Wirth and I in 1990 filibustered against legislation
that year. And he was a Democrat. In 1992, I found a bunch more partisan things although,
in the end, McCain and I were the only ones who voted against it. "686
From a staff perspective, Ward White described communications legislation as
generally not partisan. Similarly, Tom Wheeler, from a cable perspective, agreed that
telecommunications legislation is, traditionally, not a partisan issue. From the perspective
of the cities, Cynthia Pols believed it was non-partisan. "Many times we got lots of help
from Republicans as well as Democrats. Senators Gorton and Goldwater, were very helpful.
Often times Democrats were very unhelpful. "687
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Jim Mooney, a representative of cable interests, viewed the reregulation process as
partisan during the formulation stage, particularly in the House Energy and Commerce
Committee where the Republicans were tal<lng a strong ideological stand against regulation,
per se. But in the end, considering how the votes were actually cast on the floor in both
bodies, as well as in the Senate Commerce committee, this issue wasn't all that partisan. If
it was all that partisan, Bush's veto would have been upheld. However, Roy Neel, a Gore
aide at the time, recalled reregulation as being partisan. Democrats were generally for it and
Republicans were generally against it. But there were anomalies in that. "You had
Democrats, such as Tim Wirth, who opposed this and worked hard to kill it. He represented
major cable interests in Colorado. "688 Conversely, there were Republicans on the other side,
like Representative Chris Shays of Connecticut who was a supporter of reregulation. The
outcome, however, was obviously bipartisan because Congress overrode the veto.
But for Neel, reregulation was really more a matter of constituencies. If you
represented Denver where TCI, a major cable firm, was headquartered, as did Wirth, you
were going to be pretty violently opposed to it. He also recalled that another member who
was a strong advocate for reregulation was Senator Danforth from Missouri, who was the
ranking Republican on the Senate Commerce Committee. "We probably worked as closely
with Danforth as we did with Hollings. He and his staff helped write the bill. "689
The NAB' s Jack Goodman's recollections of Senate Commerce Committee
policymaking reinforce Neel's view. The leadership there acted in a very bipartisan fashion.
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Democratic senators Inouye and Hollings and Danforth, who was the ranking member of the
subcommittee, all worked together very closely. 690
As noted previously, another important political aspect was the significance of
changes in the control of the House and Senate between deregulation and reregulation. The
Republican control of the Senate beginning in 198 1 helped bring deregulation to the policy
agenda and eventually enactment. However, when control changed to Democrats in 1 989,
a high degree of interest developed in reregulating the cable industry. Arguably, the cable
industry failed to cope with the importance of this majority party change in the Senate and
what that meant in terms of regulatory policy preferences.
In the end, policy was produced out ofthe interaction of group interests, ideas about
policy, and the activities of policy makers, especially the key congressional actors,
responding to the partisan aspects of the issue and their own political interests in ways that
are extraordinarily difficult to sort out. The policy struggle culminating in the 1992 Act, was
fought over defining the core issue. Advocates for stronger regulatory policies were
successful in defining the issue as a consumer protection function and were willing to
support the policy needs of cable's main competition in exchange for their support in
framing the issue as protecting American consumers. Conversely, interests that supported
policies directed at creating more competition were unsuccessful in making their case to
allow free-market approaches to control any long-standing dominance by any individual
industry or technology. Advocates ofthis approach envisioned free competition that would
allow new technologies to develop, flourish, and replace older technologies. These in turn
would be replaced by even newer technologies.
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Summing Up
What can be said about the relative success of the various interests involved in the
struggle over cable policy? One point is that all of the interests, except perhaps for the cities,
although they eventually came around, won in the advocacy of a national regulatory system,
a set of rules founded in national authority and administered by a national agency.
Overall, despite the 1992 set back, the cable industry was advantaged. A central
factor was congressional appreciation of the power and potential of the technology and
preference for dealing with the negative effects on other interests without impairing its future
development.
Cable ' s prevalence over the cities in 1984 was key and not to be undone. The
industry flourished under this policy. That policy was created because they had many
sympathetic ears in Congress that viewed its technology in favorable light, though
previously restricted by cumbersome and awkward restraints.
In 1992, to be sure, there were set backs. Those who wished to compete with the
cable industry, such as the satellite broadcast industry, for one, and the wireless cable
industry, for another, benefitted from the program access provisions of the 1992 law.
Broadcasters won the ability to charge for their programming that was retransmitted over
cable systems, which became a financial boon for them. While many of the restrictions
consumer interests wanted placed on cable TV were enacted, many other provisions they
lobbied for were ignored.
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On the other side, municipal interests were no more successful in 1992 than they
were in 1984. Just as important, what cable won in the overall struggle, including 1992, was
to not have to compete with the powerful telephone companies. Perhaps most important of
all, despite increased regulation, including more restrictive criteria for effective competition
to be free of rate regulations, it retained the ability to attract the investment needed to
continue to develop the technology and grow as a business. A decade after 1 992, our own
viewing habits attest to the viability of a developing technology that was moderately
restrained, but not impeded in any fundamental sense by the legislation enacted in 1984 and,
especially, in 1992.
Because technological advances in the telecommunications field occur so rapidly,
it could, in theory, be totally deregulated to allow free-market competition to sort-out
survivors. However, because of the pervasiveness of the communications sector and the
level of dependence on telecommunications in today's society, this would play havoc with
the nation' s economy. The strongest survivors would become monopolies, even if only
temporarily. However, this outcome is mitigated by the deliberative policymaking process
in Congress and the influence of pluralist politics with its associated incrementalist
characteristics. In a balancing act, these two influences mitigate against both the rise of
monopolies and the undermining of the telecommunications sector of the economy by
protecting emerging companies, their employees, equipment suppliers, and investors.
The conclusion of this study is that establishing regulatory policy for
telecommunications in America is more of a process than a terminal objective. It is fluid and
must always remain flexible to accommodate enhancements of the technology which occur
so rapidly that demands for new policy create almost constant pressure for new decisions.
In the telecommunications arena, the policy-making question is how to prevent dominant
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levels of economic power from accumulating in monopolies or oligopolies while still
allowing adequate access for emerging new technologies to develop, compete, and
ultimately supplant "older'' technologies. The pluralist model of interest participation
appears the best suited to answer this question. To accomplish this, the institutional
components of the American policy-making structure, including the legislative process and
administrative rule-making, tend to navigate toward a neutral course. Along the way, course
corrections are provided by the review of laws and rules in the courts as demands by
interests raise new policy issues. Singularly important course corrections or some threshold
number of lesser corrections bring the policy-making process to a new decision point.
Thus, the policy-making process for cable television becomes analogous to a journey.
In this analogy, legislative policy decisions are more like crossroads than destinations. If,
in turn, one views policy itself as a vehicle, it can be examined as it arrives at a crossroad,
chooses the path for the next leg of the journey, and then passes through the crossroads
(policy decision) to move in a new direction. As the policy-vehicle pauses at the decision
crossroad, it takes on new passengers in the form of competitors and emerging interests as
these opportunities occur. The journey then proceeds anew through administrative rule
making, court challenges, business mergers, and then new demands for correcting the policy
course. Each new demand for course corrections represent yet another crossroad in the
continuing policymaking journey.
That the journey continues for telecommunications policymaking will be evident in
the Epilogue to follow.
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CHAPTER VII
EPILOGUE

After the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
became law, it met immediate resistance in its implementation.
challenged the constitutionality of some provisions.

Suits were filed that

Some of the new regulations

promulgated by the FCC were also challenged in the courts, and others caused unintended
economic harm to the ability of the industry to expand and develop its operations. Just four
years after the 1992 Act became law, Congress completely rewrote policy for
telecommunications when it replaced the obsolete Communications Act of 193 4 with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Since then, emerging new technologies continue to
develop and challenge the nation' s regulatory policy on telecommunications .

Implementation of the 1992 Act

After enactment, implementation of the policy changes in the 1992 Act proved
problematic. Language in the 1992 Act mandated that the FCC set rates for cable TV based
on what would have been produced by competition. The ambiguity of that language made
the FCC's job difficult which lead to prolonged rule making. As the FCC approached
deadlines on setting rates it implemented a price freeze for cable operations subject to

305
regulation under the 1992 Act. 69 1 These initial rules on cable prices had two effects: one, no
cable company lost revenue, and two, one-third of the country's cable consumers had their
prices raised.

692

In late 1 993 , the FCC developed a complex formula to set prices equitably. When
the FCC issued new rules based on the formula, it reduced rates that cable operators charged
subscribers, which in tum caused an investment crisis for the cable industry. Such rate
control frightened away investments needed to expand and upgrade operations. Thus, rate
regulation reduced the cable industry's cash flow, lowering its attractiveness for investors. 693
This in turn effected cable TV programmers who could not get their programs carried on
cable systems because rate cuts caused operators to cut back on their plans to expand the
number of channels provided. Thus market values of cable operations were lowered at a
time when the businesses needed to raise money to compete with telephone companies.
Cable operators challenged the rate rules in the courts. Then a year after the price freezes
were instituted, the FCC approved conditional price increases for those cable operators who
were willing to add six or more new channels to their service. This conditional arrangement
was not satisfactory to anyone. Subscribers viewed the changes as cable operators simply
raising their prices once again. Cable operators, on the other hand, were concerned about
the uncertainty for revenues under arrangements of conditional rate increases. In addition,
telephone companies continued to pursue the authority to enter cable markets through FCC
rule m�ng rather than legislation. 694
Dick W. Olufs, III, The Making of Telecommunications Policy, (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), 67.
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When William J. Clinton became President in January 1993, he brought a new
perspective to telecommunications issues. To encourage the industries to rebuild their
networks and compete with each other, his administration sought to permit the cable
companies to compete in the telephone business, and the telephone companies to sell video.
The Clinton administration also brought with it an interest in an "information revolution"
soon to be known by the catch phrase "information superhighway. " The rapid development
of new technologies to support the revolution carried consequences for the established major
telecommunications companies. In order to compete in a rapidly changing technological
environment, cable companies wanted to offer local telephone service, but they wanted
protection from direct competition with the economically powerful regional bell operating
companies (RBOC). They sought FCC rules to control the degree of competition that would
have to exist before telephone companies could compete. 695 They also wanted an end to
regulation of their rates. What worried the cable industry most was concerns about the
possibility of being treated as "common carriers" and having to provide access to
competitors if they were allowed to compete with telephone companies.

These

circumstances produced pressures for new regulatory legislation from Congress. During the
1 03 rd Congress, bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House that were aimed at
allowing telephone companies to compete in the cable market. H.R. 3 63 6 enabled telephone
companies to provide cable service as long as they allowed competing telephone and video
services to use their lines. S. 1 822 allowed regional bell companies to compete in long
distance markets as soon as they could demonstrate they had actual and demonstrated
competition. However, no new telecommunications legislation was enacted in the 1 03 rd
Congress.
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Another development which eroded the policy established by the 1992 Act was the
court decision on the suit filed immediately after enactment. As soon as the 1992 law went
into effect, Turner Broadcasting System and Daniels Cablevision Inc., two of the most
prominent cable programmers and large system operators, filed suit against the new law.
They claimed that the law's requirements to carry broadcast programs infringed upon their
First Amendment rights. 696 On June 27, 1994 the Supreme Court agreed with the cable
operators. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,
the Court decided 5-4 to remand the case to the federal District Court for the District of
Columbia, finding that federal regulators needed to do a better job justifying their
requirements on which programs cable operators must carry. Cable operators argued that
the law' s mandate to carry local stations infringed on their free speech since they had to
displace their own programming to make room for local stations. In its remand, the majority
expressed the need for effected local broadcasters to provide more direct evidence of their
harm if their programs were not carried on cable systems instead of just a presumption that
not being carried would cause irreparable harm. It's interesting that the minority opinion
was to strike the must-carry provision entirely as unconstitutional rather than to remand.
Evidently, none of the justices believed the provisions in the law should be supported as
written. Clearly, the Court felt that cable operators deserved more constitutional protections.
In allowing cable operators more protection against government intrusion on First

Amendment freedoms than broadcasters enjoyed, the Court made an important distinction
between the two technologies.697 Once again, a cycle of court challenges, passing laws, and
writing rules was initiated.
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In the election of November 1994, Republicans were elected to a majority in both
houses of Congress. Two new Republican chairmen for both the House and Senate
Commerce Committees wasted little time in announcing they would consider new legislation
to deregulate telecommunications, including cable television. On March 3 0, 1995, Senator
Larry Pressler, as chairman of the Commerce Committee, introduced S. 652 to deregulate
cable television so it could raise the necessary capital to compete with telephone companies
in the new service arenas. A similar bill, H.R. 1555 was introduced on May 3 , 1995. The
Senate bill passed on June 15, 81- 18. The House bill passed their version on July 14, by
voice vote, but amended the bill to replace it with H.R. 15 15. This caused a long and
protracted conference to take place with both sides finally reaching agreement on December
12, 1995 . This was also during the time when the Republican Congress had a face off with
the Democratic White House over the budget and the government was actually shut down
for a time. Finally, the conference bill was passed by the House on February 1, 1996, 4 1416. The Senate passed the bill 91-5 that same day.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996

On February 8, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (P.L. 104- 104) was
signed into law by President Clinton. The intent of the act was to again "promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies. "698 In that bill, existing rules restricting concentration of
ownership by media companies were essentially eliminated. Among other deregulatory
698

Legislative History ofP.L. 104-104, Telecommunications Act of 1996.
(Washington, D. C. , Congressional Information Service, Inc.) 1996. 1.

309
provisions, cable television regulations were relaxed three years after enactment. It also
allowed telephone companies to enter the cable TV business. 699 The act contained provisions
to establish numerous procedures to promote competition in telecommunications markets.
Title Ill of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 dealt with cable television services.
State and local governments could not act in a way that limits the ability of a company to
enter any market. Rate regulations were to disappear in three years, except for the basic
services, which means airwave broadcasts and educational and public-access channels.
Telephone companies were allowed to enter cable television businesses, but their video
transmissions were subject to telecommunications regulation, and their video programming
was to be subject to the same regulation as cable companies. Companies could offer "open"
video programming (the notion of a video dial tone, where customers can dial what they
want and not just flip through the package offered by one company). Small cable companies
were freed from many regulations, as were companies that face real competition. 700
After telephone and cable industries were subjected to open competition by the 1996
Act, FCC Chairman William Kennard predicted a boom for consumers.

Telephone

companies would carry TV shows and cable would provide voice services. The result would
be more channels and lower prices.701
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New Technologies, New Interest Representation

One result of the deregulation of cable television and the telephone industry was the
AT&T acquisition of TCI. In this merger, the largest long-distance telephone company
acquired the nation's largest cable company. 702 AT&T had found a way to bypass regional
and local telephone companies in its quest to provide direct long distance service through
the potential for using existing broad band cable connections. But by the beginning of 1999,
the growth of the internet and the development of higher capacity computer hardware also
brought new pressures from group interests on the issue of access to the high-speed
capabilities of cable' s broad-band system. As a result, the cable TV industry found itself
targeted also by companies who provided internet services principally over phone lines and
manufacturers of computer chips that were capable of ever faster data transmission speeds.
Because of the explosive development of digital technology, the traditional use of copper
telephone circuits to homes and business locations (known as the last mile) were too slow
to capitalize on the potential for speedy transmission of data. However, cable' s broad-band
circuits were capable of carrying the amounts of information that matched the speeds of the
new computer hardware.
Group interests representing internet service providers began to campaign for
changes to telecommunications policy to allow their access to cable's network. In January
1 999, America Online (AOL), began a lobbying campaign to gain access to the broadband
network that was under the control of the cable TV industry. They wanted Congress and
regulators to "require that cable TV lines to be opened to all competitors seeking to provide
702
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high-speed Internet service via their broad-band technology'' 703 The lobbyists for AOL and
a coalition of other internet providers and long-distance telephone companies also
approached municipal regulators to impose open access requirements on cable providers.
They were only successful in Portland, Oregon in getting such requirements adopted. They
targeted AT&T as it pursued its acquisition ofTCI. In tum, AT&T sued in federal court to
have the requirements ruled illegal. 704 The NCTA opposed the approach because it would
create a dangerous policy. It believed "Either your have a view that the online marketplace
is competitive and emerging, and that the government should stay out, or you have a view
that government should come in. "705
On this issue, Congress was reluctant to interfere with the internet, but was also
concerned about the tendencies of cable operators to operate as monopolies. The Chairman
of the FCC was empathic to the idea of open access to cable broad-band circuits, but some
commissioners questioned the authority ofthe FCC in this area. On the other hand, the pent
up anger of cities was evident by the growing interest of municipal regulators in supporting
the open-access approach to promote effective competition.
In 2000, another approach was undertaken by an internet provider to gain access to
cable TV broad-band systems. Internet Ventures Inc. petitioned the FCC to allow it access
to a cable system in Washington state. Internet Ventures used provisions in the 1 996 Act
that required cable operators with 3 6 or more channels to set aside space for commercial use
by third parties. The FCC ruled that the section of the law did not pertain to varieties of
Brian Gruley, "AOL Leads Lobbying Campaign to Gain Access to 'Broad
Band' Cable TV lines for the Internet," Wall Street Journal, January 26, 1 999.
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services but was limited to video programming. 706 This ruling was favorable to the cable
industry as the FCC avoided forcing cable companies to share their high-speed lines with
competitors, believing it was premature for government to regulate the industry.
By 200 1 , rulings in federal courts generally favored the cable TV industry. On
March 2, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled to invalidate limits on how
many channels cable operators can fill with programming in which they have a financial
interest (vertical integration). They also threw out government rules restricting the number
of subscribers a cable operator could serve. 707 The court concluded the FCC could not
support its reasoning for the restrictions. Cable operators argued the restrictions infringed
on their First Amendment rights by restricting them from speaking to as large an audience
as possible. This ruling was also favorable for AT&T, already the largest cable operator due
to its acquisition of TCI, as it pursued a merger with MediaOne. Without the court's ruling,
AT&T would have been in violation of the rules. 708

Internet Access as the Dominant Issue

At the tum of the century, "access" became the dominant issue in
telecommunications policy. Rules created as a result of the 1996 Act required companies
to share their systems with others. "The goal was to stop monopolies, but what regulation
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did was to bar. . . investment by privatizing the risk and socializing the rewards."709 These
open access rules were used first to restrict telephone companies, but had been extended to
cable operators. One solution to the gaining access to local broad band capacity was to buy
existing cable operations. One example occurred at the end of 200 1 when AT&T announced
a merger with the Comcast Corporation cable company. If successful, it would become the
largest cable operator in the nation. As a result, the three companies of AT&T Comcast,
AOL Time-Warner, and Charter Communications would control sixty-five percent of the
nation's cable market. The cable industry that was "once a hodge-podge of family-owned
companies has become one of the nation's most visible and profitable oligopolies, as smaller
operators are unable to cope with the rising costs of the business. "7 10
Also in 200 1, the RBOCs again tried the legislative route to change regulatory
policy. At mid-year, the House Energy and Commerce Committee passed a bill, supported
by representatives Tauzin and Dingell, to allow the Bell companies to carry internet traffic
without having to first meet strict government requirements that they open their local phone
markets to competition. 711 The requirement for allowing competitors to compete in their
markets by using their equipment. The Bells argue this was a disincentive for them to invest
the capital necessary to upgrade their systems if their competitors would immediately gain
benefit from the upgrades before the Bell companies could recoup their investments. The
new bill provided a way around those requirements and eliminated the disincentive for
capital investment. However, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain did not
support any loosening of regulations for regional and local telephone companies.
George Gilder, "Tumbling Into the Telechasm," Wall Street Journal,
August 6, 2001.
709
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Kalpana Srinivasan, "McCain wary oflooser rules on phone firms,"
Knoxville News-Sentinel, May 1 1, 200 1 .
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The most recent technological advance in the telecommunications area involves
satellite based television and digital services. In February 2002, the nations two largest
satellite dish companies proposed a merger to offer their services across the nation. The
services offered would provide a viable nation-wide competitor to the cable industry. It
would also further a technology that could provide both television programming and wireless
internet access to the nations most remote rural areas. In their effort to generate approval
of the merger, the two companies have promised uniformed pricing of their services as a
solution to uncertain and varying cable rates in different local jurisdictions.712
In summation, since enactment of the 1996 Act, intended to regulate cable rates and
protect consumers, cable prices have risen 3 1 . 9 percent, with most Americans still having
a single cable provider to choose from. Local phone rates, still regulated under the act, have
risen 12. 1 percent. On the other hand, long-distance prices have fallen 13 . 1 percent since
1 996. 713 The emergence of new technologies is promising in its potential for offering
effective competition, but also in its activation of the policymaking cycle once again.
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